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Abstract
Individuals with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD), specifically checking 
compulsions (CC), report they check because they doubt their memory ability. 
Repeated checking, however, appears to perpetuate checking behaviour and further 
enhances uncertainty over memory ability. It is unclear if a memory deficit underlies 
CC or whether beliefs about one’s memory ability initially induce CC. Beliefs about 
one’s metamemory (specifically low memory confidence: LMC) and a high sense of 
responsibility (HR) over preventing harm have separately been associated with CC. 
However, the influence of LMC and HR together have not causally been linked to 
actual checking or memory performance as yet. Therefore the current study 
manipulated healthy participants’ {n= 61) memory confidence by providing either 
positive or negative false feedback on performance in a memory task involving 
presentation of verbal and visual items. Furthermore, high or low responsibility 
feedback was given to manipulate sense of responsibility. Performance (memory 
accuracy and response bias) and memory confidence for tasks on an actual 
recognition test were measured, in addition to checking behaviour (urge to check and 
actual checking). Results revealed that the manipulations did not affect urge to check 
but did affect memory confidence, specifically numerically enhancing actual 
checking of verbal stimuli in LMC groups. Memory accuracy was better for easier 
visual tasks but also response bias was more liberal for verbal items in LMC groups. 
The responsibility manipulation appeared to be ineffective. Thus metamemory 
beliefs may induce checking behaviour and affect memory task performance. 
Limitations of the study and the roles of task difficulty and response bias are 
discussed in relation to CC experimental investigations, but also regarding cognitive- 
behavioural formulations and treatments of OCD.
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Keywords: OCD; Checking; Confidence; Memory; Metamemory; Responsibility
Instruction Based Manipulation of Memory Confidence and Perceived Responsibility 
in a Non-clinical Sample and its Effects on Checking Behaviour and Memory Task
Performance
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is a debilitating condition 
characterised by intrusive distressing obsessional thoughts and intentional repetitive 
compulsions which can significantly disrupt everyday functioning (American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). Prevalence of OCD in the adult population of 
the UK is 1.2%, with a life time prevalence of 2.5% (NICE: National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence, 2005). OCD is a heterogeneous symptomatic condition 
with various subtypes. Checking compulsions (CC) are thought to be the 
predominant subtype with this occurring in 79% of OCD patients and 15% of the 
general population demonstrate sub-clinical CC (Ruscio, Stein, & Kessler, 2010).
Numerous models seek to explain the aetiology and perseverance of OCD. 
Cognitive models propose that it is common to experience unwanted intrusions, 
however individuals with OCD develop maladaptive beliefs and appraisals regarding 
these intrusions which then cause distress (Salkovskis, 1985). When intrusions are 
appraised as being personally relevant and unacceptable, threatening in nature, and 
accompanied by perceived responsibility to prevent harm they are thought to develop 
into obsessions (Rachman, 1997). In turn compulsions arise in an attempt to reduce 
the perceived harm and distress. Contrastingly, behavioural theories of OCD are 
based on operant conditioning and suggest that compulsive behaviours are 
maintained and strengthened owing to behaviours being negatively reinforced 
through the immediate relief of anxiety (Abramowitz, 1997). Recommended 
treatment guidelines for OCD (NICE, 2005) consider these models and suggest
behavioural therapy (BT; e.g. ERP^), with cognitive therapy (CT) as a possible 
adjunct to this, and/or the use of SSRIs. ERP was considered the most efficacious 
treatment for OCD, demonstrating significant symptom reduction after treatment 
(Abramowitz, 1997 for meta-analytic review). However, a more recent meta-analysis 
of 13 randomised control trials (Olatunji, Davis, Powers, & Smits, 2013) has 
demonstrated that CBT is as effective as ERP (g=1.84; g= 1.35 respectively), and 
pharmacotherapy (Foa, et a i, 2005). However, at follow-up relapse rates for OCD 
still remain relatively high for both ERP (Abramowitz, Franklin & Foa, 2002) and 
CBT (Olatunji, et aL, 2013). Considering the profound impact on quality of life and 
everyday functioning further research is needed to explore longer lasting treatments 
for OCD. The above studies consider treatment for combined subtypes of OCD 
rather than CC per sé. Potential new research could thus (a) consider treatment for 
subtypes rather than OCD in general because different causal mechanisms could 
underlie those subtypes and (b) investigate the role of underlying cognitive 
mechanisms and maintaining factors that could enhance OCD related behaviours. 
The aim therefore of the current study is to investigate the influence of memory 
confidence and sense of responsibility on checking behaviour in a memory task.
A memory task was chosen as CC are sometimes associated with memory 
deficits (Sher, Frost & Otto, 1983). This is because individuals with CC often report 
engaging in repeated checking as they are not sure if they carried out the checking 
action correctly (Radomsky, Ashbaugh, Gelfond and Dugas 2008). Thus there is an 
assumption that individuals with CC have a problem with their memory. There is.
 ^ In ERP (Exposure and Ritual Prevention) individuals are exposed to their fear (e.g. turning a stove 
on/off) but asked not to engage in their automatic maladaptive response (CC the stove is off).
however, mixed evidence for these deficits. Replicated findings of poor memory 
accuracy in OCD checkers in comparison to controls has been found for non-verbal 
stimuli (Martinez-Gonzalez & Piqueras-Rodriguez, 2008 for a review; Sawamura, 
Nakashima, Inoue & Kurita, 2005; Segalas et aL, 2008), threat-relevant stimuli 
(Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky, Rachman & Hammond, 2001), and in 
actual threatening circumstances (Coles, Radomsky & Homg, 2006; Radomsky, 
Dugas, Alcardo & Lavoie, 2013). Some studies also found poor memory accuracy 
for verbal stimuli in OCD compared to non-clinical samples (Salvage et aL, 2000; 
Tallis, Pratt & Jamani, 1999; Tuna, Tekon & Topuoglu, 2005) but others did not 
(Foa, Amir, Gershuny, Molnar, & Kozak, 1997; McDonald, Antony, MacLeod & 
Richter, 1997), which was the case for recall rather than recognition tasks (Woods, 
Vevea, Chambless & Bayen, 2002). These mixed findings may be due to different 
methodological designs (e.g. different recognition or recall tasks or different stimulus 
types), unmatched samples (not controlled for comorbid mental health difficulties, 
medication use etc.), small sample sizes (Woods, et a l , 2002), or the sample being 
composed of different OCD subtypes.
Notwithstanding this, more consistent evidence has been reported for 
metamemory impairments in OCD checkers. Metamemory is an individual’s 
knowledge, awareness and control over their memory, including their memory 
confidence (Lovelace, 1984). MackNally and Kohlbeck (1993) compared OCD 
checkers with non-checker OCD patients and non-checker controls on recall tasks 
and found that OCD checkers were less confident than both groups of non-checkers, 
despite no effects of memory accuracy. This finding has been repeatedly replicated 
for both recall and recognition memory tasks, suggesting that checkers lack 
confidence in their memory rather than having a memory deficit per sé (Constans,
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Foa, Franklin, & Mathews, 1995; Foa et a l, 1997; Hermans, Martens, De Cort & 
Pieters, 2003). A meta-analysis conducted by Woods et al. (2002) reviewed 22 
studies investigating memory and metamemory performance, utilising recall and/or 
recognition memory paradigms for verbal and non-verbal stimuli in OCD diagnosed 
and sub-clinical checkers, and non-clinical samples. They found similar results to the 
above studies, with small to medium effect sizes for verbal and visual recall (g=0.45, 
g=0.66 respectively), no evidence of in impairment of verbal recognition, but a large 
effect of decreased memory confidence in OCD checkers for both verbal and visual 
recognition and recall tasks (g=0.92). These findings are consistent with clinical 
observations that OCD checkers are susceptible to pathological doubt (Rasmussen & 
Eisen, 1992). They also compliment cognitive models, such as Rachman’s (2002) 
cognitive theory of compulsive checking which proposes checking behaviour is 
maintained by an increase in perceived responsibility and harm, reduced confidence 
in memory and an uncertainty to an end of threat.
Paradoxically, numerous studies have found that the act of repeated checking 
further reduces memory confidence. A study by van den Hout and Kindt (2003) 
manipulated checking behaviour in a non-clinical sample using a computer 
animation task where during a series of experiments participants had to perform 
checking rituals (turning on or off) on a virtual gas stove (relevant OCD condition) 
or light switch (irrelevant OCD condition). Participants then engaged in a pre and 
post test training of checking the gas stove and rating their confidence in which gas 
rings they turned off. No difference in memory accuracy across the conditions was 
found, however, participants in the relevant condition reported lower memory 
confidence after repeated checking than those in the irrelevant condition. This effect 
has been repeatedly demonstrated using actual checking tasks in healthy participants
8
(Coles, Radomsky & Homg, 2006; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010) and in OCD 
populations (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; Hermans, Engelen, Grouwels, Joos, 
Lemmens & Pieters, 2008; Tolin et a l, 2001). Thus it appears that when repeated 
checking behaviour is induced in healthy participants, specifically for OCD relevant 
and threatening stimuli, this tends to decrease tmst in recollection of carrying out the 
task correctly. Similarly, when participants have engaged in repeated checking they 
have reported higher levels of perceived responsibility and a subsequent increase in 
memory distrust (Radomsky, Rachman & Hammond, 2001).
More recent correlational studies have shown that individuals with OCD, 
specifically those with CC, have low trait memory confidence and this is associated 
with checking behaviour (Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007; Nedeljkovic, Moulding, 
Kyrios & Doron, 2009). Whilst this correlational evidence cannot identify cause and 
effect, in an experimental study Alcolado and Radomsky (2011) manipulated a non- 
clinical sample’s memory beliefs by providing false feedback on a standardised 
memory test before completing a further memory test to assess memory ability and 
urge to check. They found that participants in the low memory confidence condition 
had greater urges to check following the memory task than those in the high memory 
confidence condition, consistent with Nedeljkovic et aVs, (2007, 2009) findings. 
Thus given the existing literature discussed earlier and the findings from Alcolado 
and Radomsky (2011) it is plausible that there is a bi-directional relationship 
between memory confidence and checking behaviour, not only does repeated 
checking lead to lower memory confidence but also that low trait memory 
confidence appears to initiate checking behaviour.
As mentioned previously, perceived feelings of responsibility also appear to 
play a role in checking behaviour. Correlational studies suggest that perceived
personal influence is associated with obsessional thoughts and behaviours in non- 
clinical samples (Rheaume, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 2000), and predicts symptom 
severity in OCD patients (Salkovskis et aL, 2000). This fits with Rachman’s (2002) 
cognitive theory of compulsive checking which proposes that OCD checkers feel 
compelled to check because they believe they have a strong responsibility to prevent 
harm to self or others specifically when they cannot be sure the perceived threat has 
diminished or been removed. This has been experimentally demonstrated by Lopatak 
and Rachman (1995) who manipulated OCD patients responsibility beliefs in 
different situations and found that individuals who felt more responsible expressed 
higher urges to check items relevant to their obsessions than those who did not. Thus 
one is more likely to repeatedly check when one feels responsible for the outcome. 
Ironically, as stated above, experimental studies have also demonstrated that repeated 
checking not only further fuels feelings of responsibility, but also promotes memory 
distrust (Radomsky et aL, 2001).
Thus from a CBT perspective appraisals regarding one’s memory ability (i.e. 
memory confidence) and perceptions of personal responsibility could serve not only 
to promote but also maintain CC. This is because CBT models of OCD propose that 
it is not the intrusive thoughts that cause the problem of distress but the way in which 
these thoughts are appraised and responded to (Salkovskis, 1985). The use of 
compulsive rituals such as repeated checking and avoidance of threat in OCD are 
conceptualised in CBT models as efforts to control or remove intrusions and prevent 
feared consequences (Abramowitz & Arch, 2013). Here the performance of the 
ritualised compulsive checking serves to reduce anxiety which in turn may 
negatively reinforce the behaviour. However, the nature of these maladjusted 
appraisals of metacognition and engagement in ritualistic checking inhibits the
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reduction in obsessional fear that would naturally occur during a habituation process, 
even in the absence of anxiety reducing behaviour. What’s more compulsive 
checking enhances the frequency of these maladjusted appraisals of metacognition 
by acting as reminders of their occurrence and thus cement these obsessions into 
existence. This may particularly be the case when engagement in ritualistic checking 
takes place but the feared consequence does not occur, the individual may then 
attribute this to the ritual (e.g. ‘Did I complete it properly?) and not to the realistic 
low probability of the feared consequence (Abromowitz & Arch, 2013).
Given that that the above reviewed literature has consistently found that 
repeated checking lowers memory confidence, and that evidence from Alcolado and 
Radomsky (2011) found low confidence causes urge to check, we could assume a 
potential bi-directional relationship. The possibility that low memory confidence 
might cause actual checking through an experimental design has not, to the author’s 
knowledge, been tested. Furthermore, perceived personal responsibility might 
moderate the effect of memory confidence on checking, with low memory 
confidence especially increasing checking when perceived responsibility is high.
This study therefore sought to manipulate memory confidence and perceived 
personal responsibility to ascertain the effects on checking behaviour (urge and 
actual checking) in a non-clinical sample. This would not only help to elucidate the 
nature of the vicious cycle between memory confidence and checking behaviour, it 
would also allow the possible moderating effect of perceived personal responsibility 
on checking in the face of low memory confidence. This allows for theories of 
memory confidence and cognitive-behavioural theories of OCD to be integrated 
which could have important implications for clinical practice, specifically in regard 
to CBT treatment models.
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Additionally, the study also aimed to establish if memory confidence and 
responsibility affect memory accuracy and if this effect is modulated by item type 
(neutral vs. ideographic^ stimuli) and stimulus type (verbal vs. visual stimuli). This 
will allow for further exploration of the memory deficit hypothesis. In order to 
investigate these factors participants were randomly allocated to one of four groups 
where memory confidence (Low Memory Confidence: LMC vs. High Memory 
Confidence: HMC) and responsibility (Low Responsibility: LR vs. High 
Responsibility: HR) were manipulated, and given a memory test utilising the 
abovementioned item and stimulus types. The effect of these manipulations on urge 
to check, actual checking, as well as memory accuracy, response bias, and 
confidence ratings during and after a memory task was measured.
Hypotheses
Primary Hypotheses. If the manipulations were successful it is predicted 
that participants in the LMC group would have a stronger urge to check and greater 
checking behaviour than participants in the HMC group. Additionally, participants in 
the HR group would have stronger urges to check and greater checking behaviour 
than participants in the LR group. Taken together, it is predicted that participants in 
the LMC-HR group would have stronger urges to check and greater checking 
behaviour than participants in the other three groups.
Secondary Hypotheses. Memory Accuracy. As visual stimuli a re ‘dually’ 
encoded (they generate verbal and image codes- ‘picture superiority effect’: Paivio, 
1986) and are more distinctive (Mintzer & Snodgrass, 1999) memory accuracy will 
be higher for visual than verbal stimuli. It is predicted that there will be memory
Ideographic refers to checking relevant stimuli (negatively valenced and threat relevant)
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accuracy differences between item types and also manipulation groups, however, the 
direction of these differences is not predicted owing to mixed findings in previous 
research. Response Bias. The way in which we choose to answer a question or make 
a decision is heavily influenced by response bias (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Thus 
this too will be explored in relation to memory accuracy for both item and stimulus 
type. It is predicted that there will be a difference in response bias between item 
types and also stimulus types, however, the direction of these differences is not 
predicted due to limited research in this area relating to CCs. Memory Confidence. It 
is predicted that reported memory confidence will be higher for visual than verbal 
stimuli. As this is a non-clinical sample reported memory confidence will also be 
higher for ideographic than neutral stimuli (Yonelinas, 2002). Furthermore, 
confidence should be enhanced in the HMC groups and reduced in the HR groups.
Methods
Favourable ethical approval was obtained from the University of Surrey’s 
Faculty of Arts and Health Sciences ethics committee (Appendix A).
Design
The study had a 2x2x2x2 four-way mixed factorial design. The independent 
between-participant factors were memory confidence (HMC vs. LMC) and 
responsibility (HR vs. LR) manipulations, with two independent within-participant 
factors: stimulus type (verbal vs. visual) and item type (neutral vs. ideographic). 
There were four dependent variables: 1) Checking behaviour which consisted of (a) 
urge to check items after each memory task (measured by urge ratings), and (b) 
actual checking, i.e. the number of times answers to the memory tasks were checked; 
2) Memory accuracy as measured by d’, calculated from hit and false alarm rate
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probabilities obtained during the memory tasks^; 3) Response bias, measured by C^; 
and lastly 4) State memory confidence ratings for (a) participants competence- 
confidence i.e. confidence in their ability to correctly identify items as old or new 
during the memory tasks for each item, (b) overall memory confidence after 
completion of each memory task (serves as memory confidence manipulation check).
Participants
Power calculations (utilising G*Power: Erdfelder, Paul & Buchner, 1996) 
estimated that 80 participants (20 per group) would be necessary to achieve 
significant hypothesised results, with a large effect size at 80% power (a= .05). This 
was based on previous research investigating the effects of manipulated memory 
confidence on urge to check (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011).
80 student participants participated in the study, for either course credit or 
entry into a prize draw to win retail vouchers. Participants were recruited via the 
university’s Psychology department recruitment system (SONA) or via poster 
advertisement (Appendix B). Inclusion criteria for participation were: aged 18 years 
old or above, native English speaking, with normal-to-corrected vision. Exclusion
 ^The memory tasks utilise a recognition memory paradigm in which participants respond either ‘Y es’ 
or ‘N o ’ as to whether they have seen an item before (old) or not (new). A correct identification o f  an 
item is labelled a ‘Hit’(H) and incorrect identification a ‘False Alarm’ (F). An individual’s ability to 
say Yes/No to an item depends on the familiarity (or strength o f  signal) o f  the item according to signal 
detection theories (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). d ’ allows calculation o f  the strength o f  this 
familiarity giving a better indication o f  actual memory accuracy, calculated by d ’=z(H)-z(F). The 
higher the d’ value the greater the accuracy. C gives an indication o f  an individual’s decision strategy 
(response bias) and is calculated by C = -[z(H)+z(F)]/2. A negative C value represents a ‘more risky’ 
decision whereas a positive C value indicates a more cautious decision.
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criteria were: no current neurological, mood or anxiety conditions (see ‘Procedure’ 
section for screening process).
Of the 80 participants, data from 19 participants were excluded because 
participants reported that they were aware of the memory or responsibility 
manipulation in the exit questionnaire. Therefore, data from 61 participants were 
analysed (Table 1), with 15 participants in the LMC-LR, HMC-LR and HMC-HR 
groups and 16 participants in the LMC-HR group. The mean age of participants was 
23 years (»SD= 5.94, range: 18-43); with 16 males and 45 females. There were no 
significant differences between the four groups in age F(l,3)= .365,p= .778, gender 
X^(3)= 2.23,p= .525, handedness %\3)= 2.24,p= .523, previous mental health 
difficulties % (^3)= .S\,p=  .846, drug use %^ (3)= .46,;?= .928, nor occurrence of a head 
injury %\3)= 2.13, p= .545. None of the participants reported a reliance on alcohol.
Measures
The following measures were administered during the screening process prior 
to the manipulation (Appendix 3.ii).
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale-21 (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond,
1995). The DASS is a 21-item self-report measure which assesses depression, 
anxiety and stress in clinical and non-clinical populations. It has good internal 
consistency across the three subscales (a= 0.87-0.94), good test re-test reliability of 
0.93, and very good construct validity (R CFI=0.94; Henry & Crawford, 2005). It 
was administered to assess for potential confounding variables.
The following measures were also administered to give an indication of 
existing trait memory confidence and responsibility beliefs: Memory and Cognitive 
Confidence Scale (MACCS; Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007) and Responsibility
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Attitude Scale (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000) respectively. The MACCS is a 28-item 
self-report measure of trait meta-memory factors associated with OCD, including 
memory confidence. It has good internal consistency for the overall scale (a= 0.92) 
and subscales (a= 0.72-0.93), very good test re-test reliability of 0.94, and very good 
construct validity (CFI=0.96: Nedeljkovic, et al., 2009). The RAS is a 26-item 
questionnaire which assesses general beliefs about responsibility associated with 
OCD. It has good internal consistency (a= 0.90), test re-test reliability of 0.94, and 
good concurrent and criterion validity (Salkovskis, et al., 2000). For both the 
MACCS and the RAS, higher scores indicate the lower trait expressions.
Table 1:
Participant Demographic Information Collected During Screening Phase
LMC-LR HMC-LR LMC-HR HMC-HR
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 22.53 6.54 22.40 4.05 24.38 6.41 23.53 6.71
Gender % % % %
Female 60 73.3 81.3 80
Male
Handedness
40.00 26.70 18.70 20.00
Left 6.70 6.70 0.00 13.30
Right 93.3 93.3 100 86.7
Past Mental Health 
Condition*
1/15 2/15 1/16 2/15
Drug Use* 1/15 1/15 2/16 2/15
Head Injury* 1/15 1/15 0/16 0/15
Reliance on 
Alcohol*
0/15 0/15 0/16 0/15
NOTE'. As part o f  the exclusion criteria participants with current mental health difficulties were 
excluded.
* Represented as the total number o f  participants per group
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Lastly, as OCD tendencies are thought to exist on a continuum and are also 
present within non-clinical samples (Adam, Meinlschmidt, Gloster, & Lieb, 2012), 
the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa, et aL, 2002) was 
administered. This was to explore if checking behaviour, memory confidence and 
accuracy were correlated with high OCI-R total and checking scores. The OCI-R is 
an 18-item self-report measure which assesses obsessional thoughts and behaviours 
in clinical and non-clinical populations. It is composed of six subscales: Washing, 
Checking, Ordering, Obsessions, Hoarding and Neutralising which reflect OCD 
symptoms as described in the DSM-IV (APA, 2000). It has good internal consistency 
across scales (a= 0.81-0.90), good test re-test reliability (a= 0.82-0.84), and good 
construct and criterion validity in both clinical and non-clinical samples (Foa, et aL, 
2002).
Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) were used to assess the participant’s degree of 
memory confidence both after the presentation of each stimulus (competence- 
confidence) and at the end of each memory task (overall confidence). The VAS 
consisted of a 10 point scale ranging from ‘ 1 ’ (definitely not confident new/old) to 
‘10’ (very confident new/old). VASs have been demonstrated to have good 
sensitivity to short-term experimental manipulations (Grant, et aL, 1999).
An Exit Questionnaire was administered on completion of the experimental 
procedure which asked participants to rate, on a VAS (1- ‘very difficult’, 5- ‘not at 
all difficult’), how difficult they found remembering the verbal and visual stimuli 
(additional memory confidence manipulation check). Similarly, they were also asked 
to rate feelings of responsibility on a VAS (1- ‘feel not responsible at all’, 5- ‘feel 
very responsible’) which served as a responsibility manipulation check. Furthermore,
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they were asked what they thought the study was investigating to check effectiveness 
of manipulations (Appendix E).
Materials
Verbal Stimuli. A pool of 132 neutral (word length M= 5.39, valence M= 
5.18, frequency M= 86.87), ideographic (word length M= 5.3, valence M= 3.03, 
frequency M= 44.12, OCD checking relevance M= 8.42) and negatively valenced 
words (word length M= 5.5, valence M= 3.52, frequency M= 36.5) controlled for 
word length, frequency and valence taken from Bradley and Lang (1999) and 
Richards et aL (in press) were used (Appendix F.i). In the manipulation phase a pool 
of 32 words were used: eight neutral and eight negatively valenced words during 
study, then eight new neutral and eight new negatively valenced words with the 
previously presented study list during the recognition test. During the verbal 
assessment procedure a pool of 100 words were used: 20 neutral and 20 ideographic 
words during study; then 20 new neutral and 20 new ideographic words with 
previously presented study list words during test. An additional 20 neutral filler trial 
words were split at the beginning and end of the recognition test to control for 
primacy and recency effects.
Visual Stimuli. Similarly, a pool of 132 neutral (valence M= 5.7), 
ideographic (valence M= 3.86, OCD checking relevance M= 7.65), and negatively 
valenced (valence M= 3.32) images taken from the lAPS database (Lang, Bradley & 
Cuthbert, 2005) or Google were used (Appendix F.ii). Visual stimuli were presented 
in the same fashion as the verbal stimuli.
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Verbal and visual stimuli were piloted prior to experimental use and rated by 
OCD experts'^ for valence; their relevance to OCD checking behaviour and OCD 
contamination behaviour; concreteness and imagiability^. Stimulus type presentation 
was randomised and counterbalanced across participants.
Filler Tasks. A series of paper based visual aptitude questions which 
assessed learning strategies were used to provide a delay between encoding and 
retrieval of stimuli, and also to prevent participants from rehearsing studied materials 
which may aid recognition (Appendix G).
Procedure (Figure 1)
To reduce bias, participants were informed that they were participating in a 
study investing the effect of presenting information in different formats to explore 
how this affects learning behaviour and memory for that information.
Screening. Participants were invited to the psychology lab and briefed about 
the study’s procedure. They were then directed to a computer-based screening 
questionnaire where informed consent was obtained (Appendix C.ii), demographic 
information collected, and the OCI-R, MACCS, DASS-21 and RAS administered 
(Appendix C: Participant Information Sheet; Appendix D.i.: Demographic
OCD experts were five psychologists who regularly worked with individuals who have a diagnosis 
o f  OCD, in clinical or experimental settings.
 ^Definitions from Richards et aL, (in press): Concreteness was defined as the extent to which 
participants thought the word/picture represented an item, i.e. items or concepts that can be sensually 
experienced as compared to items or concepts that were abstract. For example, a word like 'apple' 
might be a concrete word. A word like 'bridging' might be more abstract. Im agiability (for words only) 
was defined as the extent to which the word could be conjured up as an image in the participants 
mind. For example, a word like 'train' might conjure up a more defined image than a word like 'raise'.
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Questionnaire). Participants who met inclusion criteria were invited to take part in 
the experimental procedure, whereas those who met exclusion criteria were 
debriefed, thanked and compensated for their time.
Experimental procedure. Participants were randomly allocated to one of 
four groups: (i) LMC-LR; (ii) HMC-LR; (iii) LMC-HR; (iv) HMC-HR. During the 
experiment each of the four groups engaged in three standardised phases: 
manipulation, verbal and visual assessment. The order of the verbal and visual 
assessment phases was counterbalanced across participants. Participants were seated 
in individual recording cubicles each with a PC, monitor, filler task booklet and pen. 
A comfortable chair was used, and the presentation sereen was adjusted to be at an 
angle suitable for each individual’s viewing. Delivery of experimental procedure 
instructions, stimuli and collection of participants’ responses was carried out utilising 
the computer programme Presentation (v0.71, Neurobehavioural Systems).
Manipulation phase. This phase served to allow participants to become 
familiar with the experimental procedure and also to induce the memory confidence 
and responsibility manipulations, as such all data from the recognition test was not 
collected. The type of stimuli presented during the manipulation phase was 
dependent on the counterbalancing order of the verbal or the visual assessment 
phase, e.g. if the verbal assessment phase was to follow then verbal stimuli were 
presented and visa versa for the visual assessment phase (Figure 1). The stimuli lists 
comprised two sets. Set A (16 words/images) and Set B (16 words/images) which 
were eounterbalanced across participants, so that half of the participants would 
receive Set A at study/test and the other half Set B at study/test.
Once seated, participants were presented with Study list 1 containing 
valenced and neutral words/images. Words were centred and presented on a light
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black background in white Arial size 25 font. Each word was presented for 180ms 
followed by a 820ms blank interval. Similarly, each image was centred, measured 
10.8cm by 10.8cm, and presented for 100ms on a light black screen followed by a 
900ms blank screen. The total length of presentation of stimuli and interval was 
capped to 1000ms as during pilot ceiling effects for recognition memory were found 
when stimuli were presented for longer. Words were presented for slightly longer 
than the images as images are recognised and encoded faster than words due to 
additional contextual information (Liu, Agman, Madsen & Kreiman, 2009). After 
this a three minute filler task followed. Participants were then given a recognition 
test and asked to state if they have seen the item before (old) or if it was a new item 
(new). After completing the recognition test memory confidence was manipulated by 
giving false feedback to participants on their performance during the test. This was 
done by the computer programme telling the participant they scored either in a high 
percentage in comparison to their peers (HMC: randomly generated number between 
top 10-15%) or in a low percentage in comparison to their peers (LMC: between 
bottom 30-45%) on the preceding memory test (Appendix H.i). This was followed by 
manipulating feelings of responsibility, by asking participants to ‘try their best 
during the following section of the experiment as the researcher has had difficulty in 
collecting data and is unable to collect any further data which means the results from 
this study are very important to the researcher in completing their studies’ (HR), no 
feedback given for LR groups (Appendix H.ii). Participants were then given the 
opportunity to take a short break.
Verbal assessment Participants were presented with Study list 2
containing ideographic and neutral verbal stimuli and then asked to complete a five 
minute filler task (as above). Following this participants completed a recognition test
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following the same instructions as the manipulation phase, however, they were also 
asked to rate their confidence in their response (competence-confidence) after each 
stimulus item on a 10 point VAS. On completion of the recognition test participants 
were asked to also rate their overall confidence in the responses (memory confidence 
manipulation check), in addition to rating how strongly they would like to check the 
answers they had just given (i.e. their urge to check) on a VAS. They were then 
given the opportunity to take the test again to ensure they had given the correct 
answers (this was to measure actual checking behaviour). Participants who expressed 
they would like to check were then directed to a new screen where they could 
perform the recognition test again. After completing this, as before, they were asked 
to rate their overall confidence in their responses, their urge to check and asked if 
they would like to check again (limited to 2 checks). If participants did not wish to 
do this they were directed to the next step in the study (Visual Assessment Phase) 
after been given the opportunity to take a break and performing the filler task for 
three minutes.
Visual assessment phase. This procedure was identical to the verbal 
assessment procedure but utilised images rather than words. On completing of both 
the verbal and visual assessment phases participants were given the exit 
questionnaire to complete.
Debriefing. Participants were thanked for their time and a full debrief of 
study aims and manipulations was given (Appendix I). It was explained that all 
feedback during the experiment was false and participants where given the 
opportunity to ask questions and diseuss this further.
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Results^ 
Planned Data Analysis and Tests of Normality
Data were checked for their distribution and outliers. Visual inspection of 
boxplots revealed a number of outliers. To further explore whether variables within 
each group approximately fitted the normal distribution the Shapiro-Wilk test was 
used (due to the small group sample sizes) and where data were identified as 
nonparametrie skewness and kurtosis (z scores >2.78) was also assessed (Appendix 
J for all investigations). For all statistical analysis, where data were found to be not 
normally distributed nonparametrie tests were used where possible (Kruskal-Wallis 
and post-hoc Mann-Whitney U tests). However, owing to a lack of mixed design 
non-parametric alternatives, ANOVAs were still conducted but the interpretation of 
the findings was cautious. Here, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied when 
sphericity violations occurred. For all post-hoc tests Bonferroni corrections were 
applied for multiple comparisons to avoid type-1 errors. Analysis of data concerning 
the primary hypotheses were conducted and presented firstly. Separate post-hoc 
analysis of data regarding the secondary hypotheses, which are relevant to the 
literature concerning the potential existence of a memory deficit in individuals with 
CCs, is presented thereafter (see p. 105 ‘Effects of Manipulation on Memory Tasks’).
Questionnaire Measures
Group differences on the questionnaire measures were investigated to explore 
potential sampling differences between groups that were already present before the 
manipulation. Assessed variables were depression, anxiety, stress, sense of
 ^An alpha level o f  .05 was used for all statistical analysis, unless stated otherwise. Exact p  values are 
reported throughout the report.
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responsibility, and metamemory (MACCS). For this analysis one-way between 
ANOVAs/Kruskal-Wallis and related post-hoc tests were conducted (Table 2).
The DASS-21 mean scores are displayed in Table 1 for each subscale and 
group separately. Significant group differences were found for the anxiety subscale, 
H(3)= 10.69, p= .014, with the HMC-LR group (M= 20.2) having significantly 
higher anxiety scores than the HMC-HR group (M= 10.8; U= 42, z= -3,p= .003, r= 
.54). Similarly, there were significant group differences for the depression subscale, 
H{3)= 9.36,/?= .025. Again, the HMC-LR group (M= 20) scored higher than the 
HMC-HR group (M= 11; C/=45, z= -2.86,/?= .004, r= .52).There was no significant 
difference between the groups’ stress subscale scores.
Concerning the MACCS, significant group differences were found for the 
MACCS attention and concentration subscale, F(3,61)= 7.19,/?= .001, r|^= .27. Post- 
hoc independent t-tests revealed that the HMC-LR group had higher attention and 
concentration scores than the LMC-HR {t(29)= 2.89, /?= .007, d= 1.03) and the 
HMC-HR (/(28)= 4.28,/?= .001, d= 1.56) groups. There was also a significant group 
difference for the MACCS decision making subscale, F(3,61)= 2.78,/?= .049, rj^= 
.13. However, post-hoc t-tests did not confirm significant differences between 
individual groups. No significant group differences were found for the MACCS total 
scores and any of the other subscales.
There were no significant group differences for the RAS scores (Table 2).
As this is a study investigating ehecking, we also recorded obsessive- 
compulsive tendencies, especially in relation to checking, prior to the manipulation 
(Table 2). A significant difference between groups was found for the OCI-R Total 
score (//(3)= 8.82,/?=.032), such that the HMC-LR group had a higher score {M= 
20.17) than the HMC-HR group {M= 10.83; U= 42.5, z= -2.91,/?= .004, r= .09).
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Importantly, there were no significant differences between groups for the cheeking, 
washing, obsessing, hoarding, or neutralising subscales. There was a signifieant 
difference between the OCI-R ordering subseale and two groups F(3,61)= 4.11,/?= 
.01, r|^= .18. More specifically, post-hoc t-test revealed that the HMC-LR had higher 
ordering scores than the HMC-HR group (r(28)=4.31,/?= .000, d= 1.42).
In sum, participants in the HMC-LR group had higher total OCI-R scores 
than participants in the HMC-HR group, which may be caused by increased scores in 
non-checking related subscales (ordering). Importantly, groups did not differ on the 
OCI-R checking subscale. It should be noted that anxiety and depression levels were 
significantly higher for HMC-LR than the HMC-HR group. The same pattern was 
also found for the attention and concentration subscale of the MACCS, with 
participants in the HMC-LR group scoring higher than participants in the HMC-HR 
and the LMC-HR groups. These group differences may suggest that anxiety and 
depression levels, as well as metamemory related factors may act as confounding 
variables, which is taken into consideration in the Memory Tasks analysis section 
where they were used as covariâtes.
Manipulation Check
Several manipulation checks were applied in this study to investigate whether 
the memory confidence and responsibility manipulations were effective.
Firstly, participants were asked to rate their overall confidence about their 
performance at the end of both memory tasks (verbal and visual). If the memory 
confidence manipulation was effective, then we predicted that participants in the 
HMC groups would have greater overall memory confidence than those in the LMC 
groups.
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A three-way mixed measures ANOVA with the between-partieipant factors 
confidence manipulation (low vs. high) and responsibility manipulation (low vs. 
high), and the within-participant factor stimulus type (verbal vs. visual) was 
conducted to analyse the dependent measure overall memory confidence. It revealed 
a significant main effect stimulus type, F(l,57)= 21.30,/?= .001, r|p^= .27, with 
participants displaying more overall confidence for visual {M= 5.60, SE= .21) than 
verbal (M= 4.6, SE= .20) stimuli. There was also a signifieant main effect of 
confidence manipulation, F(l,57)= 12.27,/?= .001, r|p^=.18, i.e. participants in the 
LMC groups were less confident (M= 4.47, SE= .25) than those in the HMC groups 
(M=5.72, SE= .25), which suggests that the memory confidence manipulation was 
effective (Figure 2). There were no other significant main effects or interactions.
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Figure 2\ Mean overall memory confidence ratings for visual and verbal stimuli post 
manipulations by group. Standard errors {SE) displayed.
Secondly, participants were asked to rate the memory task difficulty in the 
exit questionnaire. Again, a three-way mixed ANOVA with the between-partieipant 
factors confidence manipulation and responsibility manipulation and the within- 
participant factor stimulus type was conducted to analyse the difficulty measures. It
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revealed a significant main effect of stimulus type, F(l,57)= 84.52,/?= .001, rjp^ = .59, 
showing that verbal stimuli {M- 3.81, SE= .092) were rated as more difficult to 
remember than visual stimuli (M= 2.82, SE= .094, Figure 3). The main effect of the 
memory confidence manipulation was also significant, F(l,57)= 33.62,/?= .001, r|p^= 
.37. Participants in the LMC groups found the memory tasks more difficult (M=
3.76, SE= .11) than participants in the HMC groups (M= 2.89, SE= .11). There was 
also a significant interaction between stimulus type and the responsibility 
manipulation, F(l,57)= 5.04,/?= .029, rjp^ = .08. Post-hoc paired t-tests showed that 
participants in both the LR (r(29)= 4.44,/?= .001, d= .82) and the HR (r(30)= 9.32,/?= 
.001, d= 1.66) groups rated verbal memory tasks {M= 3.75, SD= .92; M= 3.89, 5'Z)= 
.70 respectively) as more difficult than the visual memory tasks (M= 3, SD= .84; M= 
2.65, SD= .91 respectively). However, the difference between verbal and visual tasks 
was numerically, but not significantly, smaller in the LR group (M= .62, SL>= .72) 
than in the HR group (M= .99, SD= .69), /(59)= 2.01, /?= .048. There were no other 
significant main effects or interactions.
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Figure 3: Mean stimulus difficulty ratings by group. SE displayed.
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Finally, participants rated their sense of responsibility on the exit 
questionnaire, and it was predicted that this measure would show specific differences 
between the LR and HR groups. A two-way between-participants ANOVA with the 
factors confidence manipulation and responsibility manipulation revealed no 
significant effects. Crucially, the main effect of responsibility manipulation was not 
present, F(l,61)= 2.07,p= .156, r\p^ = .035 (Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Mean responsibility ratings post manipulations by group. SE displayed.
In sum, the manipulation checks revealed that the memory confidence 
manipulation appeared to be effective. More specifically, participants in the LMC 
groups were less confident in their ability to correctly recall items and found items 
more difficult to recall than those in the HMC groups. Unfortunately, the 
responsibility manipulation appeared not to effectively change the participants’ sense 
of responsibility, and only slightly affected the perceived task difficulty. Note, 
participants found the verbal memory task more difficult than the visual memory 
task, and in line with this, they were more confident in the visual compared to the 
verbal memory task, independent of the manipulation.
Primary Hypothesis
30
Effect of manipulation on checking behaviour. It was hypothesised that 
both the confidence and responsibility manipulations would have an effect on urge to 
check and actual checking behaviour. More specifically, participants in the LMC and 
HR groups would have a stronger urge to check and enhanced levels of actual 
checking than participants in the HMC and LR groups. Furthermore, participants in 
the LMC-HR group would have the highest level of checking behaviour. To analyse 
the manipulation effects, two three-way mixed ANOVAs with the between- 
partieipant factors confidence manipulation (LMC vs. HMC), responsibility 
manipulation (LR vs. HR), and the within-participant factor stimulus type (verbal vs. 
visual) were conducted separately for the dependent variables urge to check and 
actual checking. The effects of item type on checking behaviour could not be 
explored as checking behaviour was measured at the end of each stimulus 
recognition test and not after presentation of each item type.
The ANOVA with the dependent variable urge to check (Figure 5) did not 
yield any significant main effects (stimulus type: F(l,57)= 2.17,/>= .146, r|p^= .037; 
confidence manipulation: F(l,57)= 1.92,/?= .171, r|p^= .033; responsibility 
manipulation: F(l,57)= .21,/?= .65, r|p^= .004), nor any significant interactions.
8
7
6
rO 4
| 3
2
0
Visual Verbal
□  LMC-LR 
B HMC-LR
□ LMC-HR 
E3 HMC-HR
Figure 5: Mean urge to check ratings for stimuli type by group. SE displayed.
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The ANOVA with the dependent variable actual checking (Figure 6) was 
conducted on non-parametric data. Results should be treated with caution. No 
significant main effect of stimulus type was found, F(l,57)= .77,/?= .384, r|p^= .01. 
However, the interaction between the confidence manipulation and stimulus type was 
significant, F(l,57)= 13.94,/?= .001, T|p^ = .197. Post-hoc paired samples t-test 
revealed that this difference was marginally significant, r(29)= 1.98,/?= .056, d= .64, 
such that participants in the LMC groups checked verbal stimuli (M= .35, SD= .49) 
more than visual stimuli {M= .03, SD= .18), and participants in the HMC groups 
checked visual stimuli (M= .33, SD= .48) more than verbal stimuli {M= .13, SD=
.35). No other main effects or interactions were significant.
0.9
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Figure 6\ Mean number of checks for visual and verbal stimuli by groups. SE 
displayed.
In order to assess if confounding variables (OCl-R Total score; DASS-21 
Anxiety and Depression subscales; MACCS General Memory and Attention &
 ^N o checking occurred in the LMC-LR group for the visual memory task, or in the HMC-HR group 
for the verbal memory task. N o participant checked more than once during the experiment.
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Concentration subscales; and the RAS)^ could explain the differences between 
groups they were added as covariates to the analysis one by one, with actual 
checking as the dependent variable. Detailed findings of the ANCOVAs can be 
found in Appendix K, and only the covariates changing the findings are reported 
here. This analysis revealed that depression had a significant effect on actual 
checking, F(l,56)= 15.20,/?= .001, r|p^= .214. Depression also modulated the 
stimulus type x confidence manipulation, F(l,56)= 13.53,/?=. 001, rjp^= .195. 
However, the related two-way interaction in the previous ANOVA analysis (stimulus 
type X confidence manipulation) had a similar F-ratio (F= 13.94), which suggests 
that depression may have influenced interaction but it did not change its significance.
In sum, neither the memory confidence manipulation nor the responsibility 
manipulation had an effect on urge to check. The memory confidence manipulation, 
however, had an effect on actual checking. As predicted, LMC groups showed actual 
checking behaviour more often in the verbal compared to the visual memory task. 
However, the reverse was the case for the HMC group, i.e. they checked more in the 
visual compared to the verbal memory task (which was not predicted). The 
responsibility manipulation did not have an effect on actual checking and no 
significant interaction between the memory confidence and responsibility 
manipulations on actual checking was found. None of the potentially confounding 
variables changed the reported effects, as assessed with ANCOVAs.
Secondary Hypothesis (Post-hoc analysis)
Effect of manipulations on memory tasks. When considering the 
manipulations, it was predicted that memory accuracy differences between item type
Measures identified as significant during the questionnaire measures analysis.
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and manipulation groups would occur, however, the direction of these differences 
was not predicted. For stimulus type it was hypothesised that memory accuracy and 
competence-confidence would be higher for visual than verbal stimuli, and that the 
LMC and HR groups would report reduced competence-confidence in comparison to 
other groups. Lastly, differences in response bias between item types and also 
stimulus types were predicted, however, the direction of these differences was not 
predicted due to the limited research in this area. To investigate these hypotheses 
four-way mixed ANOVAs with the between-partieipant factors confidence 
manipulation (LMC vs. HMC) and responsibility manipulation (LR vs. HR) and the 
within-participant factors stimulus type (verbal vs. visual) and item type (neutral vs. 
ideographic) were conducted for the dependent variables memory accuracy (d’), 
response bias (C), and competence-confidence, separately.
Memory accuracy (d’). The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
item type, F(l,57)= 7.46,/?= .008, r|p^= .11, with larger d’ values for neutral (M=
1.37, SE= .07) than for ideographic items (M= 1.21, SE= .07); a significant main 
effect of stimulus type, F(l,57)= 82.68,/?= .001, r|p^= .59, with larger d’ values for 
visual stimuli (M=l .69, SE= .09) than for verbal stimuli (M= .89, SE= .06); and a 
significant main effect of the confidence manipulation, F(l,57)= 8.29,/?= .006, r|p^= 
.127, with larger d’ values for the HMC groups (M= 1.47, SE= .09) than the LMC 
groups (M= 1.11, SE= .09). There was also a significant interaction between stimulus 
type and confidence manipulation, F(l,57)= 4.33,/?= .042, r|p^= .07 (Figure 7). Post- 
hoc independent t-tests revealed this was caused by significantly higher d’ in the 
HMC groups (M= 1.97, SD= .71) than in the LMC groups (M=1.43, SD= .74), for 
visual stimuli (r(59)= 2.89,/?= .005, d= .75), but not for verbal stimuli (t(59)= 1.36, 
p= .177, d= .35).
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Figure 7: Significant interaction between stimulus type and memory confidence 
manipulation for memory accuracy (d’) rates.
The ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction between stimulus type 
and responsibility manipulation, F(l,57)= 4.35,/>= .042, rjp^ = .07 (Figure 8). In both 
responsibility conditions, paired samples t-test revealed a significantly higher d’ for 
visual than verbal stimuli, (LR: t(29)= 4.69,p= .001, d= .85; HR: t(29)= 7.94, p= 
.001, d= 1.42). However, the magnitude of the accuracy difference between stimulus 
types was significantly larger for the HR {M= .98, SD= .69) compared to the LR 
condition (M= .62, SD= .72); r(59)= 2.02, p= .048, d= .52.
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Figure 8\ Significant interaction between stimulus type and responsibility 
manipulation for memory accuracy (d’) rates
Finally, and importantly, the interaction between the confidence and 
responsibility manipulation factors were also significant, F(l,57)= 6.36,p= .014, 
rjp^ = .100 (Figure 9). Post-hoc independent t-tests revealed a significantly lower d’ 
for the LMC-LR groups compared to the HMC-LR, r(28)= 3.7,/?= .001, d= 1.34. No 
other post-hoc tests were significant.
In order to assess if confounding variables could at least partly explain the 
findings, ANCOVAs were conducted with d' as the dependent variable and the 
relevant questionnaire measures as covariates. None of these covariates had a 
significant effect on the previously reported findings (Appendix K).
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Figure 9\ Significant interaction between memory confidence and responsibility 
manipulations for memory accuracy rates (d’)
In sum, analysis indicated that memory accuracy was greater for neutral than 
ideographic items and for visual than for verbal stimuli. Generally, memory accuracy 
was also enhanced in the HMC compared to the LMC groups. However, that effect 
was modulated by responsibility. More specifically, memory accuracy was not 
different between confidence groups when high levels of responsibility were 
induced. However, accuracy was especially low in the LMC-LR group compared to 
the HMC-LR group. Interestingly, the memory accuracy differences between 
confidence manipulations groups and between responsibility manipulation groups 
were more prominent for the visual than the verbal memory task.
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Response bias (C). A significant main effect of stimulus type, F(1,57)= 
70.34,/?= .001, T|p^ = .552, revealed that participants C was more risky for verbal (M= 
-.49, SE= .05) than visual (M= -.01, SE= .05) stimuli. The interaction between 
stimulus type and confidence manipulation was also significant, F(l,57)= 6.75,/?= 
.012, T|p^ = .106 (Figure 10). Although participants utilised a significantly riskier 
decision strategy for verbal (LMC: M= -.45, SE= .07; HMC: M= -.52, SE= .07) than 
visual (LMC: M= -.13, SE= .07; HMC: M= .09, SE= .06) stimuli in both memory 
confidence groups (LMC: r(30)= 4.02,/?= .001, <7= .72; HMC: r(29)= 8.10,/?= .001, 
<7= 1.74). However, the difference between C for visual and verbal stimuli was 
reduced for the HMC than for the LMC groups, ^(59)= 2.59,/?= .012, <7= .66. This 
was caused by a numerical, but not statistical, difference in C of the LMC (M= -.126, 
SD= .37) compared to the HMC group in the visual memory task (M= .09, SD= .36; 
r(59)= 2.39,/?= .02, d= .07; not significant after Bonferroni correction |/?= .0125]).
The ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of item type f(l,57)=  
48.53,/?= .001, r|p^= .460, showing that participants were more risky in response to 
ideographic (M= -.44, SE= .05) than neutral items (M= -.06, SE= .04). The 
interaction between stimulus type and item type was also significant, F(l,57)= 34.11, 
/?= .001, r|p^= .374 (Figure 11). Post-hoc paired samples t-tests indicated that 
participants were more risky for ideographic verbal (M= -.83, SD= .66) compared to 
neutral verbal stimuli (M= -.14, SD= .39), /(60)= 7.10,/?= .001, <7= .91, but this item 
type difference was not found for visual stimuli, /(60)= 1.91,/?= .061, d= .24. 
Additionally, C was more risky for ideographic verbal (M= -.83, SD= .66) than 
ideographic visual stimuli (M= -.06, SD= .41; t(60)= 8.44,/?= .001, <7= 1.08), and for 
neutral verbal (M= -.14, SD= .39) than neutral visual stimuli (M= .02, SD=.42; t{60)= 
2.78,/?= .007, <7= .36).
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Figure 10: Response bias for significant interaction between stimulus type and 
memory confidence manipulation.
ANCOVAs were conducted in order to assess the impact of confounding 
variables on the C findings. None of the covariates had a significant relation to any 
of the above variables (Appendix K).
In summary, participants were more risky in the verbal memory task 
compared to the visual memory task. This difference was enhanced in the LMC 
groups compared to the HMC groups, caused by a more conservative behaviour for 
visual compared to verbal stimuli. Moreover, participants showed the most risky 
behaviour when responding to ideographic verbal stimuli.
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Figure 11: Response bias for significant interactions between stimulus type and item 
type.
Competence-confidence. As expected, the main effect of stimulus type was 
significant, F(l,57)= 22.47, .001, r\p^ = .283, with higher competence-confidence
in the visual (M= 6.92, SE= .13) than in the verbal memory task (M= 6.57, SE= .13). 
A significant main effect of confidence manipulation was also found, F(l,57)= 9.67, 
p= .003, T|p^ = .145, with higher competency-confidence in the HMC groups {M= 
7.12, SE= .17) compared to the LMC groups {M= 6.37, SE= .17). There were no 
other significant main effects or interactions.
ANCOVAs with potential confounding variables revealed none of the 
covariates had a significant influence on the findings (Appendix K).
Exploratory correlations were performed to investigate whether participants’ 
trait memory confidence and responsibility beliefs; current anxiety, depression and 
stress levels; and OCI-R total and checking scores related to urge to check, checking
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behaviour and memory task performance. As these investigations were not concerned 
with the primary aims of the study results are displayed in Appendix L.
In sum, participants felt more confident about their memory ability for visual 
than for verbal stimuli. Additionally, competent-confidence was higher in the HMC 
groups compared to the LMC groups.
Discussion
The aims of this study were broadly twofold, in the first instance to explore 
whether experimentally manipulated state memory confidence (specifically induced 
LMC) and sense of responsibility (induced HR) enhance checking behaviour (urge 
and actual checking). Secondly to investigate whether these experimental 
manipulations affect memory accuracy, response bias and memory confidence in a 
visual and verbal memory task using neutral and ideographic stimuli. To the author’s 
knowledge, the effect of these combined factors on checking behaviour and memory 
has as yet not been experimentally investigated.
Were the Manipulations Effective and did they Affect Checking Behaviour?
In regards to the first aim, results revealed that the memory confidence 
manipulation appeared to be effective, as participants in the LMC groups reported 
lower overall memory confidence and competence-confidence, and found the 
memory tasks more difficult than those in the HMC groups. This supports findings 
from Alcolado and Radomsky (2011), that confidence can be experimentally induced 
and affect memory confidence ratings on memory tasks in non-clinical samples. 
However, the prediction that induced LMC would increase urge to check items was 
not supported as there was no significant difference between the LMC and HMC 
groups, which is contrary to Alcolado and Radomsky (2011) findings. Interestingly 
though, a trend {p= .056, d= .64) for increased actual checking of verbal stimuli over
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visual stimuli in LMC groups was found (the lack of a significant finding here may 
be due to a type-II error which is discussed further in the limitations section), which 
to the author’s knowledge was never investigated before. It supports correlational 
findings that low confidence in one’s memory abilities is linked to actual checking 
(Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007; Nedeljkovic et a l, 2009). It is worth noting, however, 
that the checking variables were non-parametric and due to a lack of suitable 
alternative non-parametric statistical tests ANOVAs were run on this data. Thus this 
latter finding should be taken with caution. Nonetheless, considering the low sample 
size and the medium effect size this finding warrants further exploration in future 
studies. Unfortunately, the results indicate that the responsibility manipulation 
appeared to be ineffective in inducing a sense of responsibility. This is a clear 
limitation of this study.
There are a number of potential reasons as to why checking behaviour was 
not successfully induced and why the responsibility manipulation appeared to be 
unsuccessful in this study. During debriefing participants reported that they found the 
memory tasks lengthy (-15 minutes each), which may have discouraged checking 
behaviour. Moreover, some participants who did go through to ‘check’ expressed 
confusion, as the computer-program did not directly provide them with their answers 
at the end of test but only gave them the option to take the test again. Hence 
participants might not have seen the point in choosing this option and thus may have 
been discouraged from ‘checking’ in the following counter-balanced memory task. 
Future studies would benefit from having shorter memory tasks and grant more 
opportunities to allow participants to see and change their responses given on a 
memory test. This would replicate an actual checking task, providing greater 
ecological validity, but also allow recording of the number of changes made and any
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change in accuracy with checking. In regards to the responsibility manipulation, 
some exit interview questionnaires indicated that participants may have guessed the 
aim of the manipulation. Perhaps this was because the manipulation was not 
personally relevant enough. Lopatka and Rachman (1995) demonstrated that in order 
for responsibility manipulations to be successful they have to be perceived as 
personally relevant to the individual, and that perceived responsibility is boosted if 
the script is verbally expressed. Therefore future studies would benefit from a 
manipulation that is more personally relevant to the participants and verbally 
reinforced.
The Effect of the Manipulations on Memory Task Performance
Relating to the second aim, participants had greater memory accuracy for 
visual rather than verbal stimuli. Based on the ‘picture-superiority effect’ in non- 
clinical samples (Mintzer & Snodgrass, 1999; Paivio, 1986) this finding was 
expected. Memory accuracy was also found to be higher in HMC groups compared 
to LMC groups. More specifically, post-hoc analysis revealed that participants in 
HMC groups had greater memory accuracy than those in LMC groups for easier 
visual tasks, but not more difficult verbal tasks. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that the confidence manipulation might have worked specifically for the 
easier visual task, thereby potentially enhancing effort in these tasks which in turn 
resulted in better memory accuracy. This also relates to the trend finding of increased 
checking of verbal items in LMC group, as if one doubts their memory ability they 
would presumably place more effort into checking for difficult tasks. This could be 
investigated in future studies by systematically manipulating task difficulty of visual 
and verbal stimuli which might help to understand mixed findings from pervious 
literature to (Yonelinas, 2002 for a review).
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Memory accuracy was also enhanced for visual memory tasks but not for 
verbal memory tasks across responsibility manipulation groups. Interestingly, the 
effect of the confidence and responsibility manipulations on memory accuracy did 
interact such that visual memory task accuracy was reduced for the LMC-LR group 
compared to the HMC-LR group. No accuracy differences occurred between the HR 
groups. This suggests that LMC may act as a demotivating factor in the absence of 
perceived responsibility. Indeed self-efficacy (beliefs of one’s ability to perform a 
task) has been strongly linked to motivation to perform and performance outcomes 
(Schunk, 1991). Thus the role of metamemory beliefs and motivation on CC may be 
useful to explore in more detail in future studies.
Considering findings related to item type, memory accuracy was found to be 
greater for neutral stimuli rather than ideographic stimuli. This finding might best be 
considered in relation to the response bias findings which are especially relevant for 
valenced items (Kapucu, et a l, 2008). Research has found that negatively valenced 
stimuli shift our attention toward them which results in a bias toward saying that the 
item was previously seen irrespective if it was or was not (Kensinger, 2007). This 
can lead to an increase in false alarm rates for negatively valenced items. Although 
shifts in false alarm rates were not specifically investigated in this study, this 
explanation may have been true in the present study as participants demonstrated 
more liberal response bias toward ideographic stimuli than toward neutral stimuli. 
Hence the current finding of better memory accuracy for neutral items than 
ideographic items is understandable. Moreover this may help to explain findings of 
reductions in memory accuracy in clinical checking samples (Coles et a i, 2006; 
Radomsky et al., 2013). Most studies investigating the effect of repeated checking on 
memory accuracy have not considered the role of response bias or shifts in false
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alarm rates. If this were to be measured in future studies it may help to make sense of 
the discrepancies in memory accuracy findings in clinical checking samples.
The study also found that participants’ response bias was more risky for 
verbal ideographic stimuli in comparison to verbal neutral stimuli or visual 
ideographic stimuli. This is perplexing, as research has demonstrated that individuals 
are more likely to utilise more liberal response bias for negatively valenced visual 
stimuli in comparison to neutral or verbal stimuli (Ochsner, 2000). However, the 
current finding may be explained by differences in stimulus control. The verbal 
stimuli were well controlled for valence, CC relevance and a number of other 
variables, whereas the visual stimuli were less so (see Appendix F). Furthermore, 
verbal stimuli were consistently presented using the same background but the 
backgrounds of visual stimuli differed dependent on their context. Factors such as 
background and semantic relatedness affect recognition rates and response bias 
(Hintzman, 1988). Moreover, the verbal stimuli were rated for CC relevance by a 
clinical sample but the visual stimuli were not. Therefore visual items may not have 
appeared relevant or threatening, which may have then caused riskier response bias 
toward ideographic verbal as apposed to visual stimuli.
The prediction that participants would be more confident for ideographic 
stimuli than neutral stimuli was not supported. Again, perhaps this is because the 
ideographic stimuli used were CC related. Analysis revealed that OCI-R checking 
scores did not correlate with checking behaviour, suggesting that participants were 
non-clinical and therefore ideographic stimuli may not have been encoded as 
threatening.
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Further Limitations
Initial power calculations suggested that 80 participants would be necessary 
to achieve significant hypothesised results, with a large effect size at 80% power (a= 
.05). This study is underpowered as only data from 61 participants were used thus the 
likelihood that type-II errors were made is possible. This may specifically be in 
regard to the borderline significant finding of enhanced actual checking in LMC 
groups on verbal memory tasks where a medium effect size was found. However, in 
regard to the responsibility manipulation, which was not significant and had a small 
effect size for the manipulation check (r|p^= .035) and its affect on actual checking 
(rip^=.01), this would not be the case but rather would suggest that the design of the 
manipulation was flawed (as discussed earlier). All of the significant memory 
accuracy and response bias findings effect sizes were medium to large, suggesting 
the probability of type-I errors here is small, and where non-significant results were 
found effect sizes were small. Therefore the use of a larger sample may be helpful to 
explore both the above findings further (after suggested corrections to the 
experimental design have been made) but also to replicate findings in relation to 
memory accuracy and response bias for visual, verbal, ideographic and neutral 
stimuli.
As mentioned previously, the design of the current study did not allow for the 
effects of item type on checking behaviour to be measured. This is a limitation of the 
study as previous research (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003; 2004) has demonstrated 
that individuals with CC are more likely to check ideographic or threat relevant 
objects than healthy participants. Future studies utilising a recognition memory test 
paradigm to investigate potential interaction effects of item type and or stimulus type 
on memory ability, memory confidence, perceived responsibility, and checking
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behaviour would benefit from allowing participants the opportunity to actually check 
their answers at the end of a recognition test. Any changes made to their initial 
answers during this ‘checking opportunity’ would allow a measurement of checking 
behaviour for both item and stimulus types to be taken. Potential interaction effects 
with the other abovementioned factors could then also be explored.
Future studies may benefit from an investigation of a sub-clinical checking 
sample in comparison to a non-clinical sample specifically given the current study 
has demonstrated that factors such as response bias may play a role in reduced 
memory accuracy for checking-relevant stimuli. If a sub-clinical sample is used it is 
suggested that a more sensitive CC measure is utilised such as the Compulsive 
Checking Scale (Coleman, Pieterefesa, Holaway, Coles & Heimberg, 2011). In the 
current study the mean OCI-R checking score was 2.07 but recommended cut-offs 
for clinical significance on this scale are > 5 (Foa, et al., 2002), which suggests that 
with only three questions to measure checking on this scale may not be sensitive 
enough to detecting sub-clinical checkers. Importantly, visual stimuli need to be 
controlled for background, rated by an clinical checking sample, have a larger 
number of categories (to reduce encoding and retrieval interference effects), and be 
CC relevant. The latter suggestion is hard to achieve as OCD is a heterogeneous 
condition with CC often being specific to an individual. Thus perhaps the hypotheses 
may have more fruitful outcomes if an ideographic and ecologically valid design is 
used, such as actual checking of real items (as apposed to a computer-checking task) 
related to an individual’s CC. For example Radomsky et a l, (2001) placed OCD 
checkers under conditions of high and low responsibility whilst physically carrying 
out personally relevant and irrelevant checking tasks in their own homes. The
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manipulations were successful, finding that participants’ memory accuracy was 
reduced in conditions of HR.
Implications for Clinical Practice
The findings suggest that low state metamemory beliefs about ones abilities 
may reduce memory confidence further and also induce checking behaviour. 
Previous research has demonstrated repeated checking behaviour itself serves to 
enhance distrust in memory abilities, which in turn leads to further checking 
perpetuating the checking cycle (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011; Radomsky et al., 
2013; van de Hout & Kindt, 2003). These findings could therefore help to refine 
current treatments for individuals with OCD CC, such as CBT. For example, 
psychoeducation to help individuals become more aware of the relationship between 
their negative beliefs of metamemory and actual checking behaviour. Specifically 
that their beliefs about their memory ability do not actually reflect their memory 
accuracy may help them to resist the urge to check. The use behavioural experiments 
could be helpful by asking participants to put their beliefs to test (as described by 
Radomsky, Shafran, Coughtrey & Rachman, 2010). Furthermore, asking individuals 
to put their memory ability to test to find out if they really do have poor memory or 
whether they just think they have poor memory for everyday actions (Alcolado & 
Radomsky, 2011). This would help individuals to reappraise their beliefs regarding 
their memory ability which if found to be not true could help to break the vicious 
cycle of compulsive checking.
Conclusions
This study aimed to manipulate state memory confidence and perceived 
responsibility to investigate whether these factors influenced checking behaviour of
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neutral and ideographic visual and verbal stimuli; memory accuracy; response bias; 
and subsequent memory confidence and competence-confidence. The findings 
showed that the responsibility manipulation did not work. However, the memory 
confidence manipulation was effective and did numerically enhance actual checking 
of verbal stimuli in the LMC. It also altered memory accuracy, response bias, and 
decreased ratings of competence-confidence and overall memory confidence. The 
findings expand upon current research into OCD CC and have wider implications for 
existing treatment models.
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Appendix A: Ethical Approval
Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences
Ethics Committee
Chair’s Action for Amendment (2)
Ref: 816-PSY-12
Name of Student: SARA MURRAY
Title of Project: Do Memory Distrust and Inflated Responsibility
cause OOD-iike Checking Behaviour
Supervisor: DR ELLEN SEISS
Date of submission of 16*'’ NOVEMBER 201 a
original Proposal:
Date of submission of 1®‘ 21** JUNE 2013
amendment:
13* OCTOBER 2013
A second amendment to the above Project has been submitted to the FAHS Ethics 
Committee.
A favourable ethical opinion has now been given.
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Appendix B: Participant Recruitment Poster
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Appendix C: Participant Forms
i. Participant Information Sheet
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
Participant information Sheet 
A study on the Effects of Information Presentation on Learning 
What is the study about?
This study seeks to investigate the effects of presenting information in different formats and 
how this affects our learning and memory for that information. Depending on the way 
information is processed this can affect our perception and understanding of the information.
This research could help to provide a better understanding of information processing which 
could aid acquisition of new information and potentially help to improve treatments for those 
with mental health and learning difficulties. Therefore we would be grateful if you would help 
us with this by taking part in this study.
Do I have to take part?
It is entirely up to you. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for 
you to read the following information carefully. Feel free to discuss it with others if you wish 
and the experimenter. Even if you agree to take part, you can withdraw from it at any time 
without giving a reason.
What does the study involve?
This project entails two parts and is self paced therefore it can last between 1 hour to 1 and 
a half hours.
Part 1 of the study is an online questionnaire which will ask about past and present 
emotional wellbeing, thoughts and behaviours. This part of the study should take about 10 to 
15 minutes to complete. We are looking for people with a range of scores on these 
questionnaires and there are no right or wrong answers. Therefore after you have completed 
this part of the study we will let you know if you are eligible to undertake part 2 of the study. If 
you are not eligible we’ll bring the experiment to a close and you’ll be free to go. You will still 
earn 1 lab token (if you are a psychology student) or have the chance to be entered into the 
prize. If you are eligible we’ll move onto part 2.
Part 2 of the study will involve completing a series of computer and paper based tasks and 
will last approximately 50 minutes. Initially you will be presented with a list of words and/or 
images, which you will be asked to remember for a later memory test. You will also be asked 
to make a series of judgments to assess your visual motor skills. After this you will then 
complete a memory test and also receive feedback on this test to aid learning. A similar 
procedure will be carried out in a later section of the experiment but you will be asked to 
remember different information. The experiment will then end with a short questionnaire.
Will I receive anything for taking part?
If you choose to participate in the study, and you are a psychology student at the University 
of Surrey you will receive lab tokens. If you are eligible to complete Part 1 only you will 
receive 1 lab token. If you complete both parts of the study you will receive 3 lab credits. If
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you are not a psychology student you can choose to be entered into a prize draw for a 
chance to win one of three H IH H  vouchers: £50 or £30 or £15. Should you wish to 
enter the draw you will be required to provide your e-mail address after the questionnaire so 
we can contact you.
Are there any downsides to taking part?
You may find some of the questions on the online questionnaire in the first part of the study 
quite personal, although this is needed to help us understand the differences between how 
people perceive and learn information. All answers are anonymous and confidential.
Part 2 of the study will involve concentrating on information presented to you. You will be 
given the opportunity to take breaks during the experiment to help you maintain 
concentration. The study does not intend to cause distress however in the unlikely event that 
you do feel distressed please let the experimenter know and they will be able to discuss this 
with you. If appropriate, the experimenter can signpost you to relevant services such as your 
GP, or MIND.
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidentiai?
If you decide that you would like to be a participant, you will be asked to sign a form giving 
your informed consent to take part. However, you are free to withdraw form the study any 
time in the process without having to give the researchers any explanation. Your 
participation in this study will be completely confidential. All information collected will be 
annonymised by coding and storing data according to an allocated participant number to 
ensure confidentiality. All data files will be treated with the utmost confidentiality. No 
individual will be named or identified in any report or possible publication arising from this 
study. Data will be handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and kept for at 
least 10 years.
What if there is a problem?
Any complaint or concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt with during the 
course of the study will be addressed, please speak to the experimenter about this or contact 
Dr. Ellen Seiss (Principal Investigator) via the contact details below.
The University of Surrey holds insurance which covers claims for injury or deterioration in 
health which arise directly from participation in clinical trials but that it applies only in those 
situations where the University can be shown to be legally liable.
Further Information
If you would like further information about this study please feel free to contact me (Co­
investigator) or my supervisor Dr Ellen Seiss (Principle Investigator) on the contact 
information below. The researcher can also provide participants with a summary of the 
findings on request.
Co-Investigator: Principle Investigator:
Sara Murray Dr Ellen Seiss
Email: Email:
Who has reviewed the project?
The study has been reviewed and received a favourable opinion from the University of 
Surrey’s Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics Committee.
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet.
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ii. Participant Consent Form
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
Consent Form
•  I the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in the study investigating the effects of 
information processing on learning.
I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided. I have been given a 
full explanation by the investigators of the nature, purpose, location and likely duration 
of the study, and of what I will be expected to do. I have been advised about any 
discomfort and possible ill-effects on my health and well-being which may result. I
have been given the opportunity to ask questions on all aspects of the study and 
have understood the advice and information given as a result.
I shall inform the experimenter immediately if I suffer any deterioration of any kind in 
my health or well-being, or experience any unexpected or unusual symptoms.
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without needing to
justify my decision and without prejudice.
I understand that in the event of my suffering a significant and enduring injury
(including illness or disease) as a direct result of my participation in the study, 
compensation will be paid to me by the University, subject to certain provisos and 
limitations. The amount of compensation will be appropriate to the nature, severity 
and persistence of the injury and will, in general terms, be consistent with the amount 
of damages commonly awarded for similar injury by an English court in cases where 
the liability has been admitted
I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participating
in this study. I have been given adequate time to consider my participation and
agree to comply with the instructions and restrictions of the study.
Name of volunteer (BLOCK CAPITALS) .................................... ............................
Signed .....................................................................................
Date ....................................................................................
Name of researcher/person taking consent ( BLOCK CAPITALS )
Signed .....................................................................................
Date ....................................................................................
□
□
I consent to my personal data, as outlined in the accompanying information sheet, 
being used for this study and other research. I understand that all personal data | |
relating to volunteers is held and processed in the strictest confidence, and in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act ( 1 9 9 8 ) .
□
□
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A ppendix D: Computer-based Screening
i. Dem ographics Questionnaire
Please provide us with the following information about you:
How old are you? [ANSWER BOX]
What is your gender?
Female [TICK BOX] Male [Tick BOX]
Are you Left Handed [TICK BOX] Right Handed [TICK BOX]
Are you currently diagnosed with any neurological or psychiatric disorder? YES/NO
If YES to the above question please provide more information in the box below.
[ENTER TEXT BOX]
Have you ever been diagnosed with any neurological or psychiatric disorder? YES / NO
If YES to the above question please provide more information in the box below.
[ENTER TEXT BOX]
Have you ever needed to drink a significant amount of alcohol in order to get through the 
day?
YES / NO
If yes, please indicate how often:
Hardly Ever Rarely Sometimes Frequently
Have you ever used drugs or inhaled substances on a regular basis to get high, to feel 
elated or to get a “buzz”?
YES / NO
Have you ever suffered from a severe head injury? YES / NO
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ii. Questionnaire Measures
OCI-R
The following statements refer to experiences that many people have in their everyday lives. 
Circle the number that best describes HOW  M UCH that experience has DISTRESSED or 
BOTHERED you during the PAST M ONTH.
The numbers refer to the following verbal labels:
0 1 2  3 4
Not at all A little Moderately A lot Extremely
1 .1 have saved up so many things that they get in the way. 0 1 2  3 4
2 . 1 check things more often than necessary. 0 1 2  3 4
3 . 1 get upset if  objects are not arranged properly. 0 1 2  3 4
4 . 1 feel compelled to count while I am doing things. 0 1 2  3 4
5 . 1 find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been
touched by strangers or certain people. 0 1 2  3 4
6 . 1 find it difficult to control my own thoughts. 0 1 2  3 4
7 . 1 collect things I don’t need. 0 1 2  3 4
8 .1 repeatedly check doors, windows, drawers, etc. 0 1 2  3 4
9 . 1 get upset if others change the way I have arranged things. 0 1 2  3 4
1 0 . 1 feel I have to repeat certain numbers. 0 1 2  3 4
1 1 . 1 sometimes have to wash or clean m yself simply because I
feel contaminated. 0 1 2  3 4
1 2 . 1 am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my mind
against my will. 0 1 2  3 4
13.1 avoid throwing things away because I am afraid I might
need them later. 0 1 2  3 4
14 . 1 repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches
after turning them off. 0 1 2  3 4
15.1 need things to be arranged in a particular order. 0 1 2  3 4
1 6 . 1 feel that there are good and bad numbers. 0 1 2  3 4
1 7 . 1 wash my hands more often and longer than necessary. 0 1 2  3 4
18.1 frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in
getting rid o f  them. 0 1 2  3 4
Copyright 2002 by Edna B. Foa.
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DASS-21
Please read each statement and click the response which indicates how much the statement 
applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much 
time on any statement.
The rating scale is as follows:
0 Did not apply to me at all
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time
3 Applied to me very much, or most of the time
1 1 found it hard to wind down 0 1 2 3[S]
2 1 was aware of dryness of my mouth 0 1 2 3[A]
3 1 couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0 1 2 3[D]
4 1 experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid 0 1 2 3[A]
breathing,
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion)
5 1 found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things 0 1 2 3[D]
6 1 tended to over-react to situations 0 1 2 3[S]
7 1 experienced trembling (eg, in the hands) 0 1 2 3[A]
8 1 felt that 1 was using a lot of nervous energy 0 1 2 3[S]
9 1 was worried about situations in which 1 might panic and make 0 1 2 3[A]
a fool of myself
10 1 felt that 1 had nothing to look forward to 0 1 2 3[D]
11 1 found myself getting agitated 0 1 2 3[S]
12 1 found it difficult to relax 0 1 2 3[S]
13 1 felt down-hearted and blue 0 1 2 3[D]
14 1 was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with 0 1 2 3[S]
what 1 was doing
15 1 felt 1 was close to panic 0 1 2 3[A]
16 1 was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0 1 2 3[D]
17 1 felt 1 wasn't worth much as a person 0 1 2 3[D]
18 1 felt that 1 was rather touchy 0 1 2 3[S]
19 1 was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical 0 1 2 3[A]
exertion (eg, sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat)
20 1 felt scared without any good reason 0 1 2 3[A]
21 1 felt that life was meaningless 0 1 2 3[D]
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MACCS
This questionnaire is concerned with beliefs that you have about your own memory, 
planning, concentration and decision-making abilities, and your confidence in these 
abilities. Read each statement below, and click the response that most accurately 
describes how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement. Please respond 
to all items even though some may seem repetitive. There are no right or wrong 
answers.
Strongly
disagree
Strongly
agree
1. I have a poor memory.
2. I expect m yself to be 100% certain about 
, the way I plan things.
3. I experience many doubts after making a 
decision.
4. I often doubt my memory for having 
completed tasks.
5. I have little confidence in my memory 
generally.
6. I never do well at memory tests.
7. I am easily distracted.
8. I find it difficult to making decisions on the 
spot.
9. My poor concentration interferes with my 
ability to plan things effectively.
10. I have doubts about my memory.
11. I don’t feel that I make good decisions.
12. I have difficulty keeping my mind focused 
on one task until it is completed.
13. My memory can mislead me at times.
14. I have little confidence in my memory for 
actions.
15. I am never certain about my memory.
Î6. I have little confidence in my memory for 
words and names.
17. I have little confidence in my ability to 
remember how I performed on particular 
tasks.
18. 1 have doubts about my decision-making 
ability.
19. 1 expect m yself to be 100% certain about 
my decisions.
20. I often doubt m y memory for having done 
things properly.
21. 1 have difficulty knowing if  I have actually 
done something, or imagined it.
22. I have a poor concentration ability.
23. I often feel that my memory misleads me.
24. I have little confidence in my decision- 
making.
25. I have little confidence in my ability to 
remember what I did in particular situations.
26. I tiy so hard to remember things, that I end 
up forgetting everything.
27. I put a lot o f  pressure on m yself to do well 
on even small tasks.
28. I must perform tasks perfectly.
2 3 4 5
: 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 " 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 5
2 3 4 5
4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 5
2 3 4 5
2 5
2 3 4 5
2 ^ ■ 1 1 1 5
2 3 4 5
2 g g g 5
2 3 4 5
2 ' " ‘ 3' . ' ' 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 ' ' 5
2 3 4 5
2 ; g -  •• ; 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
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RAS
This questionnaire lists different attitudes or beliefs which people sometimes hold. Read 
each statement carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with it. For each of the 
attitudes, show your answer by choosing the words which BEST DESCRIBE HOW YOU 
THINK. Be sure to choose only one answer for each attitude. Because people are different, 
there is no right answer or wrong answer to these statements.
To decide whether a given attitude is typical of your way of looking at things, simply keep in 
mind what you are like MOST OF THE TIME.
[SCALE: 1= Totally Agree, 2= Agree very much, 3= agree slightly, 4= neutral, 5=disagree 
slightly, 6= disagree very much, 7=totally disagree]
1. I often feel responsible for things which go wrong.
2. If I don’t act when I can foresee danger, then I am to blame for any consequences if 
it happens.
3. I am too sensitive to feeling responsible for things going wrong.
4. If I think bad things, this is as bad as doing bad things.
5. I worry a great deal about the effects of things which I do or don’t do.
6. To me, not acting to prevent danger is as bad as making disaster happen.
7. If I know that harm is possible, I should always try to prevent it, however unlikely it 
seems.
8. I must always think through the consequences of even the smallest actions.
9. I often take responsibility for things which other people don’t think are my fault.
10. Everything I do can cause serious problems.
11. I am often close to causing harm.
12. I must protect others from harm.
13. I should never cause even the slightest harm to others.
14. I will be condemned for my actions.
15. If I can have even a slight influence on things going wrong, then I must act to 
prevent it.
16. To me, not acting where disaster is a slight possibility is as bad as making that 
disaster happen.
17. For me, even slight carelessness is inexcusable when it might affect other people.
18. In all kinds of daily situations, my inactivity can cause as much harm as deliberate 
bad intentions.
19. Even if harm is a very unlikely possibility, I should always try to prevent it at any 
cost.
20. Once I think it is possible that I have caused harm, I can’t forgive myself.
21. Many of my past actions have been intended to prevent harm to others.#
22. I have to make sure other people are protected from all of the consequences of things 
I do.
23. Other people should not rely on my judgement.
24. If I cannot be certain I am blameless, I feel that I am to blame.
25. If I take sufficient care then I can prevent harmful accidents.
26. I often think that bad things will happen if I am not careful enough.
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Appendix E: Exit Questionnaire
Pt #:. 
Cdt:
Questionnaire
Please mark the line with an ‘X ’ for the following questions:
1. How difficult did you find remembering the words?
Not difficult at all Very Difficult
1_________ 2________ _ 3 _______ 4__________ 5
2. How difficult did you find remembering the pictures?
Not difficult at all Very Difficult
1_________ 2__________3_______ 4__________ 5
3. How responsible did you feel for giving the correct answers?
Not responsible at all Very Responsible
1_________ 2__________3_______ 4 _ ________ 5
4. What was the purpose of this study?
If you prefer not to receive lab tokens but would like to be entered into the prise draw for a 
chance to win one of the following three H H I  vouchers: £50 or £30 or £15, please tick 
the box below and provide your email address so we can contact you.
I would like to enter into the prize draw | |
My email address is:________________________________
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study!
Please let the experimenter know you have finished.
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Appendix F: Stimuli
i. Verbal Stimuli
Verbal stimuli were taken from Richards et al. (in press) and Bradley and 
Lang (1999). Words in the Richards et al. (in press) study were rated by individuals 
who had a diagnosis of OCD and 11 non-clinical participants. All words were rated 
for valence, relevance to OCD checking and washing, frequency, concreteness and 
imagability. From an initial list of 334 words 26 washing, 28 checking, 52 negative 
neutral and 52 neutral words were identified. All OCD washing and checking words 
had high negatively valence (scores between 1 and 3) and high relevance to checking 
and washing (scores between 7 and 10). Words were only included which had been 
scored in this manner by at least two clinical individuals.
As the current study required 40 OCD checking relevant words (referred to 
ideographic verbal stimuli in the text) a selection of neutral and negatively valenced 
words, taken from the Bradley and Lang (1999) database of English words, were 
then rated by 5 OCD experts using the same rating criteria as Richards et a l (in 
press). The same selection criteria (negative valence score of between 1 and 3; 
checking relevance score between 7 to 10) were also used to identify a further 12 
OCD checking relevant words. Together this provided a pool of 40 ideographic 
verbal stimuli for use in the current study.
Example of neutral and ideographic word presentation
table burning
Neutral: Ideographic:
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Table F I :
Stimuli Means for Verbal Assessment Phase
Item
Type
Word Valence
M
Frequenc 
y  M
No. o f  
Letters M
Concretenes 
s M
Imagabilit
y  M
OCD CC 
Relevance 
M
Neutral office 5.24 255 6 569 518 -
cork 5.22 9 4 608 631 -
hard 5.22 202 4 425 460 -
street 5 2 2 244 6 579 577 -
fabric 5.30 15 6 565 544 -
chin 5.29 27 4 592 608 -
vest 5.25 4 4 575 581 -
lawn 5.24 15 4 588 608 -
table 5.22 198 5 604 582 -
paper 5.20 157 5 599 590 -
engine 5.20 50 6 586 595 -
locker 5.19 9 6 586 569 -
tool 5.19 40 4 570 538 -
column 5.17 71 6 520 491 -
statue 5.17 17 6 600 563 -
tank 5.16 12 4 581 563 -
month 5.15 130 5 345 448 -
clock 5.14 20 5 591 614 -
journal 5.14 42 7 563 509 -
swamp 5.14 5 5 570 600 -
utensil 5.14 - 7 - - -
door 5.13 312 4 606 599 -
elbow 5.12 10 5 607 602 -
cord 5.10 6 4 564 549 -
trunk 5.09 8 5 596 529 -
rain 5.08 70 4 600 618 -
serious 5.08 116 7 - - -
cabinet 5.05 17 7 593 524 -
rattle 5.03 5 6 549 554 -
hydrant 5.02 - 7 - - -
noisy 5.02 6 5 - - -
taxi 5.00 16 4 - - -
icebox 4.95 3 6 - - -
metal 4.95 61 5 582 541 -
seat 4.95 54 4 568 574 -
storm 4.95 26 5 527 587 -
mantel 4.93 3 6 - - -
aloof 4.90 5 5 - - -
cannon 4.90 7 6 604 588 -
OCD
board 4.82 239 5 565 592 -
CC peril 2.55 34 5 2.55 4.73 8.16
fire 4.73 187 4 9.27 9.55 8.75
risk 3.82 54 4 2.55 2.18 9.33
fault 3.64 22 5 2.09 1.82 9.5
blamed 2.82 46 6 3.36 2 3 6 10
forget 4.18 62 6 3.18 2.91 9.66
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harm 2.91 25 4 2.91 4.00 9.5
unsafe 2.91 41 6 3.00 3.09 9.25
ruin 3.45 31 4 4.91 5.64 8.5
murder 1.73 75 6 5.36 7.18 9.5
infect 2.40 47 6 3.30 4.30 9 3 3
worry 3.27 78 5 3 3 6 3.73 9 3 3
scared 2.82 52 6 3.18 5.09 9.5
doubt 3 3 2 40 5 3.55 3.45 9
fatal 1.73 38 5 3.36 4.64 8.5
panic 1.91 22 5 3.82 4.91 9
lethal 2.00 32 6 3.18 2.91 8.66
danger 3.18 70 6 3.45 4.55 9
guilty 2.45 68 6 2.82 3.09 9.5
blame 2.73 34 5 2.18 2.36 83 3
fret 3.45 28 4 4.00 4.09 9 3 3
ajar 5.00 25 4 4.36 7.09 8.33
burnt 3.36 24 5 6.45 7.73 7
cancer 1.09 25 6 7.18 6.27 8.66
flood 2.55 19 5 7.36 8.82 8.5
error 3 3 2 36 5 3.00 2.91 9
check 4.00 27 5 4.00 3.00 9
bumin
g 2.25 59 7 7.25 8.50 8.25
scald 1.75 31 5 7.50 8.00 6.5
hazard 2.75 12 6 4.25 3.75 6.75
plug 4.50 23 4 9.00 9.50 8
switch 4.50 13 6 9.00 9.50 8
sharp 3.50 26 5 4.25 6.25 7.5
blade 3.75 13 5 8.50 8.75 6.75
ablaze 2.25 21 6 5.25 7.50 7.75
crash 2.00 31 5 4.75 6.25 7.25
knife 3.25 76 5 8.75 9.00 8
needle 3.50 15 6 8.00 9.00 7
threat 2.00 42 6 3.50 3.00 6.5
anxiou
s 3.00 17 7 2.50 5.00 6.5
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ii. Visual Stimuli
Visual stimuli were taken from the I APS database (Lang, Bradley &
Cuthbert, 2005) or from Google. The TAPS database contains valence ratings for a 
variety of images. Five OCD experts were asked to rate on a 10 point likert scale 134 
images for their relevance to OCD checking (1= very low relevance, 10= very high 
relevance), relevance to OCD washing (same as above), and valence (1= very 
negative, 10= very positive). From this a pool of 40 OCD checking relevant 
(referred to as ideographic visual stimuli in the text) and 40 neutral images were 
identified. Images were deemed to be ideographic if they were rated for negative 
valence with a score of between 1 and 3, and rated for checking relevance with a 
score of between 7 to 10 (same as words).
Examples of neutral and ideographic visual stimuli 
Neutral
Î
Ideographic
- a -
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Table F2:
Stimuli Means for Visual Assessment Phase
Item
Type
Neutral
Image
Valence
M
OCD CC 
Relevance 
M
OCD
Contam*
Relevance
M
cabinet 2 2 5.67
cable 5.75 2 4.00
door 1 6 3.75 5.00
electirc fan 5.5 2.75 4.33
Fabric 4.25 4 5.33
fence 6 2.5 6.00
fireplace 6.5 4.75 5.00
cow 1.5 5.5 4.67
barrel 2.5 3.5 5.67
bed 2.5 7.5 3 3 3
book 2 3.5 4.33
bowl 2.5 5 5.00
cabinet 3.75 3 5.00
child 3.25 5.5 6.67
clip 4.5 3 3 5 5.00
clock 4.25 2.75 5.00
cloud 1.75 1.5 6 3 3
earth 1.75 1.5 7.00
fork 3.5 5.5 5.00
glass 2.25 6 4.00
gorilla 1.5 4.25 7.00
lamp 4.5 2.5 6.00
man 1.5 3 6.00
rolling pin 1.75 4.75 4.67
shadow 2.75 1.5 6.00
shoes 2 3 5 6.25 3 3 3
spoon 2 6 5 3 3
stool 2 2.75 5.00
stopper 2 3.5 5.00
tea 3 3 5 4 5.33
tool 4 2 3 3 3
watch 2.25 1.75 5.00
weights 2.75 3.25 4.67
window 4.5 5.25 5.00
woman child 2 3 5 3 5.67
woman 1.75 3 4.33
lotion 4 5.25 6.00
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OCD CC
padlock 5.5 1.25 4.67
plug 6.75 2.25 3.67
shower 5.75 6.5 6.00
bath full 7.00 5.00 4.00
boiling pot 8.00 2 3 5 3.33
bolt 7.00 4.25 3.67
broken wire 1 8.25 3.25 2 3 3
broken wire 2 8 3 5 4.25 2.00
candle 1 7.00 2.75 7.33
candle 3 7.25 5.00 3.33
car 1 7.25 3.50 3.67
car mirror 1 7.00 1.75 4.00
check light 7.75 3.25 3.67
cigarette 2 8.00 6.00 2.00
door latch 1 7.25 4.75 3.00
door latch 2 7.50 3.75 4.67
door lock 1 8.00 3.25 3.33
door open 2 7.00 3.00 3.67
door open 3 7.00 2.50 3.67
electric hob on 7.75 2.50 3.67
electric socket 1 8.75 3.50 2 3 3
electric socket 2 8.00 5.25 3 3 3
electric socket 3 7.75 3.25 3.00
gas fire 7.75 4.00 5.00
gas hob on 7.25 1.75 4.00
hair dryer on 7.25 4.25 3 3 3
iron on 1 8.25 3.00 3.67
iron on 2 8.00 2.75 4.67
kettle on 7.25 2.50 5.00
knife 7.00 5.50 3.00
light switch 1 7.00 3.75 3 3 3
log fire 8 4.75 6.00
medication 1 7.25 3.5 3.00
overflow 1 8 4.75 3 3 3
overflow 2 8 4.5 3.00
padlock closed 7.25 5.75 4.00
pot on 7.75 2 5.33
straighteners 1 8.5 2.75 4.33
straighteners 2 8.5 3 4.00
tap on 3 7.50 6.00 4.33
toaster on 8.25 4.50 5.00
window open 3 7.25 2.5 4.00
NOTE: * Contamination
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Appendix G: Filler Tasks 
Examples of spatial aptitude filler tasks
Find out which o f  the figures (1), (2), (3) and (4) can be formed from the 
pieces given in figure (X).
j  Uk. r
C.3
/>
(X ) (1) GO (3)
R 2
D.4
_ c ■ ■
6
W h i c h  i s  t h e  o d d  o n e  o u t ?
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Appendix H: Manipulation Scripts 
Memory Confidence Manipulation Feedback
The percentages displayed to participants were randomly generated by the computer 
programme. For the HMC groups they ranged between the top 10-15%, and for the 
LMC groups they ranged between the bottom 30-45%.
HMC:
“You scored in the top 15% of the general population on the memory test. This 
places you in the above average range in comparison to those in your age group.
Well done! Keep up the good work for the next part.”
LMC:
“You scored in the bottom 32% of the general population on the memory test. This 
places you below average in comparison to those in your age group. Please try and 
concentrate during the next phase.”
Responsibility Manipulation Scripts
HR:
“Please try and remember as many pictures as you can -  in a previous round of data 
collection the results were unusable because it appeared that participants made many 
mistakes. We really need people to not make mistakes in this round of data collection 
as this will adversely affect the results of the study. The researcher cannot collect any 
further data after this round of data collection, so please try and remember the 
pictures as well as you can. The pictures will be presented very quickly so please be 
ready to pay attention.”
LR:
No feedback given but participants asked if they would like to take a short break.
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Appendix I: Participant Debrief
Verbal Debrief
“So how did you find the experiment?” > Participant comments noted
“This study is investigating the effects o f  memory confidence and perceived responsibility 
on OCD-like checking behaviour and memory performance. Research suggests that 
everybody experiences unwanted intrusive thoughts from time to time but individuals who 
have a diagnosis o f  OCD tend to think that these thoughts might come true and may cause 
harm. As a result o f  this they feel responsible to ensure that no one gets hurt and thus 
engage in compulsive checking rituals to alleviate any potential harm and distress. Research 
has also demonstrated that when individuals with OCD engage in checking behaviour this 
causes them to doubt their memory which leads to further checking.
“The current study sought to find out if  individuals who are placed in a situation which 
causes them to doubt their memory, irrespective o f  having a diagnosis o f  OCD or not, would 
engage in checking behaviour or alter their memory performance, especially when they are 
placed under conditions o f high perceived responsibility. In order to test this hypothesis I 
had to manipulate your memory confidence and responsibility. This was done by giving you 
false feedback on your performance on a memory test. Therefore all feedback given to you 
about your performance on the memory test during the experiment and any instructions 
regarding your responsibility were NOT TRUE.''
“The study was investigating the effects o f presenting different stimuli e.g. pictures/words 
and how this affects your memory for these stimuli. Some o f  the stimuli were emotionally 
valenced and some were neutral. Research suggests that we are more likely to remember 
emotive material than neutral material. It has also shown that we are more likely to 
remember pictures than words as pictures provide more contextual information for us to use 
as cues. This research will help us to develop treatments for people with mental health 
conditions such as OCD as these people often have low memory confidence and therefore 
feel compelled to repeatedly check their actions because they doubt they have carried out an 
action. It will also help us to explore ways in which to help those with learning and memory 
difficulties”.
“Thank you for your participation in this experiment”. “Would you like to ask any 
questions?”
“Please could you refrain from discussing the procedure and aims o f  this study with others 
you know who might take part in the study as this will severely affect our ability to carry 
out the experiment and collect useful data”.
Light refreshments were also provided to aid eomfort and as thanks.
No participants expressed that they felt distressed in any way following the 
experiment and all participants were happy for their data to be used. However, as a 
precaution all participants were provided with the University’s Wellbeing Centre,
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and NHS Direct contact details and encouraged to speak to their GP if they felt they 
required any support (see handout below).
Thank you for taking the time to complete 'A study ïmesÿgaimg the 
effect of information processing on leamingl
Further Information
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
If you would like further information about this study please feel free to contact me (Co-investigators) 
or my superwsor Dr Ellen Seiss (Principle Investigator) on the contact information below. The 
researchers can also provide participants with a summary of the findings on request.
'n5:jj^esïïqlbisy 
Sara Murray 
Trainee Clinical P 
Email
choloqist
Principal Investigator: 
Or Ellen Seiss 
Lecturer
Any complaint or conoem about any aspect of the w ay you have been  dealt with during the course of the study 
will b e  add ressed , p lease  speak  to the experim enter about this or contact Dr. Ellen S eiss (Prindpal investigator) 
via the contact details above.
Alternatively:
• You can  contact: th e  Centre fo r ’/Vfellbeing a t the University of Surrey on 01483 68 9498 or via email: 
ce  ntrefo rwel Ibei no@ su rrev. ac.uk
• Your G P or NHS Direct on 084 5 4647
T he University of Surrey holds insurance which covers claims for injury or deterioration in health which arise 
directly from  partidpation in clinical trials but that it applies only in those  situations w here the University can be 
show n to be legally liable.
Prize Draw
If you choose to enter into the prize draw for a chance to win one of three vouchers: £50 or
£30 or £15, and provided your email address. You will be contacted in approximately April 2014 when 
the prize draw will take place.
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Appendix J: Data Normality Tests
Table J:
Shapiro-WilkNormality Test, Skewness andKurtosis z-scores and Outliers by Group
Variable Group® Shapiro-Wilk Skewness Kurtosis Outlier Parametric
Statistic d f Sig. z z Identifier
OCI-R_T 1 .94 15 .339 .59 .80 Yes
2 .87 15 .039* 2.17 1.12 No
3 .91 16 .100 .09 1.45 Yes
4 .85 15 .018* 2.34 1.39 47 No
OCI-R_C 1 .78 15 .002* 2.81 2.23 15 No
2 .90 15 .097 1.52 .06 Yes
3 .88 16 .038* 1.84 1.06 Yes
4 .64 15 .000* 4.82 7.98 47 No
DASS-S 1 .89 15 .058 1.42 1.55 9 Yes
2 .92 15 .176 .88 .87 Yes
3 .95 16 .434 1.12 .07 46 Yes
4 .70 15 .000* 4.27 6.25 47,61,59 No
DASS-D 1 .84 15 .013* 2.30 1.55 Yes
2 .88 15 .048* 1.33 .65 Yes
3 .82 16 .005* 2.70 1.94 38,46 No
4 .49 15 .000* 6.03 11.56 47 No
DASS-A 1 .92 15 .208 .00 .96 Yes
2 .86 15 .023* 1.34 .73 Yes
3 .86 16 .023* .84 1.09 Yes
4 .66 15 .000* 4.50 7.29 61 No
RAS 1 .97 15 .877 .71 .55 Yes
2 .91 15 .140 .33 1.56 22,24,25 Yes
3 .99 16 .995 .03 .55 Yes
4 .93 15 .262 1.60 .47 Yes
MACCS_T 1 .93 15 .306 1.10 .02 Yes
2 .95 15 .473 .19 1.00 Yes
3 .97 16 .756 .31 .28 Yes
4 .88 15 .049* 1.64 .71 Yes
MACCS 1 .92 15 .191 1.88 1.40 10 Yes
GM 2 .94 15 .426 .05 1.24 Yes
3 .95 16 .428 .15 .09 Yes
4 .88 15 .043* 1.17 .45 Yes
MACCS 1 .95 15 .467 .30 .36 Yes
DM 2 .95 15 .581 .99 .47 28 Yes
3 .96 16 .712 .46 .27 Yes
4 .92 15 .180 1.87 1.79 47 Yes
MACCS 1 .95 15 .583 .29 .16 9,13,14 Yes
AC 2 .94 15 .432 .67 .88 Yes
3 .93 16 .268 .62 .75 Yes
4 .94 15 .382 1.72 .19 Yes
MACCS 1 .96 15 .681 .51 .54 13 Yes
HS 2 .94 15 .446 .81 .40 Yes
3 .87 16 .025* .81 .43 Yes
4 .96 15 .718 .85 .12 Yes
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Variable Group® Shapiro-Wilk Skewness Kurtosis Outlier Paramet
Statistic d f Sig. z z Identifier
W _D iff 1 .85 15 .020* .27 1.31 Yes
2 .94 15 .422 .53 .67 Yes
3 .91 16 .112 1.05 .06 37 Yes
4 .91 15 .126 1.29 .84 Yes
P_D iff 1 .92 15 .173 1.08 .16 6 Yes
2 .91 15 .126 1.29 .84 Yes
3 .95 16 .488 1.27 .54 Yes
4 .92 15 .206 .73 .25 48,60 Yes
P_Confid 1 .97 15 .806 .27 .58 Yes
2 .93 15 .249 .81 .37 24 Yes
3 .88 16 .045* 1.26 .40 Yes
4 .85 15 .019* 2.05 1.36 4 8 ,61 No
P U r g e 1 .95 15 .505 .89 .48 Yes
2 .89 15 .058 .57 1.36 Yes
3 .93 16 .284 .19 .78 Yes
4 .86 15 .024* .06 1.60 Yes
P C h eck 2 .60 15 .000* .07 .59 Yes
3 .27 16 .000* 7.09 14.66 37 N o
4 .60 15 .000* 1.35 1.44 Yes
W C onfid 1 .94 15 .338 .09 .47 Yes
2 .96 15 .641 .44 .49 23 Yes
3 .91 16 .100 .30 1.02 Yes
4 .94 15 .403 .63 .31 Yes
W U rg e 1 .97 15 .784 1.35 1.44 Yes
2 .88 15 .041* .27 1.42 Yes
3 .92 16 .202 .04 1.05 Yes
4 .83 15 .01* 1.23 .95 Yes
W C h eck 1 .60 15 .001* 1.32 1.38 Yes
2 .56 15 .001* 2.02 .65 No
3 .62 16 .001* 1.01 1.77 Yes
4 Constant 15 Constant 1.23 .95 Yes
P_N_d' 1 .97 15 .888 .54 .95 Yes
2 .98 15 .939 .49 .32 Yes
3 .92 16 .169 1.01 .87 Yes
4 .94 15 .382 .23 .76 Yes
P_OCD_d' 1 .93 15 .242 1.32 .64 3 Yes
2 .92 15 .214 1.58 1.05 12,25 Yes
3 .91 16 .109 2.23 1.76 41 Yes
4 .96 15 .718 .28 .39 Yes
W_N_d* 1 .98 15 .955 .67 .43 Yes
2 .99 15 .998 .87 .73 Yes
3 .98 16 .975 1.20 .98 Yes
4 .97 15 .817 .26 .31 Yes
W_OCD_d' 1 .96 15 .761 .78 .98 8 Yes
2 .92 15 .180 .06 1.14 Yes
3 .89 16 .053 2.30 1.47 44 Yes
4 .95 15 .589 .48 .71 Yes
P_N _C 1 .95 15 .456 1.24 1.07 12 Yes
2 .91 15 .157 .93 .89 Yes
3 .96 16 .604 1.36 .80 40 Yes
4 .91 15 .151 1.15 .41 Yes
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Variable Group® Shapiro-Wilk Skewness Kurtosis Outlier Paramet
Statistic d f Sig. z z Identifier
P_OCD_C' 1 .91 15 .159 .04 .15 Yes
2 .90 15 .096 .58 1.37 18,28 Yes
3 .98 16 .981 .66 .15 Yes
4 .96 15 .691 .10 .69 Yes
W _N_C 1 .82 15 .007* 3.27 5.04 12 No
2 .97 15 .865 .18 .03 29 Yes
3 .90 16 .070 1.61 .20 Yes
4 .95 15 .532 .28 .62 Yes
W _OCD_C 1 .96 15 .761 .79 .98 8 Yes
2 .92 15 .180 .05 1.41 Yes
3 .89 16 .053 2.30 1.47 44 Yes
4 .95 15 .589 .48 .71 Yes
P_C_N 1 .93 15 .251 .89 .87 Yes
2 .97 15 .801 .32 .58 Yes
3 .93 16 .251 1.14 .48 Yes
4 .93 15 .258 1.76 2.19 48 Yes
P_C_OCD 1 .93 15 .258 .91 .64 Yes
2 .95 15 .479 1.17 .17 25 Yes
3 .93 16 .245 1.24 .24 Yes
4 .93 15 .253 1.63 1.61 48 Yes
W_C_N 1 .92 15 .214 1.35 .96 Yes
2 .90 15 .083 1.70 .31 Yes
3 .93 16 .237 1.25 .96 37,43 Yes
4 .90 15 .107 1.62 2.22 48 Yes
W_C_OCD 1 .94 15 .404 .50 1.02 Yes
2 .90 15 .111 1.28 .24 19,21,23,2
4,25,28
Yes
3 .91 16 .133 1.18 .69 Yes
4 .94 15 .423 .08 .31 Yes
D_W _P_Diff 1 .77 15 .001* .58 .36 Yes
2 .84 15 .012* 2.02 1.29 16,20,21,2
4,28,29
Yes
3 .92 16 .181 .94 .16 Yes
4 .69 15 .000* 1.34 1.20 Yes
d' 1 .93 15 .295 1.05 .15 3 Yes
2 .98 15 .973 .57 .08 Yes
3 .93 16 .291 1.41 1.28 44 Yes
4 .95 15 .502 1.12 .00 Yes
P_d' 1 .94 15 .403 .63 .98 3,14 Yes
2 .98 15 .984 1.96 2.80 No
3 .93 16 .275 1.21 .01 Yes
4 .97 15 .915 .40 .46 Yes
W_d' 1 .93 15 .290 1.18 .99 6,8,15 Yes
2 .94 15 .364 .57 1.05 Yes
3 .94 16 .295 1.52 .71 Yes
4 .91 15 .161 .76 1.34 Yes
D_P_W_d' 1 .95 15 .553 1.57 .26 Yes
2 .95 15 .460 1.07 .04 21 Yes
3 .93 16 .227 1.75 1.35 41 Yes
4 .94 15 .420 .15 .59 Yes
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Variable Group® Shapiro-Wilk Skewness Kurtosis Outlier Parametric
Statistic d f Sig. z z Identifier
C 1 .98 15 .927 .23 .87 Yes
2 .92 15 .175 .54 .91 Yes
3 .97 16 .857 .76 .34 Yes
4 .95 15 .568 .11 .22 Yes
P C ' 1 .93 15 .253 .58 .45 Yes
2 .97 15 .868 .66 1.12 Yes
3 .96 16 .641 .79 .16 Yes
4 .94 15 .418 .74 .54 Yes
W _C 1 .97 15 .805 .80 1.05 15 Yes
2 .90 15 .109 .08 1.32 Yes
3 .88 16 .040* 2.30 1.57 44 No
4 .94 15 .359 1.04 .48 50,55,56 Yes
N _C 1 .79 15 .003* 3.39 5.47 12,15 No
2 .91 15 .119 .39 1.25 Yes
3 .93 16 .274 .76 .02 Yes
4 .93 15 .233 .66 1.02 Yes
OCD_C 1 .96 15 .661 1.15 .25 8 Yes
2 .93 15 .260 .96 .75 Yes
3 .93 16 .255 1.73 .89 Yes
4 .95 15 .579 .71 .61 Yes
NOTE'. * Significant at p= .05; “Group 1 : LMC-LR; Group 2: HMC-LR; Group 3: LMC-HR;
Group 4; HMC-HR
W= Verbal stimuli; P= Visual stimuli; OCD= OCD Items; N = Neutral Items; C= Item Confidence; 
Confid= Overall memory confidence; Urge= Urge to check item; Check= Number o f  checks; 
d -  Memory Accuracy; C -  Response Bias; Diff= Difficulty; D= Difference between factors 
OCI-R: T= Total, C= Checking subscale; MACCS: T= Total, GM= General Memory, DM =  
Decision Making, AC= Attention & Concentration, HS= High Standards; DASS: S= Stress,
D= Depression, A= Anxiety.
After exploration of histograms, data were decided to be non-parametric if: 
• their skewness and kurtosis z scores were > ± 2.78 (i.e. 3 SD from the mean), 
and
• the Shapiro-Wilk test was significant, and
• they had a large number of unexplained outliers.
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Appendix L: Exploratory Correlations
Exploratory correlations were performed to investigate whether participants’ 
trait memory confidence (measured by MACCS) and trait responsibility (RAS) 
beliefs, but also current anxiety, depression and stress levels (DASS-21) and the 
OCI-R total and checking scores related to urge to check, checking behaviour and 
memory task performance (memory accuracy, response bias, and overall memory 
confidence). For this, the data were analysed independent of the manipulation status 
and all groups were combined. Only significant correlations are reported in text but 
please see Table L for full findings, and also the accompanying scatter plots.
Spearman’s rho correlations were used to investigate the relationship between 
urge to check and the aforementioned measures. For the verbal memory task, the 
negative correlation between urge to check and depression, rg (61)= -.260, p= .043, 
and the positive correlation between urge to check and the MACCS High Standards 
subscale, rs (61)= .276, p= .031, were significant. No correlations were significant for 
the visual memory task.
Point-biserial correlations^ were conducted to investigate the relationship 
between actual checking and the abovementioned measures. For the verbal memory 
task, the negative correlation between checking and the DASS-21 Depression 
subscale, r(61)= -.2SS,p= .025, and the positive correlation between checking and 
the MACCS General Memory subscale r{6\)= .331,p= .008, were significant. For 
the visual memory task, the positive correlation between checking and the RAS, 
r(61)= .292, p= .022, and the negative correlation between checking and the MACCS 
General Memory subscale, r(61)= -.305,/?=.017, were significant.
Point-biserial correlation used due to the dichotomous variable (checking) being discrete
89
Spearman’s rho correlations did not reveal any significant effects between 
memory accuracy or response bias and any of the abovementioned measures. 
However, a significant negative correlation between the mean overall memory 
confidence scores and the MACCS Decision Making subscale was found for the 
verbal memory task, rX61)= -.336,p= .008.
Summary and Discussion
Exploratory correlational analysis importantly revealed that the OCI-R total 
and checking scales were not related to urge to check and actual checking in the 
tasks, and therefore cannot explain differences between groups. There was also no 
relationship between general memory beliefs (MACCS General Memory) and urge 
to check, but that lower general memory trait beliefs were related to more checking 
of verbal stimuli but less checking of visual stimuli. Furthermore, the relationship 
between lower trait beliefs of decision making abilities (MACCS Decision Making) 
decreased confidence in recollection of verbal stimuli. Considering that verbal 
stimuli are rated as more difficult to remember these findings would make sense. 
Also, lower the trait expectation of cognitive performance (MACCS High Standards) 
was positively correlated to urge to check. These findings would lend support for 
Nedeljkovic and Kyrios (2007) who propose that one’s trait metamemory beliefs are 
instrumental in focusing attention on internal processes (such as doubts), and such 
focus on doubts further leads to reduced confidence in memory for ones actions, 
which in turn perpetuates checking behaviour (Wells & Matthews, 1994). The RAS 
was not correlated to urge to check. However enhanced actual checking was related 
to lower trait perceived responsibility. This finding may have occurred due to 
possibility of a type-I error occurring. Owing to the small sample size a few 
individuals may have scored in the ‘wrong’ direction and thus would have had a
90
disproportionate influence over the outcome of this correlation. Neither the MACCS 
nor the RAS were correlated with memory accuracy or response bias. Lastly, a 
correlational relationship between enhanced levels of urge and actual checking, and 
reduce levels of depression on the verbal memory task was found. Conceivably, this 
may be due to less depressed individuals having greater motivation to check more 
difficult items. It is important to note that the mean depression score across groups 
was 3.47, well below clinical significance (cut-off >9), additionally ANCOVAs 
revealed that although the depression score may have affected data it did not affect 
the checking variables.
Relevance for clinical practice. If checking behaviour is influenced by low 
trait metamemory beliefs (e.g. general memory, decision making and expectations 
placed on oneself about the one’s cognitive performance) as suggested by the 
correlational analysis in this study and research by Nedeljkovic and Kyrios (2007) 
then perhaps the use of measures such as the MACCS could be helpful in screening 
for such beliefs which would help to target treatment more effectively and at an 
earlier stage.
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Selected Exploratory Correlation Scatter Plots
DASS-D
Figure Ll: Significant negative correlation between urge to check verbal stimuli and 
DASS-21 depression subscale score, across groups.
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Figure 12; Significant positive correlation between checking of visual stimuli and
the RAS, across groups.
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Figure L3: Significant negative correlation between checking of visual stimuli and 
the MACCS General Memory subscale, across groups.
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Figure L4\ Significant positive correlation between checking of verbal stimuli and 
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Introduction
Background
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is an anxiety disorder characterised 
by intrusive distressing obsessional thoughts and compulsions which can 
significantly disrupt everyday functioning. Prevalence of OCD in the adult 
population of the UK is 1.2%, with a life time prevalence of 2.5% (NICE, 2005). 
OCD is a heterogeneous symptomatic condition with various sub-types. However, 
checking compulsions are thought to be the predominant subtype with this occurring 
in 50% of OCD patients, with 15% of the general population demonstrating sub- 
clinical checking compulsions (Stein, Erode, Anderson & Walker, 1997).
Numerous models seek to explain the aetiology and perseverance of OCD. 
Cognitive behavioural models propose that it is natural to experience unwanted 
intrusions, however, individuals with OCD develop maladaptive beliefs and 
appraisals regarding these intrusions which then cause distress (Salkovskis, 1985). 
When intrusions are appraised as being personally relevant and unacceptable, 
threatening in nature, and accompanied by feelings of responsibility to prevent harm 
they are thought to develop into obsessions (Rachman, 1997). In turn compulsions 
arise in an attempt to reduce the perceived harm and distress.
An alternative to this is the memory deficit hypothesis. This draws on 
cognitive models suggesting individuals with OCD suffer from pathological doubt 
(Rasmussen & Risen, 1989), specifically for those with the checker subtype (Muller 
& Roberts, 2005). Pathological doubt is thought to stem from uncertainty of the 
properties of actions, situations or items, and this uncertainty appears to be due to a 
memory deficit in OCD checkers whereby they are unable to recall the outcome of 
their actions (Sher, Frost & Otto, 1983). There is mixed evidence for this hypothesis,
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with some studies finding poorer recall and recognition in OCD checkers than a non- 
clinical sample (Sawamura, Nakashima, Inoue & Kurita, 2005) but others finding no 
such difference (McDonald, Antony, MacLeod & Richter, 1997). Some studies who 
did find a memory deficit in OCD checkers found lower memory accuracy for 
visually presented stimuli than for verbal stimuli (Woods, Vevea, Chambless & 
Bayen, 2002 for a review). Nevertheless, more consistent evidence has been found 
that OCD checkers have metamemory impairments. Metamemory is an individual’s 
knowledge, awareness and control over their memory, including memory confidence 
(Lovelace, 1984). A meta-analysis conducted by Woods et al. (2002) reviewed 
studies investigating memory and metamemory performance in OCD checkers and 
non-clinical samples, and found that OCD checkers reported less confidence in their 
memories than the non-clinical samples. If OCD checkers have less confidence in 
their memory this might explain why they feel compelled to repeatedly check an 
item/situation. This supports Rachman’s (2002) cognitive theory of compulsive 
checking that proposes checking behaviour is maintained by an increase in perceived 
responsibility and harm, reduced confidence in memory and an uncertainty to an end 
of threat.
Paradoxically, numerous studies have found that the act of repeated checking 
further reduces memory confidence. A study by van den Hout and Kindt (2003) 
manipulated checking behaviour in a non-clinical sample using a computer 
animation task where during a series of experiments participants had to perform 
checking rituals on a virtual gas stove (relevant OCD condition) or light switch 
(irrelevant OCD condition). After which they performed a memory test of their 
checking behaviour and rated their memory confidence. No difference in memory 
accuracy across the conditions was found, however, participants in the relevant
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condition reported lower memory confidence after repeated checking than those in 
the irrelevant condition. This effect has been demonstrated using actual checking 
tasks in healthy participants (Coles, Radomsky & Homg, 2006; Radomsky & 
Alcolado, 2010) and in OCD populations (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; Hermans, 
Engelen, Grouwels, Joos, Lemmens & Pieters, 2008). Thus it appears that when 
repeated checking behaviour is induced, specifically for OCD relevant and 
threatening stimuli, this tends to decrease trust in recollection of carrying out the task 
correctly. Similarly, when participants have engaged in repeated checking they have 
reported higher levels of perceived responsibility and a subsequent increase in 
memory distrust (Radomsky, Rachman & Hammond, 2001).
More recent correlational studies have shown that individuals with OCD, 
specifically those with the checker sub-type, have low trait memory confidence and 
this is associated with checking behaviour (Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007;
Nedeljkovic, Moulding, Kyrios & Doron, 2009). Alcolado and Radomsky (2011) 
manipulated a non-clinical sample’s memory beliefs by providing false feedback on 
a standardised memory test before completing a further memory test to assess 
memory ability and urge to check. They found that participants in the low memory 
confidence condition had greater urges to check following the memory task than 
those in the high memory confidence condition, providing support for Nedeljkovic et 
a l’s. (2007, 2009) findings. Thus given the existing literature discussed earlier and 
the findings from Adolado and Radomsky (2011) it is plausible that there is a bi­
directional relationship between memory confidence and checking behaviour.
Research Question
Does memory distrust and inflated perceived responsibility cause OCD checking 
behaviour? This study seeks to manipulate memory confidence, to investigate if low
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memory confidence causes an increase in checking behaviour (urge and actual 
checking), and whether this effect is moderated by perceived personal responsibility, 
in a non-clinical sample. Additionally, memory accuracy will be assessed to 
establish if memory confidence and responsibility affect memory performance and if 
this effect is modulated by ideographic^® verbal or visual stimuli. Such a study would 
help to bring together theories of memory accuracy and confidence with cognitive 
theories of OCD.
Main Hypotheses
1. There will be a significant main effect of memory confidence on checking 
behaviour. Participants in the low memory confidence (LMC) group will 
have a stronger urge to check and greater checking behaviour than 
participants in the high memory confidence (HMC) group.
2. There will be a significant main effect of responsibility on checking 
behaviour. Participants in the high responsibility (HR) group will have 
stronger urges to check and greater checking behaviour than participants in 
the low responsibility (LR) group.
3. There will be a significant interaction between memory confidence and 
responsibility, with participants in the LMC and the HR group having 
stronger urges to check and greater checking behaviour than participants in 
the other groups.
a. These effects will be enhanced for ideographic stimuli compared to 
neutral stimuli.
Ideographic refers to OCD relevant stimuli
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b. Additionally, memory accuracy will be reduced in the HR/LMC 
condition, especially for visual stimuli.
Method 
Participants
Power calculations (utilising G-Power: Erdfelder, Paul & Buchner, 1996) 
estimate that approximately 80 participants (20 per group) will be necessary to 
achieve significant hypothesised results, with a large effect size at 80% power (a= 
.05). This is based on previous research investigating the effects of manipulated 
memory confidence on urge to check (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011).
Inclusion criteria
Participants must be over the age of 18 years old and must be native English 
speakers with normal or corrected vision.
Exclusion criteria
Participants must not have any neurological or psychiatric conditions, 
specifically mood or anxiety difficulties (see ‘Measures’ and ‘Procedure’ sections for 
screening process).
Design
The study will have a 2x2x2x2 four-way mixed factorial design. The 
independent between-subject factors are memory confidence (high vs low) and 
responsibility (high vs low), with two independent within-subject factors: stimulus 
type (word vs image) and item type (neutral vs ideographic).
The dependent variables are:
1. Checking behaviour
a. Urge to check i.e. after recognition test (measured by urge ratings)
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b. Actual Checking i.e. number of times
2. Memory accuracy
a. Recognition i.e. the number of correctly recognised previously seen 
items (old)
3. Memory Confidence ratings during and after recognition test 
Measures
In order to establish that the sample will be non-clinical in nature the following 
measures will be used during the screening process:
• Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa, et al., 2002). The 
OCI-R is an 18-item self-report measure which assesses obsessional thoughts 
and behaviours in clinical and non-clinical populations. It is composed of six 
subscales: Washing, Checking, Ordering, Obsessions, Hoarding and 
Neutralising which reflect OCD symptoms as described in the DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). It has good internal consistency 
across scales (a= 0.81- 0.90) and good test re-test reliability with alpha scores 
ranging from 0.82-0.84, in both clinical and non-clinical samples (Foa, et al., 
2002). See Appendix 1.1.
• Depression Anxiety Stress Scale-21 (DASS-21 ; Lovibond & Lovibond,
1995). The DASS is a 21-item self-report measure which assesses depression, 
anxiety and stress in clinical and non-clinical populations. This short version 
of Lovibond and Lovibonds’ (1995) DASS has good internal consistency 
across the three subscales ranging from 0.87- 0.94 and good test re-test 
reliability of 0.93 (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns & Swinson, 1998). See 
Appendix 1.2.
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Additionally, the following measures will be administered at screening to give an 
indication of existing trait memory confidence and responsibility beliefs:
• Memory and Cognitive Confidence Scale (MACGS; Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 
2007). The MACCS is a 28-item self-report measure of trait meta-memory 
factors associated with OCD, including memory confidence. It has good 
internal consistency for the overall scale (a= 0.92) and subscales (a= 0.72- 
0.93), with good test re-test reliability of 0.94 (Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007). 
See Appendix 1.3.
• Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000). The RAS is a 
26-item questionnaire which assesses general beliefs about responsibility 
associated with OCD. It has good internal consistency (a= 0.90) and test re­
test reliability of 0.94 (Salkovskis, et al., 2000). See Appendix 1.4.
Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) will be used to assess participant’s memory 
confidence in the recognition test. The VAS will be a 100 point scale ranging from , 
‘0’ (absolutely not confident) to ‘100’ (absolutely confident). A similar VAS will be 
used as a responsibility manipulation check at the end of the experimental procedure, 
ranging from ‘0’ (not responsible at all) to ‘10’ (very responsible).
Stimuli/Material
A pool of 90 neutral (45) and ideographic words (45), controlled for word length, 
frequency and valence from Kucera and Francis (1967) or Bradley & Lang (1999) 
will be used as verbal stimuli (Appendix 3 for sample). Similarly, 45 neutral images 
and 45 ideographic images, controlled for valence and frequency, taken from the 
lAPS database (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2005) or extracted from Google will be 
used as visual stimuli (Appendix 3). Please see Appendix 2 for provisional debrief,
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consent form, instructions and manipulation scripts (memory confidence and 
responsibility). Verbal and visual stimuli, in addition to all other materials will be 
piloted prior to experimental use.
Procedure
To aid clarity the procedural steps of the study have been number listed and 
placed in Appendix 4.
Recruitment and Screening 
Participants will be recruited from The University of Surrey via the Psychology 
Departments’ SONA participant recruitment system. Additionally flyers advertising 
the study will be placed around the campus (Appendix 2.1). Given the recruitment 
method an expected response rate to advertising of the study will be 120 participants. 
This is based on previous research conducted at the University of Surrey, utilising a 
similar recruitment method and design (Bati, 2011).
After recruitment participants will be directed to an online screening website 
where an initial briefing will be given, collection of demographic information and 
administration of the OCI-R, MACCS, DASS-21 and RAS. Participants who meet 
eligibility criteria will later be invited to take part in the experimental procedure.
Experimental procedure
Participants will be told that the aim of the study is to investigate memory 
performance for different types of stimuli. After informed consent is collected 
participants will be randomly allocated to one of four groups: (i) LMC/LR; (ii) 
LMC/HR; (iii) HMC/LR; (iv) HMC/HR. Each of the four groups will engage in a 
manipulation procedure, verbal and visual assessment procedures but the order of the 
assessment procedures will be counterbalanced.
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Manipulation Procedure
Participants will be presented with a study list of valenced’  ^ (6) and neutral 
(6) words/images (12 total), which will be followed by a three minute filler task 
(completing diagrammatical mazes/puzzles). They will then be given a recognition 
test and asked to state if they have seen the item before (old) or if it is a new item 
(new). Memory confidence will then be manipulated by telling the participant they 
scored either high (HMC) or low (LMC) on the preceding memory test (see 
Appendix 2.4 for scripts). This is followed by manipulating feelings of responsibility 
(see Appendix 2.4 for potential responsibility manipulations) by presenting the 
manipulation on a computer screen.
Verbal Assessment Procedure
Participants will be presented with a new study list containing ideographic 
(20) and neutral (20) verbal stimuli and then asked to complete a three minute filler 
task (same as above). The responsibility manipulation will be reinforced, dependant 
on condition, by the researcher verbally presenting the script to participants. 
Participants will complete a recognition test and asked to rate their confidence of 
their response to each item on a VAS. Checking Phase: On completion of the 
recognition test participants will be asked if they would like to check their answers. 
If they do, they will be asked to rate their urge to check on a VAS. Participants will 
then be directed to a new screen where they can perform the recognition test again. 
At the end of the checking phase participants will be asked to rate their overall 
confidence in their responses, their urge to check and asked if they would like to
" Words which have an emotive valence to act as a substitute for ideographic stimuli in the 
manipulation procedure.
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check again (limited to 3 checks). If participants did not wish to check they would be 
directed to the next step below.
Visual Assessment Procedure
Identical task to the verbal assessment procedure but utilising images.
Exit Questionnaire
Participants will be given an exit questionnaire which will ask them to rate 
‘how responsible they felt for giving the correct answers’ on a VAS (responsibility 
manipulation check). They will also be asked what they thought the aim of the study 
was. Afterwards they will be fully debriefed, offered light refreshments and thanked 
for their participation.
Ethical considerations
The British Psychological Society’s Code of Human Research Ethics (2010) 
ethical principles were considered whilst designing the study. Please see Appendix 5 
for full ethical considerations and proposed measures to address these. Due to word 
limitations a brief synopsis is discussed below.
Prior to the design of the study consultation with Service Users and Carers 
was sought to attempt to eliminate any possible distress which maybe caused due to 
employment of deception and manipulation of independent variables. In addition to 
this the study will be piloted prior to full data collection to ensure as minimal distress 
is caused as possible. Informed consent will be collected and participants with be told 
they are able to withdraw from the study without penalty and that their data will 
remain anonymous. If the participant becomes distressed the experiment will be 
ended and they will be signposted to where they can receive further support. A full 
debrief of study aims and manipulations will be given, with the opportunity to 
discuss these further, at the end of the experiment. Participants will also be given
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contact details of the University’s Wellbeing Centre if they would like further 
support after the experiment. Details of how the data will be stored, used and 
disseminated will also be given.
Application will be made to the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences in early 
October 2012 for ethical approval.
R&D Considerations
N/A
Proposed Data Analysis
Data will first be screened and explored using descriptive statistics. Outliers 
will be identified and replaced, additionally the distribution of data and residuals will 
be checked and reported. Four-way ANOVA’s will be used to analyse main effects 
and interactions of the between-group variables (responsibility and confidence) on 
the dependant variables (checking behaviour). Furthermore ANCOVA’s will be used 
to re-run analyse controlling for covariates (RAS and MACCS) to ascertain if effects 
remain. Post-Hoc tests will also be employed.
Service User and Carer (SUC) Consultation
In order to ensure the study would provide scientific value and consider 
ethical principles the research question, study aims and procedure were discussed 
with SUCs (see Appendix 6). Feedback from this meeting was incorporated into the 
design, and further feedback will be sought on finalisation of the design and prior to 
pilot of the study.
Feasibility Issues
The potential obstacles to completing the study and identified possible 
solutions are listed in Table 1 below.
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Table 1
Potential Obstacles and Solutions to Conducting the Proposed Study
Potential Obstacle Potential Solution
Participant
Recruitment
Due to the large response rate and sample size required study 
advertisement will be placed on the Department of 
Psychology’s SONA system. This is accessed by 
approximately 600 students. Additionally, advertising flyers 
will be placed around the campus to broaden the participant 
pool and potential audience.
Participant Retention The study comprises a screening phase and experimental 
phase. As such a prize draw consisting of a leading retailers’ 
vouchers will be set up to encourage retention between 
phases, in addition to acknowledgement and thanks of 
participation.
Design of Valid 
Stimuli and 
Manipulations
The study will utilise sets of neutral and ideographic word 
lists and images. Ideographic words and images will either be 
extracted from existing databases or from pervious research, 
these will then be piloted to ensure their validity. Similarly, 
potential experimental manipulations will also be piloted to 
enhance plausibility and validity.
Design of Computer 
Program
The research is familiar with the use of E-Prime and will 
therefore design the required program.
Achievability A Gantt chart has been designed with a proposed timeline for 
carrying out the study. Contingency time periods have been
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included for any unforeseen delays.
Dissemination Strategy
On completion of the study a report will be written and submitted for 
assessment. In addition the completed report will also be submitted for publication to 
peer reviewed journals and finding presented at relevant conferences/organisations.
Study Timeline
Table 2
Study timeline showing start and completion dates
Tasks Start date
Duration
(days) End date
MRP Design & 
Approval 20/05/2012 120 17/09/2012
Ethics Process 30/08/2012 72 10/11/2012
Design of Stimuli 03/09/2012 50 23/10/2012
Pilot 17/09/2012 40 27/10/2012
Data Collection 07/01/2013 285 19/10/2013
Data Analysis 03/06/2013 150 31/10/2013
Draft Introduction 07/01/2013 172 28/06/2013
Draft Method 28/06/2013 60 27/08/2013
Draft Results 31/10/2013 67 06/01/2014
Draft Discussion 06/01/2014 28 03/02/2014
Full Draft 07/01/2013 413 24/02/2014
Final Submission 03/02/2014 63 07/04/2014
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Appendices
NOTE: Appendices 1-3 removed as these are in the MRP Empirical Paper
Appendix 4 Procedure 
Appendix 5 Ethical Considerations
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Appendix 4- Sequential steps of the experimental procedure:
1) Online Screening: Prior to experimental procedure. Initial briefing, 
administration of the OCI, MACCS, DASS-21, RAS; and collection of 
demographics
2) Experimental Procedure:
a) Briefing: Describe procedure, collect informed consent
b) Random allocation of participants to 4 groups dependant on manipulation:
i) Low Memory Confidence (LMC) and Low Responsibility (LR)
ii) LMC and High Responsibility (HR)
iii) High Memory Confidence (HMC) and LR
iv) HMC and HR
3) Manipulation Procedure* (Computer Task):
a) Memory encoding- Study list 1 ** (Verbal & Non-verbal ideographic and 
neutral stimuli)
b) Filler (3 min)
c) Recognition test 1 (old/new) **
d) Manipulation of Confidence- false feedback (high [HMC] or low [LMC] 
performance on memory test)
e) Manipulate Responsibility- written (outcome of recall test important to 
researcher obtaining degree [HR] or no adverse effect of recall results [LR])
4) Verbal Assessment Procedure (Computer Task):
a) Study List 2- new (ideographic and neutral words)
b) Filler task (3 min)
c) Manipulate Responsibility- verbally
d) Recognition test 2 (old/new). After each item:
i) How Confident are you in your choice? (VAS rating)
End of Recognition Test: Would you like to check answers? (YES/NO).
• I f ‘NO’ thenzT» Exit.
• If ‘YES’- Checking Phase- rate urge to check (VAS) then
o Press X to check answers and complete test again
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o At end of checking phase- VAS to ask how confident they are 
overall in their answers and to rate urge to check. Then asked 
if they would like to check again (YES/NO)
■ I f ‘NO’ t h e n E x i t
■ If ‘YES’ the repeat checking phase (limited to 3 
checks).
5) Filler (3 min)
6) Visual Assessment Procedure (Computer Taskk 
Identical to step 4 but using ideographic and neutral images
7) Exit questionnaire: responsibility and confidence manipulation check and 
participants views of study aims
8) Debrief and Thanks
* Manipulation different for the different conditions 
**Memory not assessed, used to induce manipulations
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Appendix 5- Ethical Considerations
Ethical Principle Ethical Issue Plan to address ethical issue
Consent Informed Consent Participants will be partially 
informed of the of study aims. 
Additionally they will be given a 
written and verbal description of 
the procedure, expected length of 
study duration, any potential 
risks/benefits and contact details 
for further information.
Deception Withholding true aim In order to ensure the awareness 
of study hypotheses do not 
influence data collection 
deception will be employed. 
Consultation with Service Users 
and Carers (SUC) prior to 
development of experimental 
design was sought to ensure 
participants will be deceived as 
little as possible with minimal 
potential for distress to be caused. 
Participants will be fully 
debriefed directly after 
completion of experimental 
procedure. ______________
R isk Emotional Distress Due to the nature of the research 
question there may be potential 
for some distress to be caused 
during manipulation of 
independent variables. In addition 
to liaising with SUCs, the study 
will be piloted prior to full data 
collect to ensure as minimal 
distress is caused as possible. 
Participants will be informed they 
will be given feedback on their 
performance during the 
experiment prior to giving 
consent. If the participant 
becomes distressed the 
experiment will be ended and 
they will be signposted to where 
they can receive further support.
A full debrief of study aims and 
manipulations will be given, with 
the opportunity to discuss these 
further, at the end of the 
experiment. Participants will also
119
be given contact details of the 
University’s Wellbeing Centre if 
they would like further support 
after the experiment.
Physical Harm Environmental safety and health 
risks will be assessed by the 
researcher and appropriate 
authorities under COSSH 
regulations.
Debriefing Full debrief The full aims, participants’ role 
and purpose of the study will be 
given directly after experiment 
completion. An opportunity for 
discussion, further information, 
researcher contact details and 
light refreshments will also be 
provided.
Withdrawal Discontinuation and Data Prior to consent participants will 
be informed they are able to 
withdraw from the experiment, 
without penalty, at any stage and 
can ask for their data to be 
destroyed if they wish*.
*Data Storage Data will be stored electronically 
and securely. Participants will 
also be informed that after a 
certain date, where the researcher 
is due to submit their project for 
marking, it will not be possible to 
remove the participant’s data.
Confidentiality and 
Privacy
Identity Participants will be informed 
their participation and data will 
be made and remain anonymous.
Data Collection and Usage Data collection, storage and usage 
will be in accordance with the 
Data Protection Act 1998.
Distribution of 
research
On completion of the study, the 
findings will be distributed via 
publications, presentations etc. 
Data may also be used in future 
research conducted by the 
researcher.
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Abstract
The metamemory deficit hypothesis proposes that individuals with Obsessive- 
Compulsive Disorder (OCD) suffer from pathological doubt. This doubt is thought to 
lead to repeated checking of an item because individuals with OCD report poor 
memory confidence. However, studies which have found support for this hypothesis 
make use of eorrelational designs thus do not tell us anything about the causal effect 
of memory confidence on checking behaviour or the effect of checking behaviour on 
memory confidence. This review sought to identify and critically evaluate 
experimental studies that have manipulated checking behaviour to test its effect on 
memory confidence, in order to establish a causal direction of the relationship 
between checking and memory distrust. A systematic search was carried out on the 
OCD and metamemory literature through which 11 experimental studies were 
identified for review. Results revealed that induction of checking behaviour in OCD 
and non-clinical samples significantly decreases memory confidence and other 
metamemory factors (vividness and detail) when checked stimuli are relevant to 
OCD compulsions (e.g. checking of a gas stove). In the majority of studies there was 
no significant effect of repeated checking on memory accuracy. Memory distrust was 
amplified when participants perceived they were personally responsible for the 
outcome of their checks. Given that repeated checking appears to cause memory 
distrust, which is enhanced under conditions of high responsibility, and there is 
correlational evidence that trait memory confidence leads to repeated checking, a 
future research question may be to investigate this bi-directionality to establish 
causal-effect within an OCD checker subtype.
250 words
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Introduction
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is a debilitating form of anxiety 
disorder which is characterised by intrusive distressing obsessional thoughts and 
compulsions. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) obsessions are 
persistent and recurrent thoughts, impulses or images which cause distress and are 
often recognised as senseless. Compulsions are repetitive behaviours or mental acts 
which are stereotyped and performed in an attempt to alleviate distress caused by 
obsessions. Individuals are diagnosed as having OCD if they experience obsessions 
and/or compulsions which cause marked distress, are time consuming (occupy more 
than 1 hour per day), have some insight they may be unreasonable, and significantly 
disrupt everyday functioning. In addition to this symptoms must not be due to a 
medical condition or substance induced (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
Annual prevalence rates of OCD in the US are between 1-1.6%, with lifetime 
prevalence rates between 1.9% - 3% (Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, Merikangas, & 
Walters, 2005). OCD individuals have a relatively high comorbidity rate of 50-60% 
of Axis I (depression, anxiety disorders) or II (personality disorders) disorders during 
the lifetime (Matthews, 2009). Thus it is suggested that OCD is on continuum of 
mental illness rather than existing as a single entity (Bienvenu et al., 2012).
OCD is a heterogeneous symptomatic condition with five predominate sub- 
types (Mataix-Carls, Rosario-Campos & Leckman, 2005): contamination obsessions 
with washing compulsions; symmetry obsessions with ordering and counting 
compulsions; doubt obsessions with checking compulsions; unwanted sexual or 
aggressive obsessions with checking and reassurance seeking compulsions; and 
hoarding compulsions fuelled obsessions of retaining objects. The predominant
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subtype is that of checking compulsions which is found to occur in 50% of OCD 
patients in addition to 15% of the general population demonstrating sub-clinical 
checking compulsions (Stein, Frode, Anderson & Walker, 1997).
There are various models which seek to establish the aetiology and 
persistence of OCD. Biological models propose a dysregulation in the serotonin and 
dopamine pathways and dysfunction of the orbito-striatal area and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (Abramowitz, Taylor & McKay, 2009). However, other forms of 
mental health difficulty have also been linked with disruption of these pathways and 
brain regions thus other models need to be considered. Cognitive behavioural models 
are founded on research which suggests that almost everyone in the general 
population experience unwanted intrusions (Gibbs, 1996), however individuals with 
OCD develop maladaptive beliefs and appraisals regarding these intrusions which 
cause distress (Salkovskis, 1985). It is thought these intrusions develop into 
obsessions when they are appraised as being personally relevant and unacceptable, 
threatening in nature, and accompanied by feelings of responsibility to prevent harm 
(Abramowitz, Khandker, Nelson, Deacon & Rygwall, 2006; Rachman, 1997). 
Compulsions develop in a bid to reduce this perceived harm and distress.
In addition to biological and cognitive behavioural models there has been a 
substantial amount of research conducted on the memory deficit hypothesis. OCD 
patients have been observed to have pathological doubt (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1989) 
which is thought to stem from uncertainty of the properties of actions, situations or 
items. Pathological doubt has been found to be strongly associated with the checker 
subtype(M uller & Roberts, 2005). For example, a checker may have left home and
Henceforth referred to as checkers
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then have a sense of uncertainty as to whether they had turned the tap off before they 
left the house. This thought is appraised as significant and consequently they feel 
compelled to return home to check they have turned the tap off and check family 
members are safe. It is this sense of uncertainty that has raised questions as to 
whether checkers have a memory deficit, as they appear to have an inability to recall 
outcomes of actions (Sher, Frost & Otto, 1983).
In order to investigate the memory deficit hypothesis the majority of 
researches have tested retrospective memory (memory for events which have 
occurred in the past). Two forms of memory are highlighted in the literature, explicit 
and implicit. Explicit memory is conscious recollection of past experiences whereas 
implicit memory is an unconscious awareness of past events which often aids 
performance on tasks, but is unable to be verbalised (Schacter, 1987). Explicit 
memory allows us to recollect episodic memory (memory for specific events) and is 
usually measured through recognition and recall tasks Studies using this 
methodology have revealed inconsistent findings. A meta-analysis conducted by 
Woods, Vevea, Chambless and Bayen (2002) reviewed studies investigating memory 
performance in checker and non-clinical samples. Analysis failed to find verbal 
recognition deficits across studies but there was some evidence for recall deficits in 
checkers in comparison to a non-clinical sample. However, the review found 
relatively small effect sizes for recall deficits, therefore there appears to be little
Recognition is the ability to accurately distinguish between stimuli which have been previously 
presented (old) and non-presented stimuli (new) during test. Recall is the ability to retrieve stimuli 
which have been previously presented either spontaneously (free recall) or with the aid o f  an 
associated previously presented stimulus (cued recall).
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evidence for a recognition deficit in checkers and only marginal difference in 
performance between checkers and control samples for recall.
There has been more consistent evidence that checkers, however, do have 
metamemory impairments. Metamemory encompasses an individual’s knowledge, 
awareness and control over their memory, including memory confidence (Lovelace, 
1984). MackNally and Kohlbeck (1993) compared checkers with non-checker OCD 
patients (NOG) and non-checker controls (NC) on recall tasks and found that 
checkers were less confident than both groups of non-checkers, despite no effects of 
memory accuracy. This finding has been repeatedly replicated in both recall and 
recognition memory, suggesting that checkers lack confidence in their memory rather 
than having a memory deficit (Constans, Foa, Franklin, & Mathews, 1995; Foa et al., 
1997; Hermans, Martens, De Cort & Pieters, 2003; Karadag, Oguzhanoglu, Ozdel, 
Atesci & Amuk, 2005; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993; Tolin et al., 2001). Woods’ et al. 
(2002) meta-analysis found similar results with studies investigating this effect 
showing large effect sizes. A study conducted by Tolin et al. (2001) compared OCD 
patients, anxious controls and non-anxious controls performance on a recall task 
using OCD threatening, non-threatening and neutral stimuli. Once again they found 
no differences in memory accuracy but that memory confidence for threatening 
stimuli was decreased in the OCD group. Furthermore, OCD checkers reported lower 
confidence levels than OCD non-checkers. Evidence from the above studies would 
be consistent with clinical observations that checkers are susceptible to pathological 
doubt (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992) and also compliment cognitive behavioural 
models. Rachman’s (2002) cognitive theory of compulsive checking proposes that 
checking behaviour is maintained by an increase in responsibility and perceived 
harm, reduced confidence in memory and an uncertainty to an end of threat.
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The literature therefore appears to show that checkers perform similarly to 
non-checker OCD patients and non-OCD controls (Cuttler & Graf, 2009) on memory 
accuracy tasks, but despite this checkers appear to have poorer confidence in their 
memory ability to recall items correctly. One would assume that if you were 
uncertain if you turned the heater off you might check once to see if the heater had 
been turned off, however, checkers feel compelled to repeatedly check the heater is 
off due to a sense of uncertainty (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992). This strategy seems 
intuitive but a number of studies have demonstrated that the act of repeated checking 
can actually have a paradoxical effect on memory confidence. A study by van den 
Hout and Kindt (2003a) manipulated checking behaviour in a non-clinical sample 
using a computer animation task where during a series of experiments participants 
had to perform checking rituals on a virtual gas stove. Participants in the 
experimental condition had to engage in ‘relevant’ (gas stove on or off) checking and 
those in the control group conducted ‘irrelevant’ (light switch on or off) checking.
All participants engaged in pre and post test training of checking the gas stove and 
rating their confidence in which gas rings they turned off. There was no difference in 
memory accuracy across conditions, however, participants in the relevant condition 
reported lower memory confidence after repeated checking than those in the 
irrelevant condition. This effect has been demonstrated using actual checking tasks 
(Coles, Radomsky & Horng, 2006; Radomsky, Gilchrist & Dussault, 2006; 
Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010) and in OCD populations (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 
2007; Hermans, Engelen, Grouwels, Joos, Lemmens & Pieters, 2008). Thus it 
appears that when repeated checking behaviour is induced, specifically to OCD 
relevant and threatening stimuli, this tends to decrease trust in recollection of 
carrying out the task correctly.
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A number of studies have found a correlation between compulsive checking 
and poor memory confidence, including studies with people with the OCD checking 
subtype (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007) and analogue studies with people scoring 
high on self-report checking measures (Goodman, Price, Rasmussen & Mazure, 
1989; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). However, correlational studies tell us nothing 
about causation. Findings from the correlational studies are consistent with the 
suggestion, amongst other things, that poor memory confidence causes repeated 
checking or that repeated checking causes poor memory confidence. The purpose of 
this review therefore is to identify and critically evaluate experimental studies that 
have manipulated checking behaviour and tested its effect on memory confidence. 
This will allow the causal direction of the relationship between checking and 
memory confidence to be scrutinised as there does not appear to be a similar review 
in the peer reviewed literature.
Method 
Search Strategy
Literature was collected by conducting systematic searches of electronic 
databases. In addition to this, references from selected articles and citations of these 
articles in the various databases were searched for further relevant titles. The 
following database search engines were used: ESBO (PsychArticles, Psychlnfo, 
Psychology and Behavioural Sciences Collection) and SciVerse (Science Direct, 
Scopus and Pubmed). Article titles, abstracts and key words were searched using the 
following terms: “OCD” OR “Obsess*” OR “Compuls*” AND “Memory 
Confidence” OR “Memory Distrust” OR “Metamemory” AND “Check*”. This 
yielded a total of 40 articles.
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Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
Electronic databases were search for English language articles printed in 
peer-reviewed journals between 1995- 2012. For the purposes of this review, only 
articles which directly manipulated or induced checking behaviour in order to 
investigate episodic retrospective memory confidence were included. Other forms of 
memory paradigms related to potential memory deficits (memory biases, semantic 
memory, implicit memory, working memory etc) were excluded as they have not be 
identified as pertinent in OCD checking behaviour and memory confidence (Cutler & 
Graf, 2009; Woods et al., 2002). In addition to this, only articles which had an adult 
working age sample (18-65 years of age) were included.
From manual inspection of abstracts and/or methods sections 11 of the 
original 40 articles were selected for review. The articles present data from 850 
healthy participants, 41 OCD patients and 16 psychiatric control patients. The 
majority of articles made use of a design based on van den Hout and Kindf s (2003a) 
study, with either an interactive computer animation task or a physical checking task. 
Thus the articles will be reviewed by task type, i.e. computer task or physical 
checking task.
Results
Despite a large volume of literature demonstrating correlational evidence that 
low memory confidence is associated with repeated checking only 11 studies were 
identified which make use of a experimental design to test a causal relationship 
between repeated checking and memory confidence. These 11 studies will be 
discussed and critically evaluated below. Please refer to Table 1 in the appendix for 
further details of each of these studies. As the majority of studies make use of a
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design similar to that of van den Hout & Kindt’s (2003a) study, this will be discussed 
in depth first.
Computer Checking Tasks
It has been suggested that checking behaviour is maintained in clinical cases 
because the act of checking does not reduce uncertainty levels, as would be expected, 
but rather fosters greater memory mistrust (Rachman, 2002). If this theory is true, it 
would explain why confidence in memory is undermined in checkers specifically, 
whilst recollections for non-checking events remains intact. As this theory had not 
been tested with an experimental paradigm van den Hout & Kindt (2003a) first 
sought to investigate if memory distrust persists after repeated checking within a 
non-clinical sample. Memory confidence is thought to be influenced by vividness 
and detail of a memory trace, the more vivid and detailed a memory the higher the 
confidence in the memory (Brown & Kulik, 1977). van den Hout and Kindt propose 
that the more an individual checks an item the more familiar the item becomes to the 
individual. Familiarity has been shown to decrease vividness and detail because 
familiarity causes higher semantic processing which inhibits lower level perceptual 
processing (colour, shape, texture etc.; Roedinger, 1990). van den Hout and Kindt 
thus suggest that higher levels of familiarity (through repeated checking) cause 
decreases in vividness and detail which leads to poor memory confidence in 
recollections, resulting in further checking and perpetuating a counter productive 
maintenance cycle.
This theory was tested using a student sample on a computer animation task 
were participants had to engage in ritual checking of a gas stove. A mixed factorial 
design was used were participants were randomly placed either into one of two 
groups, ‘relevant’ (checking of gas stove) or ‘irrelevant’ (checking light bulbs) and
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then their memory accuracy and metamemory was assessed. During a training phase 
participants were asked to turn OFF three gas rings/light bulbs depending on 
condition (presented as on), then to turn them ON, turn them OFF and lastly to check 
they were OFF. Following training and experimental manipulation test were 
administered where participants were assessed on their last checking episode for (1) 
memory accuracy (indicating gas rings checked), (2) vividness and detail ratings 
(using a 100mm visual analogue scale [VAS]), (3) confidence in which rings had 
been checked (using a VAS), and (4) outcome confidence (how confident all gas 
rings are OFF, using a VAS). In between tests the experimental group carried out 20 
‘relevant’ checks and the control group 20 ‘irrelevant’ checks. Please see table in 
Appendix for full study details. Results revealed no difference in memory accuracy 
between relevant and irrelevant conditions at both pre and post test. However, there 
was a significant decline in vividness, detail and confidence in the repeated relevant 
checking condition from pre to post test in comparison to the irrelevant condition. 
However, there was no difference in the outcome confidence ratings for both groups. 
To explore these results further a second experiment was conducted.
In experiment 2 the procedure was the same as experiment 1, except incorrect 
feedback (irrespective of actual performance) during training was give to both 
adequately and inadequately turned off stimuli, to ensure participants did not assume 
an absence of feedback after training meant they were turning off the stimuli 
correctly. Additionally, participants were asked what type of memory source they 
used to answer the confidence in outcome of checking question by indicating on a 
VAS at one end if they ‘know’ (general feeling of knowing, i.e. familiarity) or just 
‘remember’ (concretely remember) at the other. Results were identical to experiment 
1, with participants in the relevant condition indicating less usage of ‘remember’
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responses for outcome confidence but with no increase in usage of ‘know’ responses. 
To rule out the potential that the control group my have given extra attention to the 
post-test memory assessment (as they were tested on gas rings rather than light bulbs 
which may have made them aware of the occurrence of a memory test) a third 
experiment, which was identical to experiment 2, was conducted with only a post­
test assessment. Again, the results were identical to experiments 1 and 2. Thus van 
den Hout and Kindt argue that repeated checking increases familiarity of checked 
items promoting conceptual processing and inhibiting perceptual processing. 
Consequently, reducing vividness and detail of the checked items and rendering 
distrust in memory.
van den Hout & Kindt’s (2003a) study demonstrated that inducing repeated 
checking behaviour in a non-clinical sample can produce memory distrust. Their 
study made use of a computer animation task which allowed manipulation of OCD- 
like checking behaviour and controlled for participants guessing checking was 
related to memory confidence. To establish this a two-way ANOVA with vividness, 
detail, memory confidence (as dependent variables) and ‘correctly (not) guessing’ as 
a covariate was run and revealed that data from participants who did correctly guess 
the aim did not affect the results (p< 0.025). However, participants were also asked 
to rate the importance of the task at pre and post test and results revealed that the 
relevant group attached marginally (p= 0.06) less importance to the checking task 
than the irrelevant group. This would suggest that the use of a computer animation 
task potentially lacked ecological validity in the relevant condition, presumably as 
participants knew no harm would come if they failed to check correctly. Considering 
this, and due to the length and number of repeated checking trials, individuals may 
have lost concentration which could explain the decrease in vividness and detail
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ratings, and subsequent memory distrust. A further limitation of the study was the 
use of a VAS to rate ‘Remember/Know’ responses. Traditionally participants are 
asked to declare the source of their memory by the use of a forced choice response to 
either ‘remember’ or ‘know’ as they are seen as mutually exclusive (Yonelinas, 
2002). Thus the use of a VAS to measure the source of memory may not have been 
an accurate reflection.
A further two studies conducted by van den Hout and Kindt (2003b; 2004) 
made use of the same procedure as experiment 3 from their earlier study (2003a). 
However, the use of a more traditional forced choice ‘remember/know’ paradigm 
was implemented. In addition to this the authors sought to investigate if the 
phenomenological experience of checking for a non-OCD sample was the same as 
that for a checker sample. Thus participants were given, at pre and post test, a series 
of statements (cf. Reed, 1985, in van den Hout & Kindt, 2003b) provided by an 
checker sample regarding their experience of uncertainty after checking (e.g. “I can 
remember that I’ve done it. But the memory isn’t clear somehow”) and asked to rate 
their endorsement of these statements on a VAS. In order to control for semantic 
specificity the same quotations were provided with expressed ambivalence twisted 
(e.g. “I can’t remember that I’ve done it, but the memory is clear somehow”). The 
results from both studies (2003b; 2004) replicated that of the earlier study, memory 
accuracy remained intact but there was a significant decrease in vividness, detail and 
memory confidence in the relevant group in comparison to the irrelevant group. 
There was no difference in confidence of the outcome of checking between groups, 
however participants in the relevant group made use of significantly more ‘know’ 
responses as a source of their certainty than the irrelevant group. This was reflected 
by participants in the relevant group only endorsing OCD like ambivalent statements
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toward memory uncertainty. In van den Hout and Kindt’s 2004 study they also 
added a further question about perceived effort and responsibility when carrying out 
the checking task pre and post test. Results indicate that after repeated checking 
participants in the relevant group reported a significantly reduced sense of making 
their best effort and of acting responsibly compared to the irrelevant group.
From these findings they concluded that doubt about whether an act has 
occurred or not is a normal phenomenon, however, distrust in memory becomes a 
reinforcing and maintaining factor in clinical samples because patients with OCD 
feel compelled to repeatedly check, which causes them to distrust their memory even 
further. This is compounded by the act of checking in itself making checking 
behaviour feel less effortful (due to familiarity) resulting in the individual feeling 
they are behaving less responsibly than intended. OCD individuals thus become 
stuck in a perseverative checking loop. This theory supports Rachman’s (2002) 
cognitive theory of compulsive checking, however, the authors did not measure urge 
to check following repeated checking. Despite the phenomenological validity of the 
results, the findings cannot be fully generalised to a checker population as OCD is 
thought to be a heterogeneous condition with each checker having their own personal 
checking type bias, therefore this procedure may not be relevant to all checkers. In 
all of their studies (2003a/b and 2004) the authors did not screen their sample for pre­
existing psychiatric disorders, which may have affect outcome of results as both 
mood and anxiety disorders have been shown to affect memory and metamemory 
performance (Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Matthews, 1997). Nor did they screen 
their healthy participants to ensure they did not have OCD symptoms.
Cognitive models of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985, Rachman, 2002) propose that 
inflation of personal responsibility to reduce harm to self and others causes distress
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which drives checking behaviour. This has been empirically established by 
manipulation of responsibility beliefs increasing urge to check (Lopatka & Rachman, 
1995). Boschen and Vuksanovic (2007) expanded on the work of van den Hout and 
Kindt by comparing an OCD sample {n= 14) to a healthy non-psychiatric {n= 40) 
using the same computer animation task (2003a) but adding in a third factor, 
manipulation of perceived responsibility. Participants were told that another 
participant would receive a mild electric shock if they failed to turn off a gas ring or 
light bulb correctly, emphasising they were responsible for the outcome of the other 
participant. Metamemory, memory accuracy, perceived responsibility and 
importance of task were assessed pre, mid (after checking trails 1,5, 10, 15 and 20) 
and post test. Results were similar to previous studies, repeated checking had no 
effect on memory accuracy but significantly reduced vividness, detail and memory 
confidence in the relevant condition as the number of trials increased for both OCD 
and control groups. Furthermore there was a significant decrease of memory 
confidence in the OCD group when under the high responsibility condition in 
comparison to low responsibility condition, with no such effect with the control 
group. Participants in the relevant high responsibility condition also showed an 
increase in urge to check. Boschen & Vuksanovic’s (2007) study supported pervious 
findings and cognitive models of OCD. Their use of an OCD sample allows for 
generalisation of results, however, they had a relatively small sample size of OCD 
patients {n= 14) therefore increasing the chance of type II error. A strength of this 
study is that they screened their control groups to ensure they did not display OCD 
symptomology which prior studies did not. Further limitations include the use of 
Milgram’s (1963) well know paradigm in delivering ‘supposed’ electric shocks. 
Considering the control condition contained psychology students, they could have
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guessed the aim of the manipulation and thus not believe the electric shock would 
actually be delivered. The participants were also not assessed for co-morbid or pre­
existing psychiatric disorders, such as depression which has been shown to influence 
memory performance. Lastly, the use of mid-test memory and metamemory ratings 
added to an already lengthy procedure thus fatigue could have influenced 
metamemory performance.
Repeated checking has been linked with a decrease in confidence of 
perception (van den Hout, Engelhard, de Boer, du Bois & Dek, 2008) and attention 
(Hermans et a l, 2008). Dek, van den Hout, Giele and Engelhard (2010) sought to 
investigate this, in a non-clinical sample, by using the same paradigm as that of van 
den Hout & Kindt (2003a) but using abstract stimuli in the computer task to test if 
previous findings were due to stimuli specificity (see table in Appendix for further 
details). Perception and attention were assessed using a VAS, with questions for 
these factors based on the Brief Cognitive Confidence Questionnaire (Hermans et al., 
2008). Results revealed that repeated relevant checking (checking of abstract gas 
rings) significantly reduced vividness, detail and memory confidence. However, 
memory accuracy increased in both groups from pre-test to post-test but this was 
shown not to be as a result of repeated checking. Confidence in perception was not 
affected by repeated checking but significantly increased in both groups. On the 
other hand there was a non-significant trend (p= 0.06) toward reduced confidence in 
the relevant checking group in comparison to the irrelevant group. The authors 
thought the difference in results from previous studies maybe due to the nature of the 
abstract stimuli used, thus they re-ran the experiment a second time with a new 
sample to test robustness of the findings. The second experiment confirmed previous 
findings, repeated checking led to significant increase in memory distrust, vividness
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and detail in the relevant group, with no differences in memory accuracy across both 
groups. There was also no significant difference between perception and attention 
confidence ratings in both groups. Thus this study added to the existing literature by 
demonstrating that repeated checking of OCD specific stimuli is not necessary to 
induce memory distrust. Although this study replicated pervious findings they did 
not attempt to investigate the possible cause of decline in memory confidence like 
other studies which used the ‘remember/know’ procedure. This would have allowed 
an investigation of the potential link between shifts from perceptual processing to 
conceptual processing with confidence in perception and attention. It could also 
potentially explain the difference in results from prior studies (Hermans et al., 2008) 
investigating memory confidence.
A study conducted by Tallis (1993) found that OCD checking behaviour was 
attenuated by asking participants to imagine novel and distinct stimuli when they felt 
the urge to check. Boschen, Wilson and Farrell (2011) replicated van den Hout and 
Kindt’s (2003a) study to investigate if novel and distinct stimuli would affect 
repeated checking behaviour and its affect on memory confidence. The authors 
included a Perceptual Change (PC) condition in addition to the relevant and 
irrelevant conditions. In the PC condition the stove top would change colour every 
five trials in an attempt to increase novelty and distinctiveness. Their results 
replicated previous findings, repeated checking in the relevant condition lead to a 
significant reduction in memory confidence, vividness and detail but did not have an 
affect on memory accuracy. Memory confidence increased in the irrelevant condition 
from pre to post test but there was no such difference in memory confidence in the 
PC condition. The authors interpreted the results to indicate that the use of distinctive 
and novel stimuli in checking behaviour may reduce a decline in memory
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confidence, thus having potential important implications for clinical treatment 
programs (similar findings to Tallis, 1993). This study made use of a healthy sample 
therefore one cannot assume generalisation to an OCD population. Again the use of 
an animated stove with automatic colour changing stove tops is not representative to 
everyday checking of real items for OCD patients, and hence lacks ecological 
validity. The study also did not have a control irrelevant condition with PC of light 
bulbs, thus one cannot be sure the same effect would have occurred in the irrelevant 
condition.
Summary o f  Computer Checking Tasks
The studies above demonstrate that repeated checking, through the use of a 
computer animation task, in both healthy and OCD samples can significantly reduce 
memory confidence, vividness and detail of checking recollections when checked 
stimuli are relevant to OCD obsessions. This effect was further enhanced for memory 
confidence when under conditions of high responsibility, and also occurs when 
abstract stimuli are used. However, repeated checking does not appear to affect 
memory accuracy. A major limitation of these studies is the use of a computer 
animation task which is not representative of everyday life thus they lack ecological 
validity. Additionally, only one study utilised an OCD sample but this only had a 
small sample thus if  s potentially lacking in power. The healthy participants in most 
of the studies were not screened to see if they had OCD symptomology. Those that 
used an OCD sample were also not screened to see if they scored high on the 
checker-subtype scales which would help to explain OCD checking compulsions. 
Lastly, van den Hout & Kindf s (2003/4) design, on which the majority of studies 
were based, made use of the same stimuli across the training phase, checking trials, 
and pre and post tests therefore participants could have become habituated to stimuli.
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Physical Checking Tasks
This section focuses on studies which utilise a more ecologically valid design 
by asking participants to engage in physical checking tasks rather than computer 
tasks. In one of the first studies to manipulate checking behaviour Radomsky, 
Rachman & Hammond (2001) used an OCD checker sample («= 11) and placed 
them under conditions of high and low responsibility whilst carrying out one 
personally relevant and one irrelevant check in their own homes. Responsibility was 
manipulated by asking participants to sign a contract that stated they were solely 
responsible for any outcomes of checking behaviour conducted during the study 
(high responsibility), or conversely a contract inferring the experimenter assumed 
sole responsibility (low responsibility). After each of the checks memory accuracy 
and memory confidence measures were taken through the use of VAS’s and 
interviews. One week later participants were shown a video tape of their checks and 
again asked to rate their memory and confidence (no responsibility condition). They 
found that checkers recalled significantly more threat relevant information than 
irrelevant information, suggesting a memory bias for threat relevant information.
This was inflated under conditions of high responsibility with memory confidence 
significantly decreasing in this condition in comparison to low or no responsibility 
conditions. No memory bias was observed under conditions of no responsibility. The 
authors concluded that when exposed to threat, especially when one assumes 
personal responsibility, attention is focused on threat relevant information at the 
expense of threat irrelevant (peripheral) information. Therefore when trying to recall 
the event individuals would be less confident in their overall memory as they would 
not be able to recall peripheral information. Radomsky et aVs. (2001) study made use 
of an ecologically valid methodology with an OCD population which confirms
139
cognitive psychology findings of a central peripheral trade off in memory accuracy 
for threatening events (Wessel & Merckelbach, 1994). However a crucial limitation 
of this study is the lack of a control group and small sample size and is thus less 
representative of an OCD sample. In addition to this the manipulation check (asking 
participants to rate feelings of responsibility and anxiety during and after test) did not 
show between-group differences (p< .10). Thus perhaps this manipulation check 
lacked validity.
A further follow up study by Radomsky et al. (2006) investigated the effect 
of repeated checking on memory confidence using the same design as van den Hout 
and Kindt (2003) but asking healthy participants to physically carry out the checks in 
a real laboratory kitchen. The use of real kitchen was thought to enhance probability 
of harm (threat) and perceived personal responsibility as participants were left alone 
in the kitchen to carry out the checks. For participants in the relevant condition 
memory confidence, vividness and detail significantly decreased after 19 repeated 
checking trials. In addition to this they made use of more ‘know’ responses post-test 
indicating a shift in memory source. A slight but significant decrease in memory 
accuracy was found in the relevant condition after test, in contrast to previous 
findings. The study made use of an ecologically valid design allowing for generation 
of threat and responsibility, however, in the relevant condition, due to time 
constraints, participants did not wait for the stove to cool down once turned off 
before carrying out further checks. Therefore participants could not be 100% sure the 
stove was off and would not cause harm, which might have amplified memory 
confidence decline and account for poor memory accuracy in that condition. In 
addition no perceived responsibility or threat manipulation checks were taken during 
the experiment thus one cannot be sure the manipulations were adequate.
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To investigate at what point repeated checking starts to have a detrimental 
effect on metamemory Coles, Radomsky & Horng (2006) used a similar design as 
van den Hout & Kindt (2003) on healthy participants but with physical checking 
behaviour and manipulated the number of checks. In experiment one participants 
were randomly assigned to a non-checking condition (0 checks) or a high checking 
condition (15 checks) for a relevant checking procedure only (stove). Results 
confirmed previous findings, participants in the high checking condition showed no 
significant difference in memory accuracy but they did show a significant decrease in 
memory confidence, vividness and detail in comparison to the non-checking 
condition. Additionally, participants in the high checking condition showed a 
significant shift from the use of ‘remember’ response at pre-test to a ‘know’ response 
at post-test, with no such shift in the non-checking condition. In a second 
experiment, a new sample was used and number of checks was varied on an 
incremental basis (0, 2, 5, 10, 15). Results were as before, however significant 
changes in metamemory occurred between checks 2 to 10, with a significant decrease 
in metamemory and use of ‘know’ response between 10 to 15 checks. Thus this 
research contributed to existing findings by demonstrating relatively few checks can 
have a detrimental effect on memory confidence. The authors made use of a well 
designed ecologically valid study, however, they did not have a control condition 
thus comparisons to non-threatening irrelevant checking could not be made. In 
addition, the use of van den Hout & Kindt’s (2003) design only examines the effects 
of repeated checking in one session on one day.
Hermans et al. (2008) used a slightly different paradigm to investigate 
confidence in memory, attention and perception. They asked all participants to 
engage in four repeated action tasks, (1) a non-specific compulsive action (NC)
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which could be considered a relevant OCD compulsion but was not relevant to the 
participants in the study, (2) a ideographically*"^ selected specific compulsive action 
(IC) for each OCD participant, (3 and 4) two separate neutral actions. Participants 
were asked to complete these compulsive tasks five times and confidence ratings 
were obtained after trials one, three and five. The Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire 
(MCQ; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) and the Brief Cognitive Confidence 
Questionnaire (BCCQ) constructed by the authors was used to assess confidence 
ratings of memory, attention and perception. Participants consisted of an OCD group 
{n= 16), yoked clinical controls {n= 16) and yoked non-clinical controls {n= 16). 
Results from the study contrasted to previous findings as despite participants in the 
OCD group demonstrating lower trait levels of memory confidence, there was no 
significant difference in memory confidence after the checking tasks in any of the 
four conditions across all participant groups. However, there was a significant 
decrease of confidence in attention for the OCD group in comparison to the control 
groups after repeated checking. The author’s state results may be due to the small 
number of checking trials (5 checks) which might not be sufficient to reduce memory 
confidence but might be sufficient to reduce confidence in attention. They concluded 
that distrust in memory confidence maybe a result of distrust in attention. A more 
recent study investigated the effects of repeated checking on confidence in attention 
but the results from the current study were not replicated (see Dek et a i, 2010). The 
use of a mixed design with four different experimental conditions may have 
contributed to the non-significant findings as the experiment would have been a
Ideographic compulsion is a compulsion which is uniquely and personally relevant to that 
individual
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lengthy process which might have lead to fatigue and carryover effects between 
trials. Given the small sample size a large effect would be necessary to produce a 
significant result thus perhaps the study was underpowered. In addition, despite the 
use of an IC condition these actions were carried out in a laboratory setting thus not 
in the usual associated context, which might have affected internal validity. The 
authors self-constructed the BCCQ which is an unvalidated measure thus it may lack 
construct validity.
Radomsky and Alcolado (2010) expanded on the effects of physical repeated 
checking on memory confidence by including a mental repeated checking group.
They used a healthy sample with the same procedure as van den Hout & Kindt 
(2003; Radomsky et al., 2006) but in a real laboratory kitchen. Participants in the 
repeated mental checking (RMC) group were given the same instructions and 
training as the repeated physical checking (RPC) group but they were told to 
visualise these steps in their mind. Participants in both groups undertook one 
physical and one mental check in both pre and post test phases (see Appendix for 
further details). The study revealed results which were consistent with previous 
findings participants in both the RMC and RPC groups demonstrated modality 
specific significant decreases in memory confidence, vividness and detail. No cross­
over effect occurred. Similarly both RMC and RPC groups had slight but significant 
decreases in memory accuracy for their own domain (p= .001, p= .039 respectively). 
These results add to existing literature and potentially have important implications 
for clinical treatment options, taking into account the effects of metal checking on 
memory distrust. The study has some limitations, however, as they did not make use 
of an irrelevant control repeated checking condition thus one can not rule out the 
effects observed are not due to other factors such as cognitive load. Additionally,
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there is no way in which the authors could have knovm if participants in the RMC 
group were actually carrying out the checks in their mind or following the procedure 
given to undertake these checks.
Summary o f  Physical Checking Tasks
The majority of studies utilising a physical checking task revealed that 
repeated checking appears to significantly decrease memory confidence and other 
metamemory variables for OCD relevant checking compulsions but does not affect 
memory accuracy. This has been demonstrated in healthy and OCD samples and the 
effects on memory distrust also appear to extend to mental checking. Repeated 
physical checking has been shown to decrease memory confidence from between as 
little as two to ten checks and in one study a decrease in confidence in attention was 
demonstrated after 5 checks. These studies make use of an ecologically valid design, 
with the some studies screening their participants for pre-existing and/or comorbid 
psychiatric conditions (see Appendix for further details). Most studies using the 
physical checking design did screen their healthy participants to ensure they did not 
display OCD symptomology which was not the case in studies using computer tasks. 
However, considering most of the above studies make use of a between-participants 
manipulation design and have small sample sizes their results may not be 
representative of OCD checkers in general. It is also interesting to note that all but 
one (Hermans et al., 2008) of these studies were conducted by the same author.
Overall Summary of Study Findings
From the eleven experimental studies reviewed there is clear evidence that 
repeated checking (using a range of checking trials including computer animation, 
physical and mental checking tasks) reduces memory confidence, vividness and
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detail of memory. This has been demonstrated in healthy and OCD samples (three 
studies) with the use of abstract, threatening and ideographically relevant stimuli. 
Although the majority of studies demonstrate no affect of repeated checking on 
memory accuracy, other studies showed either an increase in accuracy (Dek et al., 
2010; Radomsky et al., 2001) or a decrease (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010; 
Radomsky et al., 2006). All of the studies which assessed the source of memory 
confidence demonstrated a shift with repeated checking from perceptual ‘remember’ 
responses to conceptual ‘know’ responses. Memory distrust has been show to occur 
after relatively few checks, with changes occurring between 2 to 10 checks (Coles, 
Radomsky & Horng, 2006), with these effects being amplified under conditions of 
perceived importance and high responsibility.
There are a number of general limitations in the methological procedures 
used in the reviewed papers. The majority of the studies made use of or a similar 
procedure to that of van den Hout & Kindt (2003, 2004) thus results obtained may be 
due to study design and not a true reflection of actual checking behaviour in general. 
Thus the use of other designs should be used to manipulate checking behaviour. A 
large proportion of the studies did not screen for existing psychiatric conditions in 
their non-clinical samples and those that used OCD samples did not screen for co­
morbid conditions which are knovm to occur in a high percentage of OCD patients 
(Matthews, 2009). Low mood and anxiety have both been shovm to affect memory 
and metamemory performance (Williams et al., 1997). Despite the studies using 
OCD relevant stimuli and physical checking tasks to increase ecological validity, in 
the majority of studies personally selected ideographic stimuli in a natural setting 
were not employed, van den Hout & Kindt (2003, 2004) propose that decreased 
memory confidence, after repeated checking, occurs due to a shift from perceptual
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processing to conceptual processing (evidenced by a decrease in vividness and detail) 
which results in higher feelings of familiarity (‘know’ responses). However, as they 
did not directly manipulate vividness and detail of the memories this only provides 
correlational and not causal support for their theory. Although the studies recruiting 
OCD participants had small sample sizes, the study hypotheses were supported 
suggesting that these studies were not underpowered.
Discussion
Studies investigating a potential memory deficit in individuals with OCD 
(specifically compulsive checkers) have demonstrated that checkers tend to rate their 
ability to correctly recall items presented to them earlier as low, despite no memory 
deficits (i.e. memory confidence). Thus there is a correlation between checking and 
low memory confidence. In this review these findings have been extended by 
experimental studies which directly manipulate checking behaviour (thus look at 
cause-effect relationship) and they have found that repeated, ritualised checking 
causes memory distrust in clinical (OCD) and non-clinical populations. This adds 
weight to cognitive theories of OCD (Rachman, 2002) which suggest that not only 
are checkers prone to pathological doubt but this doubt is caused and maintained by 
ritualised checking behaviour. Considering cognitive treatments such as ERP^  ^
(Exposure Response Prevention) these findings would suggest that ERP should be an 
effective treatment for OCD.
There are, however, gaps in the literature which need to be considered. The 
majority of the reviewed studies employed a non-clinical sample which were
In ERP patients are exposed to their fear (e.g. turning a stove on and off) but asked not to engage in 
their automatic maladaptive response (repeatedly checking the stove is off).
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assessed to ensure they did not meet criteria for an OCD diagnosis. However, they 
were not assessed to see if they displayed sub-clinical checking behaviour. Therefore 
although they did not meet criteria for diagnosis they may still have checking like 
traits. The studies which made use of an OCD sample contained both checkers and 
washers. It would therefore be interesting in future studies to see if both a sub- 
clinical sample and an OCD sample scoring high on the checking subtype of OCD 
showed higher levels of memory distrust, through manipulation of checking 
behaviour, than those scoring lower on such measures. This would allow us to see if 
trait compulsive checking moderates the effects of repeated checking on memory 
confidence.
Evidence from some of the reviewed studies suggests there are other factors 
which influence memory distrust and increase checking, such as perceived personal 
responsibility. Repeated checking was shown to increase feelings of responsibility 
which subsequently increased memory distrust (Radomsky et al., 2001). Rachman’s 
(2002) cognitive theory of compulsive checking proposes that checkers feel 
compelled to check because they believe they have a special responsibility to prevent 
harm to self or others and when they cannot be sure the perceived threat has 
diminished or been removed. Checking is then seen to be fuelled by a sense of 
increased personal responsibility, probability of harm occurring and anticipated 
seriousness of harm. Thus one is more likely to repeatedly check when one feels 
responsible for the outcome. The checking behaviour is thought to be maintained by 
a need eliminate harm which, the findings from this review show, paradoxically 
increases a sense of responsibility and reduces memory confidence, fuelling further 
checking. Checking is assumed to eliminate uncertainty but it has been show to
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paradoxically cause memory distrust, therefore serving to maintain the checking 
cycle.
The studies which have investigated memory confidence in checkers have 
made use of designs which capture ‘state’ measures of confidence. Spielberger’s 
(1975) state-trait anxiety theory suggests there are two forms of meta-cognition, state 
meta-cognitions which are situation specific and transitory, and trait meta-cognition 
which is an individual response that is stable over time. In order to explore the 
cognitive aetiology of OCD checking Nedeljkovic and Kyrios (2007) constructed the 
Memory and Cognitive Confidence Scale (MACCS) which assesses beliefs about 
general memory abilities, confidence in decision-making abilities, confidence in 
ability to pay attention, and perfectionistic standards about cognitive performance. 
They administered the MACCS, the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-Revised (OBQ- 
44, OCCWG, 2005) which assesses beliefs associated with OCD, and the Pauda 
Inventory-Revises (PI-R; Bums, Keortge, Formea & Stemberger, 1996) which 
assesses obsessions and compulsions, to an non-clinical and a OCD sample. The 
measures revealed that low trait meta-memory factors (including confidence) 
predicted OCD symptomology, over and above the other meta-memory factors and 
comorbid disorders such as depression. Further general trait memory confidence was 
a unique predictor of OCD symptoms, and additionally finding that perfectionisitic 
expectations of memory ability were related to checking behaviour in particular 
(Nedeljkovic, Moulding, Kyrios & Doron, 2009). Thus these studies provide 
correlational evidence that low trait memory confidence is associated with checking 
behaviour. Due to their susceptibility and trait memory distrust checkers seek to 
decrease uncertainty by checking, as demonstrated earlier, however, checking only 
leads to further uncertainty, thus perpetuating the vicious cycle. A recent study by
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Alcolado and Radomsky (2011) sought to test Nedeljkovic et al.’s (2007, 2009) 
hypotheses by manipulating a non-clinical sample’s beliefs about memory through 
providing false feedback on a standardised memory test before completing a further 
memory test to assess memory ability and urge to check. They found that participants 
in the low memory condition had greater urges to check following the memory task 
than those in the high memory condition. Thus this study provided evidence that low 
trait memory confidence can increase checking urges.
Given that this review consistently found that repeated checking leads to low 
memory confidence, and that evidence from Adolado and Radomsky (2011) suggests 
low confidence causes urge to check, this would imply a potential bi-directional 
relationship. The possibility that low memory confidence might cause repeated 
checking has not, to the authors’ knowledge, been tested. Therefore, in order to 
establish the direction of the relationship between memory confidence and checking 
a future study could manipulate memory confidence and measure the effect on actual 
checking behaviour (e.g. number of checks, rather than urge to check). In addition, it 
is possible that perceived personal responsibility moderates the effect of memory 
confidence on checking, with low memory confidence only increasing checking 
when perceived personal responsibility is high. A future study could therefore 
manipulate memory confidence and perceived personal responsibility in a 2x2 design 
to ascertain effects on checking behaviour. This would not only help to elucidate the 
nature of the vicious cycle between memory confidence and checking behaviour, but 
it would also allow the possible moderating effect of perceived personal 
responsibility (strongly associated with OCD) on checking in the face of low 
memory confidence. Such a study would also help to bring together theories of 
memory confidence with cognitive theories of OCD.
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The studies reviewed have important implications for clinical practice which 
could be incorporated into existing psychological treatment models such as 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). The use of psychoeducation around the effect 
of negative beliefs of memory abilities can have on checking behaviour and 
maintenance of checker symptoms. For example, giving checkers information that 
repeatedly checking is a counterproductive strategy as it enhances further uncertainty 
(Radomsky, Shafran, Coughtrey & Rachman, 2010). Considering outcomes which 
have posited checkers have general low memory confidence, screening tools such as 
the MACCS could be utilised to identify susceptibility to developing OCD and 
engage in early intervention strategies. Given the evidence reviewed, perhaps it is 
time to stop focusing on the idea that memory deficits account for checker 
symptomology and rather put further investment into the role of memory confidence 
and other metacognitive beliefs with checker behaviour.
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Abstract
Background: Clinical Psychology is a profession which prides its self on utilising 
scientific research to inform practice and practice-based evidence to improve client 
care. However, recent reviews suggest that clinical psychologists’ publication rates 
over the past decade are low (Eke, Holttum & Hayward, 2012). This trend appears to 
parallel publication rates for trainee clinical psychologists who, as part of training, 
engage in research which should paradoxically be of a publishable standard.
Aim: To investigate factors which may contribute to or hinder trainees from 
publishing course assignments at the University of Surrey. This will help to inform 
the service of how it can adjust training delivered to increase trainee publication 
rates.
Methods: A service evaluation was conducted by surveying four cohorts of clinical 
psychologists, who previously trained at the university. A 20% response rate was 
achieved. Quantitative data was analysed utilising descriptive statistics and 
qualitative data by Thematic Analysis.
Results: 47% of participants submitted work for publication, and 60% of first 
submissions were accepted for publication. Three master themes each with three 
subthemes were extracted: Supervisor Factors; Course Factors; and Trainee Factors. 
Conclusions: Whilst on training supervisors were found to provide good 1:1 support 
in encouraging publication of major research project. However, little teaching was 
provided on the publication process, and the structure and timing of research projects 
made motivation to publish difficult. Little encouragement was given to publish 
academic assignments. Given the low response rate further exploration is needed. 
Nevertheless suggestions to improve on the identified factors are recommended.
Word count: 248
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Introduction
As a profession clinical psychologists (CP) adopt a ‘scientist-practioner’ 
model by applying evidence-based research when working within clinical settings 
(Long & Hollin, 1997). Such a model proposes that CPs should not only engage in 
utilising evidence-based practice but also further engage in developing practice- 
based evidence to enhance the efficacy and quality of care delivered to clients 
(Shapiro, 2002). Therefore a substantial proportion of CP’s training is dedicated to 
ensuring trainees have the opportunity and skills to conduct ethical research to a high 
standard (British Psychological Society: BPS, 2012). The Quality Assurance Agency 
for Higher Education’s (QAA) Doctoral Characteristics stipulates that doctoral level 
research must be of a publishable peer-review standard (QAA, 2011), and the BPS 
Code of Human Research Ethics (BPS, 2010) states that research findings should be 
disseminated where humanly possible. As both trainees and as qualified CPs there 
therefore is a strong emphasis on producing and publishing research.
Over the past two decades there has been concern regarding the low level of 
research published by trainee and qualified CPs (Milne & Paxton, 1998). A USA 
study investigated publication rates from a large representative sample of doctoral 
level CPs and found the modal number of publications to be zero (Norcross, Karpiak 
& Santoro, 2005). This finding has been recently replicated in the UK by Eke, 
Holttum and Hayward (2012) who surveyed 1300 CPs (29% response rate). In 
relation to newly qualified CP publication rates Cooper and Turpin (2007) surveyed 
28 training courses from the UK and found that only 24% of CPs successfully 
published their research project. Possible reasons for this low rate were suggested, 
such as support given on training and personal trainee factors, but were not 
investigated (similar findings from Eke, et a/., 2012; Wright & Holttum, 2012).
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It is argued that psychological research is not only crucial for the 
enhancement of theoretical understanding of psychological distress, but also for the 
development of effective and safe treatments (Marzillier & Hall, 1999). In recent 
years CPs have been adopting a more active role in contributing to and producing 
clinical guidelines within mental health care, such as the NICE guidelines (National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2013). The Division of Clinical Psychology’s 
(DCP) leadership and development framework (BPS, 2010) encourages 
psychologists at all levels in the profession to be actively contributing to developing 
services and client care, by promoting psychological mindedness and influencing 
policy at both organisational and wider systems levels. As a profession with a strong 
research skill set, it would seem CPs are in a good position to be implementing DCP 
strategies by promoting evidenced-based practice and practice-based evidence. 
However, in order to do so it is important that CPs continue to engage in, and 
publish, research.
Research Aims and Objectives
This project aims to explore publication rates of CPs who trained at the 
University of Surrey (CPTS), and factors which may affect publication. The 
objectives are to conduct a service evaluation of the Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology (DClinPsych) course by firstly establishing the number of CPTSs who 
publish their research assignments (Major Research Project [MRP]; Service Related 
Research Project [SRRP]; any other audit/service evaluation) as well as academic 
assignments. Secondly, and crucially, the evaluation will explore what helps and 
what hinders the publication process. This will allow the course to develop and 
improve services to support CPTSs to publish their work, thus hopefully promoting 
and supporting the scientist-practioner role with future CPs.
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Method 
Design and Procedure
The most recent four completed cohorts of CPTSs were contacted via email 
(Appendix 1 : Recruitment Email). The purpose of the study was described 
(Appendix 2: Information Sheet) and CPTSs were asked to complete an online 
survey regarding publication rates (Appendix 3: Consent Form). After completing 
the survey, participants were thanked for their participation and given the 
researcher’s contact details for any further information.
Participants
In total, 124 CPTSs were contacted, of which 26 CPTSs undertook the survey 
(20% response rate). Data from three participants had to be excluded as they only 
partially completed the survey. Consequently, responses from 23 participants were 
analysed. In an attempt to increase response rate the recruitment email was sent out 
twice more and the length of the time for data collection was extended.
Demographics. The majority of participants were female (21; 2 male); 
employed as a CP (22; 1 managerial), within the NHS (18; 4 charity sector; 1 private 
sector); with an average age of 32 (range: 26-53 years). Most participants were of 
White British ethnicity (16), followed by White Other (2); Indian (2); White Irish 
(1); British Black Caribbean (1); and one non-disclosure. Response rates per cohort 
varied: six from cohort 1 (qualified 2010); seven from cohort 2 (qualified 2011); six 
from cohort 3 (qualified 2012); and four from cohort 4 (qualified 2013).
Survey
To enable ease of access for participants, an online survey was created which 
utilised forced choice responses and open-ended questions (Appendix 4). The
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questions asked were jointly constructed with the DClinPsych’s Research Director 
and informed by previous studies investigating CP publications and the CP training 
environment (Eke, et al., 2012; Holttum & Goble, 2006).
Ethical Considerations. Consideration was paid to any potential distress 
which may be caused to participants, specifically with regard to the effect of asking 
about difficulties with, or potential failure (and success) at, publishing. In an attempt 
to minimize any potential distress, current trainees and members of the DClinPsych 
course team were consulted regarding questions.
Data Analysis
Rationale. All quantitative data was analysed utilising descriptive statistics. 
The use of Thematic Analysis, following Braun and Clarke’s (2006) approach, was 
used to inform transcription and analysis of the qualitative data. This approach was 
chosen as it allows for exploratory analysis and a rich description of themes relevant 
to personal experience to emerge. Data was approached at an explicit level from an 
essentialist position which reflected the researcher’s assumption of a unidirectional 
relationship between meaning, experience and language (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Furthermore, an inductive approach to data analysis was adopted to allow organic 
themes to arise naturally rather than fitting data within existing theory driven codes.
Process. Following transcription, data was initially coded by items of 
interest and frequency, and allocated to broader themes (Appendix 5). After 
additional familiarisation with the data, themes were further defined into master and 
subthemes by the use of thematic mapping (see Results Section).
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Results 
Descriptive Analysis
As shown in Table 1 just under half (48%) of participants submitted an article 
for publication during training, with the majority of these submissions being for 
either their MRP or other academic assignments. Previous research experience was 
explored as an indicator of likely publication activity. 56% of participants entered 
training with some form of post-graduate qualification, and 35% of participants had 
previous paid research experience. Out of these two groups only 36% went on to 
submit work for publication.
Table 1
CPTS Research Experience Prior to Training and Number o f Submissions for  
Publication o f Work Carried Out Whilst on Training, by Cohort
Overall Total Cohort
(sum) 1 2 3 4
Post Graduate qualification 
None 10 4 3 2 1
MSc 9 2 2 4 1
PhD 1 0 1 0 0
Other 3 0 1 0 2
Previous paid research post 
Yes 8 1 2 3 2
No 15 5 5 3 2
Submitted article for 
publication during training
Yes 11 4 4 0 3
No 12 2 3 6 1
Type of work submitted for
publication
MRP 4 2 1 / 1
SRRP 3 0 2 / 1
Literature Review 1 0 0 / 1
Other 6 2 2 / 2
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The majority of participants submitted a piece of work for publication whilst 
in training rather than post-qualification (Table 2). The outcome of submission 
favoured acceptance for publication, but was mixed and dependant on type of 
submission. Of the total number of submissions nearly all CPTS were first authors, 
the remained being second authors. Three participants submitted two or more articles 
for publication during training.
Table 2
Descriptive Totals o f When Articles were Submitted for Publication, the Outcome o f  
Submission, and whether CPTS was First Author on Submitted Article
Tvne of 
Submission
Outcome When Submitted FirstAuthor
Accepted Rejected Revised & Resubmitted
During
Training
Post
Training
MRP 3 / 2 4 1 5
SRRP 2 1 / 3 / 3
Literature
Review
/ / 1 1 / 1
Other“ 4 1 1 6 / 3
Total 9 2 4 14 1 12
“Other: 3 Reflective Accounts; 1 Case Report; 1 Qualitative Research Report; 1 
Professional Issues Essay
In relation to publication of work carried out during training nearly all 
participants, bar three, discussed their intentions with their university supervisor. 
Figure 1 illustrates what participants thought would be helpful from the course when 
considering publication.
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Figure 1. Factors CPTSs would find helpful from the course team to aid publication
For CPTSs who did not submit an article for publication during training but 
attempted to do so post-qualification, the support described as being received from 
the course team is demonstrated in Figure 2 below.
3%
□  A dvice ab o u t subm ittin g24%18%
Q A dvice on app ro p ria te  journal
m H elp with revising
□  C o-au tho rsh ip
2 1 % ■  H anding over d a ta  an d  b eco m in g  
2nd au th o r34%
Figure 2. Support on publication received from course to CPTSs post-qualification.
56% of participants reported that the course had provided sufficient training 
to leave them feeling skilled in being able to publish their work (Figure 3). When 
asked to rate how confident they felt to conduct research on a 5-point likert scale 
(ranging from ‘l=Not confident at all’ to '5=Very confident’) the mean response was 
3.7. Just over half of participants expressed they felt competent to supervise others’ 
research.
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Figure 3. CPTSs views on their skills and competence in publishing, conducting and 
supervising research (%).
All of the participants stated they had an interest in conducting and 
publishing research and other pieces of work. 53% of participants indicated a 
preference for qualitative research. Virtually all of the participants (n= 22) stated 
they thought it is important for CPs to publish work.
Qualitative Analysis
The analysis revealed three master themes: Supervisor, Course, and Trainee 
factors. Each master theme had three subthemes (Figure 4).
Supervisor
Factors
Support Availability Expertise
Course
Factors
TeachingPublishing
ethos Structure
Trainee
Factors
Views on Clinical 
Psychologist Role
Time
Experience whilst 
training
Figure 4. Thematic map of master themes and subthemes
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Supervisor Factors
Participants identified a number of factors that related to qualities of the 
supervisor which affected their willingness and ability to attempt publication. 
Participants described positive and challenging aspects within subthemes.
Support
CPTSs found that supervisor support for publication was encouraging while 
they were based on the programme:
“I  think that the skills I  gained to complete and publish my work really came 
from my university supervisor... it was my supervisor’s belief support and 
time and effort that she put into helping me prepare my work to be published 
which made it succeed. ” P.14*^
However, the converse appeared to be the case when CPTSs were attempting 
to publish their university work post-qualification^ ^  :
“Ife lt left to do it myself...having to do it after leaving university made it 
harder to keep getting support. ” P.2
Availability
Similarly whilst on training CPTSs felt that access to resources and 
supervisor availability meant they were able to consider and publish their work: 
...feedback from coursework, regular supervision o f research project... 
meetings with my supervisor which focused on adapting the thesis to make it 
appropriate for a journal article...was helpful. ” P.3
P. denotes Participant
The cohorts recruited in this project were prior to the new MRP submission and VIVA dates which
came into effect in 2014
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But once CPTSs had qualified they felt staff were less able to support them in 
being able to publish their work:
“...supervisors who are overworked so don't have time to dedicate to 
supporting you to the point o f publication. ” P.5
Expertise
Many participants noted that they believed their supervisor’s experience of 
and success at publication played an important role in encouraging and aiding them 
to publish:
” ...university supervisor was widely published and could offer a lot o f 
expertise. " P.13
Course Factors 
Teaching
When asked what CPTS found less helpful or if they came across any barriers 
when on training to publishing their work, the majority of participants commented on 
a lack of teaching on this matter:
“There was nothing in the training for my cohort that prepared us for  
publication. ” P.IO 
This was echoed by members from other cohorts:
“no specific assignments or teaching relating to writing for research 
journals.” V.\^
Publishing Ethos
CPTS reported an absence of a publishing ethos on the course, with little 
emphasis on publishing anything other than MRPs:
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"Other than the MRP, there was no direction or indication towards 
publishing any o f the other work, so it never occurred to me to do so. ” P.7 
Similarly, participant 5 highlighted a lack of course importance for 
publishing:
"There was so much other work to prioritise. Publishing was not one o f 
them. ”
Course Structure
Throughout the survey CPTS noted that the structure of the course in terms of 
MRP submission date and thesis layout were unhelpful This made publication more 
difficult:
"The length o f the thesis was not helpful for publication, there’s so little time 
post-qualification that it would have been great i f  we had more time during 
training to prepare for submission. ” P.3
Trainee Factors 
Experience
CPTS negative experience on training appeared to affect motivation to 
publish:
"...my route to submission [MRP] was very rocky, so I  almost don’t want to 
go there again! ” P.4
Feelings of being overwhelmed during training were also reported, which 
affected publication:
"Not getting around to writing anything to submit... Which is in part due to 
my exhaustion post training and a desire to avoid additional deadlines... ” 
P.18
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Clinical Psychologists Role
Participants were asked to comment on their views of the importance of CPs 
conducting and publishing research. The majority of participants deemed research 
and publication as a crucial:
“I t ’s a core part o f the role. We can V offer evidence based interventions in 
the absence o f evidence. And the evidence needs to be sound evidence that is 
gathered and analysed with expertise and a critical mind, which is what we 
are trained to do.” P. 13
However it was quite clear from the data that this is often not the reality when 
working within the NHS :
“I  understand the research/practioner ideal... but the trust I  work in have 
hired me to work in other aspects o f the psychology i.e. therapy, groups, team 
support, service delivery. ” P.7
Time
A  subtheme of a general lack of time was evident across transcripts. As noted 
earlier this was in regards to CPTS feeling they lacked time whilst on training to 
write up their work for publication (course structure) but even more so once 
qualified. Participant 16 commented:
“I  already work long hours just to meet the demands within the service I  
work in. I  have very little time for anything other than clinical case 
management”.
Furthermore, there was reluctance for participants to utilise their own time to 
publish university work. As suggested by participant 7 perhaps this is due to the 
adjustment of becoming a qualified CP:
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“Once leaving training, and starting work, the learning curve and time 
demands are so great, that publication would have to be sorted on personal 
time. ”
Discussion
This service evaluation aimed to investigate factors which promote or hinder 
publication of CPTS’ university work. The results suggest that the course structure 
(thesis layout and timing of submission), publishing ethos (encouragement only for 
MRP work), and limited teaching on the process of publishing are not conducive to 
promoting CPTS publication. The experience of the training environment appears to 
influence CPTS’ motivation to publish and views on the role of a CP. CPTS felt 
supported by their supervisors whilst on training and valued their knowledge, 
expertise and availability, but felt these factors were lacking post-qualification. The 
results are reflective of previous research (Eke, et al., 2012) and highlight the crucial 
influence training courses can have in CPs contributing to evidence-based practice. 
Nonetheless, 47% of CPTS in the current survey submitted work for publication, 
with 60% of first submissions being accepted for publication. In comparison to other 
UK DClinPsych courses these rates are positive (Cooper & Turpin, 2007: CP 
successful publication rate 24%), and may rise with recent changes to the course. 
Current trainees now submit MRPs early in their final year of training. This should 
allow more time for any necessary changes to projects to be made whilst on training.
However, caution should be taken when considering the results from the 
current study due to the low response rate. In an attempt to maximise response rates 
an online survey was designed as this allowed participants to complete the survey at 
their own leisure. Furthermore the online survey provided a platform to not only 
collect quantitative data for audit purposes, but also the ability to gain richer data by
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incorporating qualitative methods. Nonetheless, access to the survey was dependant 
on utilising email addresses, which in some cases were five years old and therefore 
may have been inactive. This coupled with the fact that some cohorts left training up 
to four years ago may have affected response rates. By the nature of the title of the 
project ‘Factors which affect publication rates of trainee CPs’ this may have 
inadvertently also caused a response bias to those that were more successful at 
publishing. The findings from the current study can, however, be used to inform 
future DClinPsych service evaluations, but also further research into the wider 
factors which influence publication in the profession as a whole.
Feedback & Recommendations
Feedback to the service will occur at the next DClinPsych course team 
meeting in July, in the form of a presentation. The following recommendations will 
be made:
1. For specific teaching to be provided regarding publication i.e. types of 
journals to submit to; how to format and revise work for publication; how to 
manage rejections and what to do for resubmissions.
2. For teaching on publication process to occur earlier on during training.
3. For a ‘publishing ethos’ to be created whereby trainees are encouraged to 
submit assignments other than their MRP. This could be done by setting some 
assignments to be written in a style that was akin to a publishable article and 
for them to be marked accordingly. Alternatively, setting a ‘practice’ 
assignment for this.
4. Allocate time to staff to support trainees post-qualification in being able to 
publish their course work (or provide a workshop post-qualification). This is
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specifically relevant to those trainees 'who are not able to submit their MRPs 
and VIVA at the earlier date.
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Appendix 1 : Recruitment Email
Dear Former University of Surrey Ciinicai Psychology Trainee
My name is and I am a Trainee Ciinicai Psychologist at the University of Surrey 
currently undertaking a Service Related Research Project (SRRP) as part of my training. The 
course administrator shared your contact details with me as my SRRP is investigating the 
factors which affect publication of Trainee Ciinicai Psychologists' research and academic 
assignments. We are interested in gaining y o u r  v ie w s  of youx research experience during 
training and whether this has led to any publications either during or after ciinicai training.
This project aims to help the University of Surrey's Ciinicai Psychology Doctorate training 
programme to have a better understanding of the factors which may promote or inhibit 
trainee publication, with the view to aiding improvement of the quality of service provided to 
trainees at the University of Surrey.
What does the study involve?
The study involves an online questionnaire which will ask questions regarding your research 
experience and interests; publication rates; thoughts about what you found helpful/ less 
helpful during training when thinking about research and publishing; your thoughts on what 
you think may be helpful for the course to consider in relation to research and publication 
for future trainees. The survey should take approximately 10 minutes to complete, with ail 
data collected being completely anonymous and confidential.
please click on the following link and complete the survey:
(If the hyperlink does not work, please copy and paste it into your web browser).
Your time and views are much appreciated! If you would like any further information 
regarding this project, please feel free to contact me on:
Kind Regards,
T r a in e e  C lin ica l P s y c h o lo g is t
Department of Psychology 
University o f Surrey 
Guildford 
GU2 7XH
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Appendix 2: Participant Information Sheet
An Investigation into factors which affect Publication Rates of Trainee Clinical
Psychologists
Names and contact details o f Investigators
(Supervisor)
Email: Email:
What is this study about?
I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist at the University o f Surrey currently undertaking a 
Service Related Research Project (SRRP) as part of my DClinPsych training. My SRRP is 
investigating the factors which affect publication of Trainee Clinical Psychologists’ research 
and academic assignments, both during and after clinical training.
What does the study involve?
The study involves an online questionnaire which will ask questions regarding your research 
experience and interests; publication rates; thoughts about what you found helpful/ less helpful 
during training when thinking about research and publishing; your thoughts on what you think 
may be helpful for the course to consider in relation to research and publication for future 
trainees. The survey should take approximately 10-15 minutes to complete.
Are there any advantages of taking part?
Unfortunately, I am unable to reimburse you for your participation in this study. However, this 
project aims to help the University o f Surrey’s Clinical Psychology Doctorate training 
programme to have a better understanding of the factors which may promote or inhibit trainee 
publication, with the view to aiding improvement o f the quality of service provided to 
trainees. It will also hopefully contribute to the existing literature on Clinical Psychology 
publication rates and promote a better understanding of wider professional practice.
Are there any downsides to taking part?
This questionnaire is not intended to cause any distress or harm. It is acknowledged however 
that some questions relate to personal experiences and views which for some may provoke 
negative associations due to their experiences. If you haveanyquestions or would like any 
further information please feel free to contact me via email
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?
Yes, you will be allocated a participant number and all o f your information will be 
annonymised. All data will be treated with utmost confidentiality. No individual will be 
named or identified in any report or possible publication arising from this study. You have the 
right to withdraw from the study, without penalty, if you so choose. Data will be stored 
securely in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and kept for at least 10 years.
How do I agree to take part?
If you decide to take part you will be asked to tick the box below. The next screen will 
display the online consent form.
[CONTINUE BUTTON]
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Appendix 3: Consent Form
Consent Form
I the undersigned voluntarily agree to complete a questionnaire, which relates to an 
investigation into factors which affect Publication Rates o f Trainee Clinical 
Psychologists.
I have read and understood the Information webpage. I have been given an 
explanation o f the nature, purpose, and likely duration o f the questionnaire. I have 
been given the opportunity to ask questions on all aspects o f  the study and have 
understood the advice and information that may have been given as a result.
I understand that all personal data relating to volunteers is held and processed in the 
strictest confidence, and in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). I agree 
that I will not seek to restrict the use o f the results o f  the study, on the 
understanding that my anonymity is fully preserved (e.g. the data might be used for 
publication).
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without needing 
to justify my decision and without prejudice.
I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to 
participating in this study. I have been given adequate time to consider my 
participation and agree to comply with the instructions and restrictions o f  the study.
Do you give your consent, and therefore wish to continue?
Yes [TICKBOX]
No [TICK BOX]
[CONTINUE BUTTON]
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Appendix 4: Survey
Questionnaire
[Demographics]
Please provide us with the following information about you:
How old are you? [ANSWER BOX]
What is your gender?
Female [TICK BOX] Male [Tick BOX]
How would you describe your ethnicity?
Asian or British Asian [TICK BOX]
Indian [TICK BOX]
Pakistani [TICK BOX]
Bangladeshi [TICK BOX]
Any other Asian background [TICK BOX]
Black or Black British [TICK BOX]
Caribbean [TICK BOX]
African [TICK BOX]
Any other Black background [TICK BOX]
Mixed [TICK BOX]
White and Black Caribbean [TICK BOX]
White and Black African [TICK BOX]
White and Asian [TICK BOX]
Any other mixed background [TICK BOX]
Chinese or other Ethinc Group [TICK BOX]
Chinese [TICK BOX]
Any other ethinic groups [TICK BOX]
White [TICK BOX]
British [TICK BOX]
Irish [TICK BOX]
Any other White background [TICK BOX]
I would not like to disclose [TICK BOX]
In what year did you complete your DClinPych training? [Text Box]
Are you currently employed as a Clinical Psychologist? [Yes] [No]
If so what is your job role? [Text BOX]
If you are not employed as a Clinical Psychologist what is your current 
position? [Text BOX]
Is research named as part o f your role? [Yes] [No]
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Are you employed in one o f these sectors?
NHS [TICK BOX] Academia [TICK BOX]
Private [TICK BOX] Other [Text BOX]
Are you currently employed on a full-time or part-time basis?
Full-time [TICK BOX] Part-time [TICK BOX]
Do you have any additional post-graduate research qualifications?
MSc [TICK BOX] PhD [TICK BOX]
Other [ANSWER BOX]
Have you previously been employed in a paid research role/post?
Yes [TICK BOX] No [TICK BOX]
[NEW PAGE]
Publication o f Research and Assignments During Training
1. Have you submitted any work conducted during training for publication?
[YES] [NO]
[IF YES present question l.a] [IF NO present question 1 of [Training]]
a. If yes to the above question please select all that apply:
Major Research Project (MRP) [TICK BOX]
Service Related Research Project (SRRP) [TICK BOX]
Literature Review [TICK BOX]
Other [TIX BOX] Please state [Text Box]
i. MRP:
1. Where did you submit to? [Text Box]
2. What was the outcome (Please select)?
Accepted [TICK BOX]
Rejected [TICK BOX]
Revised and Resubmitted [TICK BOX]
Have you resubmitted yet? [YES] [NO] 
Other [TICK BOX]
Please state [Text Box]
3. When did you submit this piece o f  work?
During Training [TICK BOX]
After Training [TICK BOX]
4. Were you the first author: [YES] [NO]
(The same questions from l.a.i. were asked for SRRP, Literature Review, and Other)
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b. Please could you provide the full reference(s) for any publications o f  
course related work. [Text Box]
[NEW PAGE]
Your thoughts on Publication o f Research and Assignments During Training
1. When considering publishing research/ academic assignments related to work 
undertaken during training, did you discuss your interests and intention to publish 
with anyone? [YES] [NO]
a. If so who:
University Supervisor [Tick Box]
Field Supervisor [Tick Box]
Other [Text Box]
2. If you have not already published work undertaken during training but are 
considering doing so what stage do you consider yourself to be in:
Have not started [Tick Box]
Started to revise the work [Tick Box]
Revised the work [Tick Box]
Submitted draft to co-author/supervisor [Tick Box]
Submitted to peer-review journal [Tick Box]
Other [Text Box]
3. Would you find any o f  the following helpful when publishing your work: (please 
tick all that apply)
Advice about submitting [Tick Box]
Advice on appropriate journal [Tick Box]
Help with revising [Tick Box]
Co-authorship/ writing the article with your supervisor [Tick Box]
Consider handing over your data someone else and becoming second author 
[Tick Box]
4. If you have attempted to or considered publishing your work post qualification 
have you been offered any o f  the following from the university? (please tick all 
that apply)
Advice about submitting [Tick Box]
Advice on appropriate journal [Tick Box]
Help with revising [Tick Box]
Co-authorship/ writing the article with your supervisor [Tick Box]
Consider handing over your data someone else and becoming second author
[Tick Box]
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5, Do you feel your training equipped you with sufficient skills to complete and 
publish your work? [YES] [NO] Any further comments [Text box]
a. What did you find helpful during training which may have aided your 
ability to publish?
[Text Box]
b. What did you find less helpful?
[Text Box]
c. Did you come across any barriers to you publishing your work?
[Text Box]
6. Do you have any ideas or suggestions about the DClinPsych training course 
which may aid future trainees to publish their work?
[Text Box]
[NEW PAGE]
A little about you...
7. Do you have an interest in conducting research? [YES] [NO]
8. Do you have an interest in publishing research or other pieces o f  work? [YES]
[NO]
9. Which research area do you prefer to focus on:
Qualitative [Tick Box] Quantitative [Tick Box]
10. As a clinical psychologist do you think it is important to publish research and 
other pieces o f  work? [YES] [NO]
a. Please tell us your views on this topic [TEXT Box]
11. Please rate how confident you feel to carry out research?
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
Not confident at all Very confident
12. Do you consider yourself to be a competent researcher? [YES] [NO]
13. Do you feel competent to supervise research? [YES] [NO]
14. In the next year (please tick all that apply to you):
a. I intent to carry out research [Tick Box]
b. I want to carry out research [Tick Box]
c. I expect to carry out research [Tick Box]
15. If you intend to carry out research in the next year, do you intend to publish this 
research? [YES] [NO]
16. Do you think you have the capacity to carry out research in your current 
employment? [YES] [NO]
Any further comments [Text Box]
17. Do you feel supported to carry out research in your current role/ employment? 
[YES] [NO]
Any further comments [Text Box]
18. Do you think there are any barriers to carrying out research in your current role/ 
employment? [YES] [NO]
Any further comments [Text Box]
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19. H ave you  published  or subm itted any w ork sin ce qualifying? P lease select: 
Published [T IC K B O X ] N um ber o f  Publications [Text B ox]
Subm itted [TICK B O X ] N um ber o f  Subm issions [Text B ox]
20. I f  you  have attem pted to  publish or have published research or other w ork either 
pre, during or after training w hat w as your general experience o f  the publishing  
process?
[T ext B ox]
[N E W  P A G E ]
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire!
I f  you  w ou ld  like any further inform ation p lease could  you  em ail
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Appendix 5: Transcript Extract and Initial Codes
Transcripts coded to question asked. Colours used to aid coding of main themes: 
Purple= Course Factors; Blue= Supervisor Factors; Green= Trainee Factors.
tS b) W hat d id  y o u  find  le s s  h e lp fu l?
P t
#
C o d e /Id e a ’s L# R e s p o n s e T h e m e /S u b th e m e
1 -Little support an d 1 L ackjfx iu idancq pn  f"  write a  p ap e r fnr -Lack of formal
teaching on  publication 
p ro cess
-R esearch  vs acad em ic  
publications (treated  
differently?)
2
3
publication (asjJDDosed to for academ ic  
subm ission)
teach ing  
-Lack of support 
-Publishing e th o s
2 -Publishing Is hard- 1 1 don 't think anvthinq o re o a re s  u s  for the
don’t  feel p repared
2 level of subtpittinq to  a n  acad em ic  jni irpal j
-Little support post- 
qualifying
-L a c k  of teach ing
-Felt unsupported  after 
uni to publish 3 felt left to  do  it m yself an d  having to  do  It
-Difficult to g e t support 4 after leavino universitv m ad e  it h a rd er to -T rainee experience
o n ce  qualified
5 k eeo iie ttin a  support -  suoerv isors
-A bandonm ent?
6 th em se lv es a re  bq$y a n d  s o  corresponding
-Em pathy for 
supervisors 7 via email could take  time.
3 -T hesis too long 1 T h e  lenath  of th e  th es is  w a s  not heloful for - T h esis  form at
-M ore time during 
training n eed ed
2
3
publication, there’s  so  little tim e Dost- 
qualification th a t It would have  b een  g rea t if
-Little tim e in training
-Little tim e post- 
qualifying-Uttie time post- 
qualification 4
5
w e h ad  ULoreJime durina trainino to o reoare  
for subm ission
4 -Subm ission & VIVA 1 th es is  e n d  viva w ere  rioht a t th e  en d  of the -T hesis form at
too late
-No tim e on co u rse  to 
prepare-m ore time
2
3
co u rse , if it m s  earlier, th en  1 would have 
had  tim e an d  enerov  to  rev ise  into a  p ap er
-Lack of tim e in training 
-Lack of tim e post- 
qualifying?
-T rainee experience
n ee d e d
-Exhaustion
4 before starting full tim e work.
6 -Not enough  tim e on 1 not havina.tim e d ed ica ted  to  publishlno. -Lack of tim e in training 
-Publishing e th o s  
-O ther cou rse
th e  co u rse
-O ther work to prioritise 
-Publishing not
2
3
T h ere  w as  so  m uch o th er work to orioritise. 
Publishlno w as  not o n e  of them .
Important d em an d s
6 Not app licable? 1 No
7 -Not enough  time 
during training
-No practical support
-U nclear experience
-Lack of teaching
1
2
3
4
No c lear Idea of th e  p ro c e ss  of publication. 
No support with editing/re-writing for 
publication. No tim e allocated  to helping 
with this ag en d a .
-Lack of tim e In training 
-Lack of support 
-Lack of teach ing  
-T rainee experience
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8 -Little support post 
qualifying from course
1
2
I felt tha t th e re  w asn 't m uch suooort after 
training for help with publishing.
-Lack of support
9 Not applicable? 1 - : ...........
10 -No specific training
-W orkshop relied on 
own experiences of 
publish ing-not helpful
1
2
3
4
5
6  
7
T here  w as jio th in a  in_theJtraininalOLmy -Lack of training 
-T rainee e>qDeriencecohort that_D.[eD.aced u s io r  Dublicatlon. T he
o n e  se ss io n  w e h ad  related  to  this topic 
w a s  in th e  form of a  w orkshop which u sed  
our own though ts and .ex o erien ces on  the 
subiect. This w as not heloful w hen  so  few
of u s  ha_d_DJXblishina exoerience.
11 -T hesis too long? 1
2
T he form at of th e  th es is  did not 
autom aticallv  lend itself to  publication
-T hesis structure
12 ? 1 U nsure
13 -Little teaching
-Not em b ed d ed  in 
teaching
1
2
Little focus on  how  to actually oo  ab o u t it a s -Lack of training 
-Publishing e thospart of th e  m ainstream  teach ing .
14 -No tim e on  training
-Little motivation post- 
qualifying
-Rely on  supervisor for 
support
1
2
3
4
5
6
Not havinoJim e o.n-.the_coui5 e t o  p repare  it - Lack of tim e on 
training
-T rainee experience 
-Support
- this w a s  all d o n e  after 1 h ad  com pleted 
trainino. so  motivation w as  m uch low er to 
dn  fhifi an d  1 therefore relied m uch m ore on 
th e  input an d  support from  mv university
supervisor.
15 -Little training provided 
-Little time
-Not incorporated into 
co u rse
1
2
Not m any lectures/trainino/tim e em b ed d ed -Little time on course 
-Publishing e th o s 
-Little teachingjn the  cou rse  to do  it
16 Not relevant? 1 Not applicable
17 Felt unsupported  after 
finishing
1 no  suooort after_comDletion of.doctorate -Lack of support
18 No training
Not incorporated into 
co u rse  assig n m en ts
1
2
no  soecific assio n m en ts  o r teaching  relating - Lack of training 
-Publishing e thosto  writing for resea rch  joum als.
19 No specific teaching 1 workshOD would hav e  b een  realty useful -Lack of teaching
20 - Little teaching 1 1 think th a t teaching on  oublishioo a  ioumal
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-T hesis timing for 2 article could hav e  b een  be tte r incoroorated -T hesis format
subm ission
-M ore helpful if earlier 
on
3
4
in trainino. T he write uo  for oublication 
co m es after, training finishes. 1 think n o w
-Lack of tim e 
-T rainee experience 
-Lack of support 
-Publishing e th o s
-Lack of motivation
-S upport not available 
d ue  to timing
5
6  
7
th a t th e s e s  a re  subm itted earlier, writing up 
p ap e rs  can  b e  d o n e  while, still a  tra inee  so  
IhejDSliyaiiflQ and  euBO.ort_wili.be oreater.
21 -No specific teach ing / 1 ttO lQ C U S  a t all on  oublicafion - all vmry - Lack of training 
-T rainee experience 
-Publishing e th o s
focus for publication- 
no t e m b ed d ed  Into 2 fo cu sed  o n  m arkers narticular ooints of
co u rse  v a lu es?  
-N egative experience 3 view. whicb_was not a lw avs accu ra te
of m arker feed b ack ?
22 Not relevan t? 1 X '
23 -Not m uch teaching 
again
-Not m uch em phasis 
on  publication by 
cou rse /no t Im portant? 
-N ot Incorporated
1
2
3
N a ie a l f o c u s  durino trainino on oublication. 
Shfiuldi)ê_D.att of the o ro cess  of relevant 
acad e m ic  work eo. lit re v ie w  e tc
- Publishing e th o s 
-Little teaching
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Appendix 6: Evidence of SRRP Feedback to Commissioning Service
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Appendix 7: Feedback Presentation to Commissioning Service
27/09/2014
An Investigation in to the Factors 
which Affect Publication of Trainee 
Clinical Psychologists’ University 
Assignments at the 
 University of Surrey______
SRRP Service Evaluation Feedback 
By Sara Murray 
S*'* of August 2014
Outline
o Background
o study Alms and Objectives 
o Design and Procedure 
o Findings and Conclusions 
o Recommendations 
o Questions
Background
o The 'sclentlst-practloner' model Is a t  the heart 
of Clinical Psychology.
•  Evidence-based practice
•  Practice-based evidence
o A substantial proportion of CPs' training Is 
dedicated to  ensuring trainees have the 
opportunity and skills to conduct ethical 
research to a high standard (BPS, 2012).
o The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher 
Education's (QAA) Doctoral Characteristics 
stipulates th a t doctoral level research m ust be 
of a publishable peer-review  standard  (QAA,
2 0 1 1 )
o BPS Code of Human Research Ethics (BPS, 
2010) s ta tes  tha t research findings should be 
dissem inated w here hum anly possible.
Current CP Publication R ates
o  Norcross, Karplak & Santoro (2005) surveyed 
1500 randomly selected APA m em bers across 
the USA regarding their training and current 
practice
» 694 respondents (46% response rate)
« The modal number of publications to be zero, 
however 84% of respondents had published at 
least one article 
o  Similar findings In the UK: Eke, Holttum & 
Hayward (2012) surveyed 1300 CPs (29%  
response rate)
• Mode publications n= 0, 60% published at least 1
Trainee CP Publication R ates
o Very few studies (1=  qualitative accounts, 1= 
quantitative survey)
0 Cooper and Turpin (2007) surveyed 28 training 
courses from the UK ( n -  17)
•  24%  of tra inees successfully published their 
research  project betw een  1999-2004
0 m ean num ber of publications across the courses 
was 16.9%  (3.4 publications per year)
•  Main suggested  reasons for this low rate:
c support given on training and personal trainee 
factors. These were not further Investigated 
(similar findings from Eke, e ta / . ,  2012; Wright & 
Holttum, 2012)
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27/09/2014
The Importance of Psychological 
Research
o To reduce distress
o To develop effective and safe treatments
o Role of CP?
• NICE Guidelines
•  Leadership (BPS, 2010)
•  NHS Health Education England's (DOH,
2012) staff training strategy
Study Aims and Objectives
o Service Evaluation of the Doctorate in 
Clinical Psychology course
• Number of tra inees who publish the ir research 
and  academ ic assignm ents
•  To Investigate factors which m ay contribute to 
or hinder trainees the  publication process
o Aim; to a aid the course in being able to 
develop and Improve services to support 
trainees to publish, thus hopefully 
promoting the 'sclentlst-practloner' role 
with future CPs.
Method
o Design & Procedure
•  Email Recruitm ent: Most recent four com pleted 
cohorts (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013)
» Online Survey
Q Fixed choice and open ended 
o Questions constructed with course research 
director and based on previous studies 
o Participants
•  124 contacted, of which 26 undertook  the 
survey  (20%  response rate)
• R esponses from 23 participants were analysed
Method
o Participant Demographics
« Majority of participants w ere fem ale (21; 2 m ale)
•  Employed as a CP (22; 1 m anagerial), within the 
NHS (18 ; 4 charity sector; 1 private sector)
•  Average age of 32 (range: 26-53 years).
•  Ethnicity; White British ethnicity (16), followed 
by White O ther (2); Indian (2 ); White Irish (1); 
British Black Caribbean (1); and one non­
disclosure.
•  R esponse ra tes  per cohort; cohort 1 n - 6  
(qualified 2010); cohort 2 n = 7  (qualified 2011); 
cohort 3 n= 6  (qualified 2012); cohort 4  n=  4 
(qualified 2013).
Data Analysis
o Quantitative data was analysed utilising 
descriptive statistics
o Qualitative data was anaiysed utilising 
Thematic Analysis following Braun and 
Clarke's (2006) approach
•  Process: Following transcription, data  was 
Initially coded by Items o f In terest and frequency, 
and allocated to broader them es. After additional 
fam iliarisation with the  data , them es w ere further 
defined Into m aste r and sub them es by the u se of 
them atic  mapping
Quantitative Results
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Research Experience Prior to Training and Number of Submissions 
for Publication of Work Carried Out Whilst on Trahing, by Cohort
piM m nnb p«n
T>TK or\T»ik labroJtlrd for
DescriptiveTotals of When Articles were Submitted for Publication, 
the Outcome of Sutxnission, and whether trainee was First Author 
on Submitted Article
ACffPlfd Rdccifd R«iubnkted
Dmot
7hW*s ThWw
R«Niriv / /  1
Ofto- 4 1 1
To,a 9 J 4
Flgun 1. R ^orted  advice received from the course team 
when considering publication, during training
DMtMboJ autannfie
■ Ad«i an «mpftae jouitf
Q0»-»4lNr«Mp
■ wv (W* md toc»«rtng
FIgun 2. Support on pubücatlon received from course to 
trainees post-quallflcation
Fÿure 3. Participants* views on their skills and competence 
In pi4)ilshlno. conducting and supervising research (%) Views on Research and Publishing
o  All of the participants s ta ted  they had an 
In terest In conducting and publishing 
research and o ther pieces of work,
o 53% of participants Indicated a preference 
for qualitative research.
o Virtually all of the participants (n=  22) s ta ted  
they thought It Is Im portant for CPs to  publish 
work.
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Qualitative Results
:sï“'
f i p n  4. oup BMcr Oumet aad Wxha
Supervisor Factors
0 ^  o  S u p p o rt
•  Supervisor support for publication w as encouraging 
whilst based on the  program m e
• However, no t so post-quallflcatlon 
o  A vailability
•  Good availability of supervisor m eant they were 
able to consider and publish their work
• But poor availability of supervisor post qualification 
o  E xpertise
•  Supervisor's experience of and success a t 
publication played an Im portant role In 
encouraging and aiding them  to publish
Course Factors
o Teaching
•  Lack of  specific teaching on publication process 
and w here to publish (w hat Informs this decision)
0 Publishing Ethos
•  Absence of a 'publishing e th o s ' on the  course, 
little em phasis on publishing anything o ther than
•  Publishing n o t prioritised by course, I.e. 
completion of assignm ents and clinical 
placem ents seen  a s  m ore Im portant
o C o u rse  S tru c tu re
• MRP subm ission date  and thesis  layout viewed as 
'unhelpful*
Trainee Factors
o Experience of Training
•  negative experience appeared  to affect 
m otivation to  publish, e .g . feeling overwhelmed
o Views of CP's Role
•  R esearch and publication seen  as  Im portant and 
crucial part of training
• However, feel tha t this Is no t always practical or 
possible once In clinical practice (NHS)
o Time Constraints
• No tim e for publication on training, even less so 
once qualified
•  Reluctance to utilise th e ir  personal tim e to 
publish university work once qualified
Conclusions
o Results are reflective of previous research 
(Eke, e ta /., 2012) and highlight the crucial 
influence training courses can have In CPs 
contributing to evidence-based practice.
o Nonetheless, 48%  of trainees in the current 
survey submitted work for publication, with 
60%  of first submissions being accepted for 
publication. In comparison to other UK 
DCIinPsych courses these rates are positive 
(Cooper & Turpin, 2007: CP successful 
publication rate 24% ). This rate may rise 
with recent changes to the course, i.e. 
earlier MRP submission deadline.
y
Recommendations
For specific teaching to be provided regarding 
publication I.e. types of Journals to subm it to; how to 
form at and revise work for publication; how to 
m anage rejections and w hat to do for resubm lsslons. 
For teaching on publication process to occur earlier 
on during training.
For a 'publishing e thos' to be created whereby 
tra inees a re  encouraged to subm it assignm ents 
o ther than  the ir MRP, e.g . essays, case reports, 
reflective pieces of work.
1. This could be done by setting some assignments to be 
written In a style that was akin to a publishable article 
and for them to be marked accordingly. Alternatively, 
setting a 'practice' assignment for this.
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Recommendations
Allocate tim e to staff to support tra inees post- 
quallflcatlon In being able to  publish their course 
work (or provide a workshop post-quallflcatlon). This 
Is specifically re levant to  those tra inees who a re  not 
able to subm it their MRPs and VIVA a t the earlier
It would tre helpful to repea t this type of survey In 
the fu ture, especially now the subm ission da tes  and 
structure  of the  MRP have been changed.
1. If this were to be done In the future, to maximise 
response rates It would be helpful to gain up to date 
email addresses for trainees when they leave (out of 
date addresses may have affected the current low 
response rate). Additionally, to carry the survey out 
within 1 2 - 1 8  months after qualifying.
References
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Any Questions?
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Embracing the Future 
Being accepted in to clinical psychology training filled me 18 with excitement 
but also anxiety about what the next three years would bring. As I enter the final six 
months of training I am however amazed at how quickly the past few years have 
gone. A recent conversation with an assistant psychologist regarding the role of a 
clinical psychologist (CP) made me acutely aware of how much I have learnt over 
these past few years. Furthermore it made me reflect on how my experiences during 
training have helped to shape me not only professionally but also personally. During 
this account I will reflect on two aspects of my development which I believe have 
greatly evolved. Firstly, transitioning from an individual who strived for certainty to 
someone who is now more content in being able to acknowledge the unknown and 
able to embrace uncertainty. Secondly, the development of my professional identity 
not only when working with clients but also in wider systems. To explore these areas 
I will draw on experiences from across the three years of training, and then discuss 
this in light of the future career I am about to embark upon as a qualified CP.
A Leap into the Unknown 
This section will focus on the development of my therapeutic awareness and 
its influence on my practice in relation to uncertainty.
Stepping Out of the Comfort Zone
Throughout my career to date I have always been praised for my organisation 
and planning skills. I recall that from an early age I took great pleasure in organising 
things and working towards completing goals to the best of my ability. Looking back 
I suppose this gave me a sense of structure, with the acts of organising and planning
The use o f  the first person is to aid reflexivity
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providing some form of predictable certainty. Certainty to me meant a comfortable 
feeling of safety and a feeling of control of what was knovm, but partly also a denial 
(due to fear) of the unknovm. Before starting clinical psychology training I felt 
assured that my organisational and planning skills would stand me in good stead, 
specifically with having to juggle academic, research, and clinical aspects of training 
but also in maintaining a social life. To a large extent they did, but on reflection they 
also proved to be a barrier to development at times.
I recall my first year of training as being filled with lots of new challenges, 
expectations and unknowns. This left me feeling in a position of complete 
uncertainty, feeling unskilled and as if my confidence had been knocked. In a bid to 
maintain a sense of control and security I delved further in to a reliance on my 
organisational and planning skills, finding as many resources as I could to help fill in 
the gaps of some of the unknovms. This brings to mind one of my first cases in an 
adult mental health community setting with a client who had an eating disorder 
diagnosis, I had relatively little experience of working with individuals who have 
eating disorders and thus I spent a significant amount of time meticulously planning 
sessions. I drew heavily on manualised approaches (Cognitive Behavioural Therapy: 
CBT) and in sessions focussed a lot on what I was doing, trying to stick to the 
manualised session plan as best as I could. At the time I thought this would be most 
helpful for the client and but also develop my competencies. However, I often left 
sessions feeling as though I was missing the point and that we were not moving 
forward. On discussion of this with my supervisor I came to notice that by focusing 
on my ovm competencies in session I was unintentionally being emotionally 
unavailable to the client and therefore not understanding the client’s needs, resulting 
in an emotional misattunement. Emotional attunement is thought to be key in
205
developing the therapeutic relationship and fostering change (Erksine, 1998), but can 
often be difficult to achieve as a new therapist due to personal anxieties regarding 
their competence (Zeddies, 1999). Reflecting on my own anxieties and how they 
may be impacting upon the therapeutic relationship, but having this normalised 
during supervision, was extremely helpful in reducing the pressure I placed upon 
myself to provide the ‘perfect’ predictable (and therefore known) session. Through 
this I began to be more relaxed in sessions which in turn allowed me to pay more 
attention to the process of therapy and thus to respond to the clients needs more 
flexibly and appropriately. I became aware of the parallel processes that were playing 
out not only for me but also my clients. Emotional attuenment is necessary not only 
to enhance the therapeutic relationship but from an attachment perspective is also a 
key tool that we seek to promote within our clients. Many of our clients are 
misattuned to their own needs or those of others in their lives, which often is at the 
heart of their distress. Just as I was seeking a secure base in certainty so may many of 
our clients. This furthered my understanding of the natural tendency to err for 
certainty and comfort, but also enhanced my empathy toward the individuals I work 
with.
It’s Okay Not to Know
From a position of hindsight I also think that a large proportion of my anxiety 
regarding my competencies, and strong reliance on organisational strategies to 
manage the anxiety, was due to an element of being evaluated. Inherent in the nature 
of any training course is the element of assessment. However, with clinical 
psychology training it can at times feel that the element of assessment is amplified as 
this occurs across all levels: academic, research and clinical practice; by several 
different people: tutors, clinical supervisors, professional colleagues, cohort peers,
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and clients. During the first year of training I perceived this as having to ‘get things 
right’ and to not make any mistakes. This became apparent to me on placement 
where at times I perceived my supervisor to be ‘all knowing’ and as such set the 
expectation that I too should have in-depth specialist knowledge and be able to 
demonstrate this. On reflection of this with my cohort peers I was relieved and 
validated to hear that this was an experience shared by many. However, it 
emphasised the existence of power imbalances within the trainee-supervisor 
relationship and the client-therapist relationship. Furthermore these power 
imbalances appear to be embedded within the dominating medical model discourse 
prescribed by the NHS, that patients (I use this description as the inference is that the 
client has little knowledge about or control over their difficulties or care- Johnstone 
& Dallos, 2006) attend appointments to see an expert clinician.
In my second year of training I undertook a placement within an older adults 
community mental health team. During this placement power imbalances became 
apparent as I noticed that some clients attended appointments with the assumption 
that I was the expert and that I would be able to ‘fix them’. On reflection this is 
understandable given the generational cohort effects of exposure to the patient-expert 
discourse which has been embedded in the NHS since its conception. I recall being 
almost seduced by this supposition that I may be the expert considering my relative 
inexperience and the significant age difference between myself and my clients. I 
suppose this may have fitted with my expectation of my supervisor as being ‘all 
knowing’ and that I too should have the answers to the client’s questions and be able 
to solve their problems. This is someone that from a systemic perspective can be 
described as a first order therapist who leads from a position of authoritative 
knowing and safe certainty (Masson, 1993). Here by adopting a position of certainty
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the therapist excludes other possibilities or meanings and there may be a presumption 
(by both the therapist and the client) that the solution to the problem is absolute. The 
position of safe certainty was enticing early on in training as it provided an element 
of predictability i.e. that ‘if I do X, the result will be Y% with the hope that this 
would in turn improve client outcomes and therefore lead to a positive evaluation of 
my abilities. However being faced with clients who expected me to be an expert 
paradoxically had the opposite effect on me. Acknowledging that I may have specific 
therapeutic expertise gained through training, I did not have the lived experience of 
the client’s difficulties and therefore could not be an expert. This placement 
encouraged me to begin to embrace a position of safe uncertainty by working along 
side the client with respectful curiosity about their lives and difficulties. This is not to 
say that I had previously adopted a closed minded authorative position with clients 
but that I was less comfortable in being able to explore the unknown. I realised that it 
is impossible to work with a client and not be affected or changed in some way by 
them. Therapy is a mutually influencing process and that as therapists we are not 
only agents of change but subjects of change too (Zeddies, 1999). Drawing on 
Acceptance Commitment Therapy (ACT) and Compassion Focused Therapy (CFT) 
approaches when working towards helping clients with adjusting to changes in later 
life, also aided me in being able to accept that I do not know everything about every 
condition/therapeutic approach and that is okay. In fact not knowing opens doors for 
curiosity, collaborative exploration and discovery with clients to form a mutual 
understanding of their difficulties and ways forward.
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A Little Bit of Self Assurance
In order to be open to uncertainty one has to have a degree of confidence in 
one’s ability to be able to manage what may lie ahead. During my second year and 
beginning of my third year of training I undertook a child and adolescence (CAMHS) 
placement followed by a learning difficulties (LD) placement. Prior to starting these 
placements I did not have any experience either personally or professionally with 
these client groups, and therefore felt quite unconfident at the beginning with being 
able to engage and maintain a therapeutic relationship with my clients. I also was 
posed with having to learn two new therapeutic approaches, narrative therapy and 
Cognitive Analytical Therapy (CAT), which heightened my anxiety. The fear of the 
uncertainty was creeping in again. However, by acknowledging what I had already 
learnt from previous placements and transferring these skills to new settings helped 
me to feel more confident with being able to utilise the new therapeutic techniques 
with a different client group. A review of the literature on the personal attributes of a 
therapist which positively affect therapeutic alliance (Ackerman & Hilsenroth, 2003) 
found that therapists who appear and feel more confident tend to have better 
therapeutic outcomes. In order to aid self-awareness and encourage collaboration I 
asked for regular feedback from my clients on how they found the sessions, and also 
from my supervisor who observed sessions. This provided me with greater 
understanding of the reciprocal roles which my client may be engaging in in their life 
but also how these roles may be re-enacted in the therapeutic relationship through 
transference and countertransference. Inviting feedback left me feeling quite 
vulnerable at first but I found this an invaluable process as it allowed me to tailor my 
approach to the client’s needs. Knowing this and having better self-awareness
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provided the little bit of self assurance necessary to continue to welcome to 
uncertainty.
Development of my Professional Identity
One of the reasons I wanted to become a CP was due to the variety of roles 
you are able to engage in alongside delivery of therapy. In this section I will reflect 
on two areas which have helped to shape the development of my professional 
identity as a CP: neuropsychological assessment; and provision of consultation to 
teams.
Neuropsychological Assessment
I have always been fascinated by how organic brain functions can affect 
cognition, behaviour and personality and thus took a special interest in 
neuropsychology during training. During my CAMHS placement I was referred a 
client with a very complex presentation of memory difficulties (to preserve 
anonymity I will not discuss the case in detail). The referral was to assess for any 
potential underlying organic deficit before a diagnosis of psychosis could be given. 
After conducting an array of tests and liaising closely with a neuropsychologist the 
assessment suggested that the client was strangely presenting with symptoms akin to 
dementia. As such we suggested a referral to a neurologist presuming others would 
think this was the logical next step. However the referral was opposed by the team as 
they did not believe it was necessary due to the client’s age. In a bid to work 
collaboratively I carried out a neuropsychologically informed case formulation with 
the team, spending time explaining the types of tests administered, their norms, what 
the results may mean and how the findings might explain the clients behaviour. The 
team expressed they valued this approach and found it highly informative. After this
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the referrals were made, unfortunately for the client the neurologist discovered 
deficits in cerebral functioning similar to semantic dementia. Working closely with 
the team we were able to secure funding for the client to be seen at a specialist centre 
to receive appropriate diagnosis and treatment. Reflecting on this experience made 
me aware that at times we can make the presumption that professionals/individuals 
from different backgrounds have the same knowledge and experiences as us and 
therefore expect them to perceive a situation in the same light. I learnt that being 
aware of and respecting issues of diversity and similarity (e.g. Burnham, 1993:
Social Graces) not just with clients, but also within the multidisciplinary team 
(MDT) can help to foster good working relationships and in turn aid promotion of 
psychological mindedness in services. The experience also emphasised the unique 
and valuable role of CPs in conducting specialist cognitive assessments, and how this 
has become an integral and enjoyable part of my professional identity which I hope 
to cultivate in the future.
Team Consultation
As I gained experience across different services I became more aware of the 
systems that surround clients, and in particular care teams. This was particularly 
evident when working in older adults and LD services where in some circumstances 
the client’s care team were the only people in their lives. My LD placement provided 
the opportunity to develop my consultation skills when working with care teams. I 
recall undertaking a piece of work which involved carrying out individual sessions 
with a client, and co-facilitate with my supervisor a consultation to her care home for 
managing her ‘challenging behaviour’. Through working with the client and talking 
to her care team it became evident that the staff team played a role in perpetuating
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the client’s behaviour. My supervisor and I spent a lot of time tentatively formulating 
the client’s behaviour and were keen to explore this with the care team. We 
attempted to adopt a non-judgemental approach when meeting with the team, but 
were struck by the team’s reluctance to take any ownership of their role in the 
client’s behaviour. On reflection of our approach I do not think we clearly explained 
the purpose of a consultation nor did we establish a consultation contract. 
Furthermore, the role of me providing individual therapy to the client but then also 
facilitating consultation made the boundaries between what was expected from our 
service and the care home team unclear. There was also a sense that as ‘outsiders’ we 
therefore did not have experience of managing the client’s behaviour on a frequent 
basis thus could not understand the behaviour. This is a common experience for 
individuals providing consultation to residential settings (Emmerson et al., 2000) but 
this made me wonder how I would do things differently in the future. Providing a 
clear rational for consultation and establishing a contract with the care home would 
be helpful. Moreover highlighting the care home team’s expertise and knowledge 
about the client, and collaboratively co-constructing a formulation with staff rather 
than going in with predetermined hypothesises would better promote staff ownership 
and hopefully provide better client outcomes. By acknowledging the ‘outsider’ status 
you are able to offer an observer perspective of the system as a whole, which I 
believe CPs are well trained to offer.
The Future
Before writing this reflective account it felt as though my journey toward 
becoming a CP was drawing toward the end. However reflecting back across the 
three years of training has made me aware of how much I have learnt but also how
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much I still have to learn. The transition from trainee to qualified CP will be filled 
with new challenges and I am sure a good dose of uncertainty too, specifically in the 
first few years post qualification. I am just coming to terms and feeling comfortable 
with being a trainee CP but this is soon to change where in many respects the 
expectations and responsibilities will be far greater. The feelings of ‘not knowing’ 
and doubt are bound to reappear but this time I feel as though I have come to accept 
this as being okay and in actual fact ‘not knowing’ provides a platform for further 
learning opportunities. I also now feel more able to vocalise to others that I ‘don’t 
know’, and no longer view this as a failure on my behalf. Peer supervision and 
reflective practice groups during training were invaluable to me in not only providing 
support and managing anxiety but also in encouraging reflexivity. I aim to maintain 
and draw on peer supervision once qualified but also to engage in personal therapy in 
hope to provide greater self-awareness.
In light of the examples discussed earlier on in the first two sections (‘A Leap 
in to the Unknown’ and ‘Development of My Professional Identity’) of this account,
I would incorporate what I learnt from these experiences into my future practice. 
When working with clients individually or when providing consultation I would aim 
to do things differently by ensuring that the context/purpose of the piece of work was 
established collaboratively and clearly at the beginning of the work. This would help 
to promote ownership and engagement but also reduce ambiguity. Furthermore I 
would aim to remain curious by attempting to find a balance between planning and 
organising but also trying to remain open to and flexible with change. This would 
allow for attention to be paid to the process by reflecting in-action but also on-action 
after the event (Schon, 1983). From this I would be able to continue to utilise an 
experiential learning approach (Kolb, 1984) which would help to further develop my
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skills and also my professional identity. Such an approach promotes learning through 
practical experience followed by reflection on the experience, conceptualisation and 
planning to then allow you to test your theory through further practice. This will 
allow me to be able to draw on the scientist-practitioner model that is the comer 
stone of our profession by maintaining theory practice links and hopefully 
contributing to evidence-based practice in the future.
As I embark on my career as a CP I hope to work within the NHS as I 
strongly believe in its principle of free health care to all at the point of access. 
However, due to recent government reforms and a current climate of economic 
austerity I am aware change will continue to occur and this will bring great 
uncertainty for its staff and clients. The experiences I have gained outside of therapy 
(neuropsychological assessment and consultation to name a few) have really shaped 
my professional identity. As such I am keen to employ the skills I have learnt at a 
wider organisational level by improving services, providing consultation, specialist 
assessment and formulation, and adopting a leadership role. I am conscious however 
of the parallel pitfalls of adopting a ‘rescuer’ role when working with clients and 
falling into the trap of the ‘Hero Innovator’ (Georgiades & Phillimore, 1975) when 
working at an organisational level. In the future I will have to be mindful of that we 
aren’t ‘hero innovators’ but be more aware of my own capabilities and adopt a self 
compassionate approach, knowing I can’t do it all. A more a realist position would 
be that safe certainty is impossible, and therefore doing what you can is okay.
Conclusion
As uncertain as the future may be I look forward to embracing it and staring 
my new career as a qualified CP. I have learnt so much from the individuals I have
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worked with (clients, colleagues, tutors and supervisors) and owe them great thanks 
for the person I have become. They have taught me that in order to be a facilitator of 
change you have to be open to be changed. As Masson (1993, pp. 198) points out 
“Safe uncertainty is not a technique but an always evolving state of being”. Hence I 
hope to continue to evolve as I transition from trainee to a qualified CP and never 
stop learning.
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Specialist Placement- High Secure Forensic Mental Health Hospital
My specialist placement was within a high secure adult male forensic mental 
health inpatient hospital. Clients presented with severe mental illness, a range of 
personality disorders, substance misuse, and a history of criminal and violent 
behaviour. This placement provided me with experience of autonomously conducting 
in depth admissions assessments utilising a range of standardised measures (STAXI, 
CFSE-II, STAI, BDI), and personality measures (Millon Clinical Multiaxial 
Inventory-Ill; Personality Assessment Inventory) to establish care plans and 
contribute to CPAs. I also assessed both static and dynamic risk utilising Structured 
Clinical Judgment and Actuarial measures such as the HCR-20 and the Risk Matrix- 
2000. I helped to develop and co-facilitate a Dialectical Behavioural Therapy (DBT) 
group on a high dependency unit for individuals with personality disorder and 
varying degrees of cognitive ability, in addition to providing Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT) anger management and cognitive remediation therapy for individual 
clients. Working with individuals from various forensic, socioeconomic, and cultural 
backgrounds in this placement has helped me to be more knowledgeable about and 
respectful of diversity, but also to adopt a non-judgmental approach to my practice. It 
has also allowed me to work in a multi-disciplinary, anti-discriminatory and highly 
confidential environment. Furthermore, it has equipped me with the confidence to 
work in hostile and confrontational settings.
Adult Community Team for People with Intellectual Disabilities and Older 
Adults Mental Health Team
My experience working in community teams for older adults and individuals 
with intellectual disabilities, enabled me to develop skills in adapting therapeutic 
techniques to a variety of age and ability ranges. Additionally, it allowed me to build
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on experience in being able to conduct functional analysis, dementia assessments and 
interventions with carers and staff groups. For example, providing consultation to 
both NHS and private sector residential care homes on formulating and managing 
behaviour that is perceived as challenging (specifically in the context of dementia, 
autistic spectrum disorder, and moderate-severe intellectual disabilities); and also 
providing teaching to staff and carers on what dementia is, its subtypes and how 
these can present and impact differently on suffers and their carers, and ways to 
promote good quality of life and care through a person centred approach. My older 
adult placement allowed me to develop my skills in both Compassion Focused and 
Reminiscence therapies by providing psychotherapy but also setting up and 
facilitating a reminiscence group across two dementia wards. Utilising a range of 
materials/methods to stimulate memories and teaching staff reminiscence techniques 
was received very positively by both clients and staff. Being supervised by a 
specialist Cognitive Analytical Therapist (CAT) during my intellectual disabilities 
placement allowed me to explore systemic influences such as relational interaction 
patterns within given contexts, and how the reciprocal roles adopted within these 
interactions can contribute to and maintain distressing difficulties. Through exploring 
these patterns of relating I have been able to collaboratively formulate and 
implement successful CAT interventions when both working individually with 
clients but also with staff teams. These placements have equipped me with good 
skills in administering and interpreting various psychometric assessments. 
Constructing psychometric reports and feeding back these reports to clients, carers 
and different professionals equipped me with skills in being able to communicate 
highly technical and clinically sensitive information at a demographically appropriate 
level.
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Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS)
I conducted psychological assessments through a range of approaches such as 
clinical interviews, standardised measures, school observations, behavioural 
observations in the home, and discussions with carers and professionals.
Furthermore, I delivered individual interventions and developed collaborative 
formulations with clients, utilising Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), 
developmental, attachment, systemic and narrative approaches. During this 
placement I provided teaching to multi-disciplinary teams (MDT) on basic CBT 
techniques, and supervised a CAMHS nurse for a CBT Emetophobia case. I was able 
to supervised an assistant psychologist on conducting school and behaviour 
observations and report writing. Working within the paediatric service with clients 
under the age of 3 years old, who had delayed developmental difficulties, and their 
parents allowed me to develop skills in Solution Focused Therapy, Attending the 
Neurodevelopmental Clinic and assisting MDT members in undertaking assessments 
helped to develop assessment skills for ASD and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder. I also co-facilitated a parenting group for understanding ASD.
Adult Community Mental Health Recovery Service (CMHRS)
Experience in this CMHRS allowed me to work within multi-agency and 
systemic approaches, but also in being able to identify and manage risk both within 
my own caseload but also as a team. I developed skills in Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT) through working individual with clients who had 
severe and enduring mental health difficulties. Furthermore, I co-facilitated an ACT 
group and had the opportunity to work as part of a reflective practice team within the 
Adult Family Therapy Service. I was able to deliver training to carer support groups, 
MDT members on Mindfulness based practice and anxiety management.
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Assessments
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Year I Assessments
P r o g r a m m e
C o m p o n e n t
TITLE OF ASSIGNMENT
Fundamentals of Theory 
and Practice in Clinical 
Psychology (FTPCP)
Short report of WAIS-III data and practice 
administration
FTPCP -  practice case 
report
Cognitive Behavioural Assessment and Formulation for 
a lady presenting with Anxiety and Panic
Problem Based Learning 
-  Reflective Account
Trainee Clinical Psychologists Relationship to Change 
Through Action Base Reflective Learning
Research -  Literature 
Review
Repeated Checking Causes Memory Distrust: A Review 
of Compulsive Checking and Memory Confidence
Adult -  case report An Integrative Approach with an Adult Man Presenting 
with Depression and Anxiety
Adult -  case report A Neuropsychological Assessment of a Male in his 
early-forties with Memory Difficulties
Research -  Qualitative 
Research Project
The Experience of Being a First Year Trainee Clinical 
Psychologist
Research -  Major 
Research Project 
Proposal
Do Memory Distrust and Inflated Responsibility cause 
OCD-like Checking Behaviour?
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Year II Assessments
P r o g r a m m e
C o m p o n e n t
TITLE OF ASSESSMENT
Research Research Methods and Statistics test
Professional Issues 
Essay
‘Leadership and Engagement for Improvement in the 
NHS: Together we can’. What role can the clinical 
psychology profession make in effecting change and how 
might this contribution be received by other managerial 
professional groups?
Problem Based 
Learning -  Reflective 
Account
Toward a Deeper Understanding
Older People -  Case 
Report
Consultation to a Residential Care Home Team for a 
Lady in her Mid-Seventies, with a Diagnosis of 
Dementia, Presenting with Behaviour that Challenges her 
Professional Carers
Personal and 
Professional Learning 
Discussion Groups -  
Process Account
PPLDG- A Risky Business?
Child and Family- Oral 
Presentation of Clinical 
Activity
Working within a CBT- Systemic Framework with an 8 
Year Old Girl with a Diagnosis of Trichotillomania: 
Exploring Roles and Embracing Uncertainty
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Year III Assessments
P r o g r a m m e
C o m p o n e n t
ASSESSMENT TITLE
Research - SRRP An Investigation in to the Factors which Affect 
Publication of Trainee Clinical Psychologists’ Research 
and Academic Assignments at the University of Surrey
Research -  MRP 
Portfolio
Instruction Based Manipulation of Memory Confidence 
and Perceived Responsibility in a Non-clinieal Sample 
and its Effects on Checking Behaviour and Memory Task 
Performance
Personal and 
Professional Learning -  
Final Reflective 
Account
On Becoming a Clinical Psychologist: A Retrospective, 
Developmental, Reflective Account of the Experience of 
Training
People with Learning 
Disabilities- Case 
Report
A Cognitive Analytical Therapy (CAT) Intervention with 
a Lady who has a Significant Intellectual Disability, 
Downs Syndrome and a Diagnosis of Emotional Unstable 
Personality Disorder, who Struggles to Manage Her 
Emotions and Maintain Relationships
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